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Diaz, R. v

Smart Summary

Summary of Judgment

Factual and Procedural Background

This is an application for leave to appeal against a determinate custodial sentence imposed by Judge Devlin in the Crown Court on 16 May 2024. The Appellant pleaded guilty to two counts of facilitating a breach of immigration law by a non-national contrary to section 25(1) of the Immigration Act 1971. The sentencing judge identified a starting point of four and a half years' custody and, after allowing a one‑third reduction for a guilty plea, imposed a determinate custodial sentence of three years (to be served as 18 months custody and 18 months on licence).

The offending conduct occurred on 29 September 2022 and 22 November 2022 and involved facilitating unlawful travel from The City, via The Airport in Northern Ireland, and onwards to another airport. The Appellant was sentenced alongside two other individuals (hereafter referred to as Co‑defendant 1 and Co‑defendant 2), who pleaded guilty on the same date and received identical determinate custodial sentences.

Applications for leave to appeal by all three were refused by Judge Rooney on 19 February 2025; only the present Appellant renewed the application for leave to appeal to this Court. The Appellant is recorded as having been born in Bolivia in 1981, later acquiring Spanish citizenship, moving to the United Kingdom around 2013 and working mainly in the construction industry. The sentencing judge found the Appellant had been under financial pressure following a serious ankle injury in May 2022 which affected his ability to work.

Arrests and investigations began when immigration enforcement officers at The Airport detected Co‑defendant 2 in the presence of multiple Bolivian nationals without permission to enter or remain in the United Kingdom. Further investigation (including examination of mobile phones, CCTV and booking/payment data) uncovered bookings and communications linking the three individuals to a concerted enterprise of facilitating unlawful entry for several Bolivian nationals. Some flights were paid for using payment methods associated with Co‑defendant 1 and some by the Appellant. The Appellant admitted booking flights, acting as an escort on at least one occasion, and providing advice and assistance to migrants in communications recovered by investigators.

The Appellant and Co‑defendant 1 were arrested in The City and conveyed to Northern Ireland for interview. The Appellant made admissions in interview and a pre‑sentence report was prepared; the Appellant cooperated with the probation officer. Because the custody element of the sentence exceeded 12 months, the Home Office has notified the Appellant that deportation will follow completion of the custodial term and any subsequent immigration detention pending removal.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the sentencing judge overstated the aggravating features of the Appellant's offending.
  2. Whether the trial judge erred in his assessment of the Appellant's culpability and the harm caused.
  3. Whether the trial judge adopted a wrong starting point for sentence.
  4. Whether there was unjustifiable disparity between the Appellant's sentence and those of his co‑defendants.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The judge overstated the aggravating features and described the conduct as that of a "gang," when it was closer to co‑operation between three known individuals without wider criminal associations.
  • The offending was relatively unsophisticated and readily detected; there was no physical or emotional mistreatment of migrants and only modest sums were paid, producing low net profit.
  • The Appellant's offending was limited in number (two counts) and was less serious than cases involving, for example, small‑boat crossings; travel was by commercial means without coercion or danger.
  • The judge adopted too high a starting point for sentence and thereby produced a manifestly excessive sentence.
  • The judge erred in assessing culpability and failed to recognise a relevant difference in role between the Appellant and Co‑defendant 2, producing unjustifiable disparity between sentences.

The Prosecution's Position

  • The Prosecution did not dispute the sentencing principles or the authorities cited by the trial judge and the Court in this appeal. (The opinion records that none of the principles or authorities were disputed by either party.)

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
R v Le and Stark [1999] 1 Cr App R 422 Immediate custody for all but the most minor s.25(1) offences; list of aggravating factors (repetition, financial gain, facilitation for strangers, planning/organisation, prominent role, number of entrants, contesting charge). The Court accepted and applied these aggravating factors as guiding sentencing in this case.
AG's Reference (Nos. 37, 38 & 65 of 2010) [2010] EWCA Crim 2880 Identified routine sentencing range of 3–8 years after trial for s.25 offences and affirmed relevance of Le & Stark aggravating factors. The Court treated this range as informative and applicable when assessing the starting point in the present case.
R v Oliveira [2012] EWCA Crim 2279 Approved Le & Stark aggravating factors and added recruitment of others as an aggravating factor; noted significance of statutory increases in maximum sentences. The Court noted Oliveira's observations about the increased maxima and accepted the relevance of those observations to sentencing here.
R v Rotsias [2013] EWCA Crim 2470 Example of a lower‑end s.25 case: starting point of 45 months for a one‑off, unsophisticated offence; affirmed judge's approach where aggravating factors fewer. The Court compared the present case to Rotsias and observed that Rotsias had fewer aggravating features than the present case.
AG's Reference No 28 of 2014 [2014] EWCA Crim 1723 Set out a non‑exhaustive list of factors relevant to sentencing (isolation/repetition, duration, previous convictions, motive, number involved, strangers/family, organisation, recruitment, role, exploitation). The Court adopted these considerations as relevant to assessing aggravation and starting point in this matter.
AG's Reference 49 of 2015 [2015] EWCA Crim 1402 Reinforced that the gravamen of such offences is the deliberate circumvention of immigration rules and that commercial schemes with exploitation attract clear sentencing pathways. The Court treated the principles as supporting a deterrent approach where commercial and exploitative features are present.
R v Roman [2017] 1 Cr App R (S) 43 Commercial facilitation of illegal entry; indicated an appropriate sentence (after trial) of 42 months in a single‑count facilitation case. The Court noted comparability between that starting point and the starting point used in this case, observing Roman involved fewer aggravating features.
R v Ahmed [2024] 1 WLR 1271 Where small‑boat use involves low culpability (pilot seeking own entry), a starting point of three years may be appropriate; statutory maximum increase not invariably to be reflected by higher sentences in every case. The Court referenced Ahmed to emphasise that statutory increases in maxima do not automatically increase custodial terms for lower culpability roles; applied that caveat in assessing the present case.
R v Estabrook [2023] EWCA Crim 405 Emphasised the need for individual assessment of culpability and personal mitigation where multiple defendants are involved. The Court considered Estabrook and concluded that it reinforces the necessity of individual assessment but did not find an error in the trial judge's individual assessments in this case.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court (sitting with Judge Keegan, Judge Kinney and Judge McLaughlin, the opinion delivered by Judge McLaughlin) approached the appeal by first accepting that the sentencing principles established in the cited English authorities are applicable in Northern Ireland. The Court explained that immigration is an Excepted Matter and the s.25 offence applies throughout the United Kingdom; accordingly, similar sentencing approaches are appropriate across jurisdictions.

The Court set out a number of general principles derived from the authorities and the statutory history: (a) that immediate custody remains appropriate for all but the most minor s.25 offences; (b) that the aggravating features identified in R v Le & Stark and subsequent authorities should guide sentencing judges; (c) that the statutory increases in maximum sentences provide scope to deal with more serious forms of the offence but do not mandate proportional increases in every case; and (d) that certain features—such as physical or emotional mistreatment or exploitation amounting to servitude—would justify significantly higher sentences.

Applying those principles to the facts, the Court reviewed in detail the sentencing judge's analysis. The judge had identified multiple aggravating features: (i) an organised and concerted course of conduct involving the three defendants (described by the judge as an "organised gang"); (ii) commercial motivation; (iii) multiple offences over a period of time rather than a single, isolated incident; (iv) facilitation for strangers rather than family; and (v) abuse of the Common Travel Area (the open border between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland) — the Court agreed this latter point was properly regarded as an aggravating feature in Northern Ireland.

The Court considered the Appellant's submissions that the judge overstated aggravation, that the offending was unsophisticated, produced low profits, involved no mistreatment and was of limited number. While acknowledging these points might militate for some reduction, the Court concluded that the Appellant's role nonetheless involved organised, repeated conduct to facilitate entry for multiple strangers and for financial gain. The Court therefore found the sentencing judge's starting point of four and a half years was within the permissible range and not manifestly excessive.

The Court also addressed mitigation and risk. It noted the judge had recognised the Appellant's lack of previous convictions and the absence of physical mistreatment as factors diminishing aggravation rather than as primary personal mitigation. The pre‑sentence report (in which the Appellant had cooperated) assessed a low risk of committing another serious offence; the judge had nonetheless assessed a moderate risk of reoffending but was not obliged to accept the probation officer's precise formulation. The Court regarded this divergence as immaterial to the overall sentence.

On the point of disparity, the Court accepted that individual assessments of culpability are required but concluded the trial judge had properly considered and recorded the individual roles. The judge's conclusion that the factual basis of the pleas reflected broadly comparable involvement was supported by the material before him, including continuing offending by the Appellant after the apprehension of Co‑defendant 2. Given that the Appellant had not advanced before the trial judge a contention that his role was substantially lesser, the Court regarded it as difficult to succeed on that revised ground on appeal.

Holding and Implications

HOLDING: The Court refused leave to appeal and dismissed the application. The sentence imposed by the trial judge (a determinate custodial sentence of three years after a one‑third reduction from a four and a half year starting point, served as 18 months custody and 18 months on licence) stands.

Implications:

  • The direct effect is that the Appellant's sentence is upheld and the Home Office's notification that the Appellant will be deported upon completion of the custodial term (and likely immigration detention pending deportation) remains operative.
  • The Court confirmed that the established sentencing principles from authorities in England & Wales for s.25(1) Immigration Act 1971 offences are applicable in Northern Ireland and should guide sentencing judges there.
  • The Court endorsed the view that abuse of the Common Travel Area is a properly regarded aggravating feature in Northern Ireland cases involving cross‑border facilitation.
  • The Court emphasised that increases in statutory maxima provide scope to address more serious organised or exploitative offending but do not automatically require proportional increases in all cases; sentencing remains intensely fact‑sensitive and judges must assess aggravation and mitigation on an individual basis.
  • No new legal principle or binding precedent altering the established sentencing approach was created; the decision applies established principles to the facts of this case and confirms their appropriateness in Northern Ireland.

Note on anonymization: Personal names and some identifying details in the original opinion have been replaced with consistent placeholders to preserve anonymity in this summary. All substantive content and quotations summarize or reproduce the reasoning and findings contained in the provided judgment.

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Diaz, R. v

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Diaz, R. v
(Sep 12, 2025)