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F against F and A (Court of Session)
Summary of Opinion — Outer House, Court of Session (Anonymised)
Factual and Procedural Background
This opinion, delivered by Judge Stuart, follows proof in the second of two related actions between the principal parties. The first action addressed child-related orders and is reported at the citation relied on in this opinion. In the present action the parties (referred to throughout as Pursuer and Defender) seek divorce and financial provision on divorce. The parties were married on 20 September 2014 and separated on 5 February 2019, that separation date being the relevant date for the purposes of section 10(3) of the Family Law (Scotland) Act 1985.
A third party (referred to in the opinion as the Minuter) was brought into the action by way of minute of amendment by the Pursuer seeking, among other orders, setting aside of (i) a loan said to have been made by the Minuter to the Defender and (ii) a standard security granted by the Defender in favour of the Minuter. The Minuter entered process and participated in the proof.
At the conclusion of proof the court dealt with multiple discrete issues: valuation and treatment of the Defender's interest in a property referred to as "13b"; whether sale or transfer of the Defender's interest in 13b was appropriate; whether certain items should be excluded from matrimonial property (including a pension CETV, director's loan account balances and an inherited investment broken into segments); whether either party had suffered or benefited from economic advantage/disadvantage requiring adjustment under section 9(1)(b) of the Act; whether the Defender should receive a periodical allowance; and whether the Minuter's security should be set aside under section 18 of the Act. The court also addressed expenses between the parties and between the parties and the Minuter.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether decree of divorce should be granted (parties agreed the marriage had irretrievably broken down).
- How the net value of the matrimonial property should be calculated and divided in accordance with the Family Law (Scotland) Act 1985, including whether specific assets or sums should be excluded as non-matrimonial or treated as special circumstances under section 10(6).
- Whether, as a matter of practical fairness, the court should order sale of 13b or transfer of the Defender's interest in 13b to the Pursuer, and on what compensatory terms.
- Whether the Pursuer's pension CETV attributable to the marriage, certain director's loan account balances, and an inherited investment segment held by the Defender should be excluded from matrimonial property or otherwise adjusted.
- Whether either party has suffered an economic disadvantage or gained an economic advantage such that an adjustment under section 9(1)(b) is warranted.
- Whether the Defender is entitled to a periodical allowance under section 9(1)(d).
- Whether the Minuter's standard security should be set aside under section 18 of the Act.
- How expenses should be allocated between the Pursuer, Defender and Minuter, including the scale and any modification by legal aid rules.
Arguments of the Parties
Pursuer's Arguments
- Sought decree of divorce (admitted breakdown of marriage) and, on financial provision, sought (i) payment of a capital sum, (ii) transfer of the Defender's interest in 13b to the Pursuer, and (iii) setting aside of the Minuter's standard security and reduction of the Minuter's loan to the Defender under section 18.
- Argued that certain sums or assets should be excluded from the matrimonial pool or otherwise treated as special circumstances: in particular, that his pension contributions were made before the relationship and should be excluded (CETV £5,397 agreed as matrimonial element but he argued for exclusion), and that elements of his director's loan account included inherited funds.
- Advanced valuations and factual material to support a transfer of the Defender's interest in 13b to him and asserted he had incurred significant post-separation expenditure on 13b.
- Sought expenses against the Defender on an agent/client scale, alleging unreasonable conduct by the Defender that increased length, complexity and cost of litigation.
- Included the Minuter in the action and sought setting aside of the Minuter's security, asserting (on the material before the court) that the Minuter's loan and security might defeat his financial claims.
Defender's Arguments
- Consented to divorce but opposed aspects of the Pursuer's financial proposals. Sought (i) payment of a capital sum (the Defender advanced her own proposals), (ii) sale of 13b (instead of transfer) and (iii) a periodical allowance under section 9(1)(d) to allow adjustment to loss of support.
- Contended the Defender had suffered economic disadvantage (loss of dividend rights and loss of medical career) and that contributions by the Defender to 13a conferred advantage on the Pursuer which should be reflected.
- Relied on a desktop valuation of 13b placing a higher value on the property (with a valuation for the conservatory), urged sale as appropriate and proposed a particular arithmetical outcome based on strict property rights and net equity calculations.
- Sought an order of no expenses between the parties in accordance with usual matrimonial practice (advanced reasons including the Defender's assisted party status).
Minuter's Arguments
- Entered the action to protect reputation and entitlement to repayment of a loan to the Defender and relied on the protections afforded to third parties by section 18(3) of the Act (good faith acquisition and rights for value).
- Argued the tripartite approach to section 18: (1) threshold test whether the transaction defeats a claim, (2) whether third-party protections apply, and (3) the court's residual discretion.
- Sought her expenses of process on the basis that she was successful in defending the Pursuer's attempts to reduce her loan and set aside her security and that the Pursuer's allegations about her involvement were unsupported and unreasonable.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| [2025] CSOH 13 | Earlier related opinion by the same court dealing with child-related orders in the parties' first action (used as factual and procedural background). | The court referred to its earlier factual findings and procedural history in that earlier opinion when considering the present matters (for context about separation and the parties' interactions). |
| Wilson v Wilson [2008] CSOH 161 | Authority for the proposition that funds inherited may remain non‑matrimonial even if they have passed through joint accounts (Lord Drummond Young's opinion cited). | The court relied on the reasoning cited in Wilson to support the conclusion that certain inherited funds lent to third parties did not thereby convert into matrimonial property merely because of subsequent transactions through joint accounts. |
| Sweeney v Sweeney (No 3) 2007 SC 396 | Guidance on the court's discretion in awards of expenses in matrimonial and financial provision cases (expense awards should serve substantial justice; "expenses follow success" not applied rigidly). | The court applied the principles from Sweeney to exercise discretion over expenses between the parties and between the Pursuer and the Minuter, taking account of fairness, mixed success, and the Minuter's assisted-party status. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court set out and applied the statutory framework in the Family Law (Scotland) Act 1985. The analysis proceeded by identifying matrimonial property as at the relevant date (earlier of cessation of cohabitation and service of process), assessing net values, deducting matrimonial debts, and applying the principles in section 9 together with the adjustments permitted by section 10(6) for special circumstances. The court balanced the parties' respective resources and applied section 8(2)'s reasonableness requirement.
Key factual and valuation findings that drove the legal conclusions were:
- The relevant date was 5 February 2019.
- The property "No 13" had been divided into 13a (upper floors) and 13b (remainder). The Pursuer had inherited 13b; 13a was not matrimonial property.
- The Pursuer disponed a one-half pro indiviso share of 13b to the Defender on 1/2 December 2014, thereby creating a matrimonial element in 13b (the Defender's one-half share).
- Valuations: the court accepted a 5 February 2019 valuation for 13b of £515,000 (composed of £490,000 without the conservatory plus £25,000 for the conservatory). The Defender's matrimonial half of that figure was therefore £257,500. As at 10 October 2024 the appropriate value for 13b was £530,000 (£500,000 without conservatory plus £30,000 conservatory).
- The parties had an interest-only loan secured over 13b with a relevant date and current balance agreed at £215,852.
- Accordingly, the Defender's net relevant-date matrimonial free equity in 13b (one-half share less secured debt apportioned) was assessed at £41,648 (as summarised in the court's appendices).
- The CETV of the Pursuer's pension attributable to the relevant marital period was agreed at £5,397. The court concluded that those pension contributions had been made prior to the relationship and marriage and accordingly excluded that £5,397 from the matrimonial pool as a special circumstance under section 10(6).
- The Pursuer's director's loan account had a relevant date balance agreed at £441,540 but the court assessed the portion attributable to the marriage and concluded the net figure to be included was £83,215. The court accepted that £45,000 of that sum derived from inherited funds and excluded that portion from matrimonial property; for the remainder the court also exercised its discretion to exclude the whole £83,215 or, alternatively, to treat it so as to produce an unequal division because it would be unfair for the Defender to receive the whole of her director's loan account plus a share of the Pursuer's loan account.
- An inherited investment ("La Mondiale" in the source opinion) had been split into segments; some segments had been assigned to the Defender and became matrimonial on assignment and on encashment. One segment held by the Defender at the relevant date remained unencashed and the court treated the net encashment value of that segment (net £26,107) as matrimonial property in the Defender's hands but adjusted for tax so that the net retained sum was included; the Defender was required to pay half of the net retained amount to the Pursuer (£13,053) to return his half-share of that segment.
- The court carefully analysed post-relevant-date expenditures on 13b and accepted the Pursuer had incurred significant post-separation expenses in maintaining 13b (the court reached a post‑relevant‑date total of around £105,484 incurred by the Pursuer, one half of which (£52,742) the court considered should be reimbursed by the Defender if ownership transferred).
- On economic advantage/disadvantage under section 9(1)(b), the court performed the statutory balancing exercise (section 11(2)) and concluded the Defender had not established she had suffered an overall relevant economic disadvantage. The evidence did not support that the Defender gave up practice as a doctor in the interests of the Pursuer or family in a way that produced a compensable economic disadvantage. The court accepted only a modest economic advantage to the Pursuer from certain Defender expenditures on 13a (broad-brush value c. £10,000 at best) but overall the balancing did not justify an award under s9(1)(b).
- On periodical allowance under section 9(1)(d), the court found the Defender was not dependent to a substantial degree on the Pursuer's financial support at separation or subsequently. The Defender had received compensation, salary and the balance of her director's loan account; the court therefore refused a periodical allowance award.
- On the Minuter's standard security and the section 18 test, the court applied the tripartite approach advanced by senior counsel for the Minuter (threshold test under s18(2); third-party protections under s18(3); residual discretion). The court concluded that even if the threshold were relevant, after deducting the Minuter's secured loan there remained ample equity in the Defender's property (the court referred to at least c. £261,850 of equity), and the Minuter's security would not have the effect of defeating the Pursuer's claim; accordingly the Pursuer's motion to set aside the standard security was refused.
- The court emphasised that the division of net matrimonial value is discretionary and fact-sensitive; earlier first-instance decisions were of limited assistance except by reference to factual matrices that matched the present case.
Holding and Implications
Holding:
- The court granted decree of divorce (the parties agreed the marriage had broken down irretrievably).
- The court ordered transfer by the Defender to the Pursuer of the Defender's one-half pro indiviso share in the property referred to as 13b.
- The court ordered payment by the Defender to the Pursuer of a capital sum of £30,000.
- The court refused the Pursuer's motion to set aside the Minuter's standard security under section 18 of the Family Law (Scotland) Act 1985.
- Expenses:
- Between Pursuer and Defender: the court ordered no expenses due to or by either party up to (but not including) the expenses of proof. In respect of expenses of proof the Pursuer was found entitled to one half of his expenses of proof, but because the Defender was an assisted party the court modified the Defender's liability for expenses to nil (including by-order hearings on 15 August and 6 October 2025).
- Between Pursuer and Minuter: the court ordered no expenses due to or by as between the Pursuer and the Minuter in respect of the action overall, but made a specific order that the Pursuer pay the Minuter's expenses occasioned by her attendance at the by order hearing on 15 August 2025.
- The Minuter was, at points in the reasoning, acknowledged to be entitled to her expenses of process in principle (being successful in defending the attempted reduction), but in the exercise of discretion and having regard to all circumstances the court fixed the overall practical outcome described above.
Implications:
- Direct effects: The Defender will transfer her one-half interest in 13b to the Pursuer and will pay the Pursuer £30,000 by way of capital sum. The Minuter's standard security remains effective and is not set aside. The specific expenses directions described above are imposed.
- Broader legal implications: The opinion applies the established statutory framework under the Family Law (Scotland) Act 1985 and does not purport to establish new legal precedent beyond fact-specific applications of section 9 principles, section 10(6) special circumstances adjustments, and section 18's tripartite test. The court emphasised that first-instance decisions are of limited assistance absent equivalent factual matrices and reaffirmed the discretionary, fact-sensitive nature of matrimonial property division under the Act.
Appendices and Arithmetic (As Used by the Court)
The court prepared appendices setting out the itemised assessment of matrimonial property, the deductions (including secured loans), the adjustments made (CETV exclusion, director's loan exclusions and the treatment of the inherited investment segment), and the arithmetical outcomes that led to the conclusion that, on an initial assessment, the net positions produced a gross balancing sum of c. £59,171 payable by the Defender to the Pursuer. Having regard to reasonableness and the parties' resources the court adjusted the capital award to £30,000. The court further ordered the parties to return on a by-order basis to settle practical arrangements and precise arithmetic entries required to give effect to the transfer and payment ordered.
Notes on Anonymisation and Sources
This summary is strictly an anonymised account derived solely from the opinion delivered by Judge Stuart and contained in the provided text. All personal names, counsel and non-party individuals have been replaced with neutral labels (Pursuer, Defender, Minuter, Judge Stuart, Attorney [Last Name]) in accordance with the instruction to anonymise Personally Identifiable Information. Institutional names appearing in the source have been described functionally where necessary (for example "Investment A", "Company A", "Bank A") or left as the property references used by the court (13a / 13b) where those references were central to the legal analysis in the opinion.
If specific numeric entries from the court's appendices are required in a different format, or if a fully anonymised copy of the court's schedule of assets (appendix table) is requested as structured data, that can be produced on request using the figures that appear in the court's opinion.
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