Summary of Judgment — Judge Nicklin

Factual and Procedural Background

This judgment arises from a multi-day series of Case Management Hearings (CMHs) in complex civil litigation between the Claimants and the Defendant (hereafter "Company A"). The Court held a first CMH on 26–27 November 2024, a second two-day CMH on 6–7 May 2025 and a third substantial CMH on 1–2 October 2025. At the third CMH the number of outstanding applications exceeded the time available; some applications were therefore adjourned to a further hearing to be fixed in early November 2025. The trial is fixed to begin on 14 January 2026.

This written judgment addresses (i) the Claimants' application to amend their Particulars of Claim and (ii) an overlapping application by the Defendant (Company A) to strike out various parts of the Claimants' statements of case (collectively, the "Pleadings' Applications"). A separate application by Company A to strike out allegations that it commissioned burglaries to order (the "Ward Allegations") is dealt with in this judgment. The judgment must be read alongside the Court's earlier decision of 11 July 2025 (the "July Judgment"), which the Court treats as setting the relevant parameters and definitions for the litigation.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the Claimants should be permitted to amend their Particulars of Claim at this late stage and, if so, which amendments are permissible.
2. Whether Company A's strike-out applications targeting parts of the Particulars of Claim (including categories of the 'generic case') should succeed.
3. Whether the Ward Allegations (an historical allegation that two journalists committed a burglary in 1992) are relevant and admissible as propensity or similar-fact evidence in relation to the Claimants' individual claims.
4. How established law on similar-fact/propensity evidence (in particular the approach in O'Brien) applies to allegations of unlawful information gathering (UIG) and to propensity evidence about different journalists or third-party investigators (TPIs).

Arguments of the Parties

Claimants' Arguments (as summarised in the judgment)

• The Claimants challenged the parameters set out in the July Judgment and sought reconsideration of limits placed on the use of propensity evidence; they relied on the approach in O'Brien and on decisions from prior large-scale press litigation asserting a practice of admitting 'generic' evidence of employee misconduct.
• The Claimants sought numerous amendments to their Particulars of Claim (issued 22 August 2025), including to the 'generic case' and to individual claims. They relied upon disclosure to support some new, more specific allegations.
• In respect of allegations about destroyed documents (payment records/emails), the Claimants sought to plead that deliberate destruction could lead to adverse inferences and support a concealment case to defeat limitation defences.

Defendant's (Company A's) Arguments (as summarised in the judgment)

• Company A applied to strike out various parts of the Particulars of Claim (application issued 10 September 2025), grouping the challenged material into several categories that include overly broad or non-probative allegations.
• Company A argued the Claimants' amendment application was late, that very few amendments genuinely arose from Company A's disclosure, and that delay and prejudice are relevant to whether late amendments should be permitted.
• Company A contended the Ward Allegations are irrelevant as propensity evidence because the alleged perpetrators are not pleaded to have been involved in any of the Pleaded Articles or to have a connection with the Claimants' specific claims; alternatively, Company A argued those allegations are disproportionate to investigate and inconsistent with relevant pleading rules.
• Company A opposed amendments that would rely on destroyed documents, arguing that broad destruction allegations are speculative, lack the requisite specificity and, where concealment is alleged, do not identify individuals with the requisite state of mind under the Limitation Act 1980.

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court applied established law on similar-fact/propensity evidence and the overriding objective of case management. The reasoning can be summarised in the following logical steps, each drawn from the judgment:

1. Two-stage analysis for similar-fact/propensity evidence (derived from O'Brien):
   • First stage: admissibility requires that the evidence be logically probative of an issue in the case (i.e., relevant and capable of supporting the inference advanced).
   • Second stage: even if admissible, the judge must exercise case management discretion to exclude evidence if its burden, prejudice or disproportionate impact outweighs its probative value (weighing under the overriding objective).
2. Application of the first stage: the Court concluded that proving Journalist A's propensity to use UIG cannot, as a matter of logic, be probative of whether Journalist B had such a propensity. The Court therefore rejected any submission that generalised proof of propensity across different employees or agents (e.g. "a widespread habit" within Company A) is sufficient to support individual claims. Such an argument fails at the threshold of logical probativity.
3. Distinction from other litigation: the Court considered prior large-scale press litigation (including Gulati and later Mirror/News Group cases) but concluded those decisions were fact-specific and did not establish a general principle that propensity across different employees is probative for individual claims. In some prior phone-hacking litigation, particular technical evidence (e.g., telephone records) could prove that a voicemail had been hacked without identifying the individual, a context materially different from the present UIG allegations.
4. Case management and proportionality: even where evidence might be admissible, the Court emphasised the need to constrain investigations to what is necessary for the fair resolution of the individual claims. Attempts to establish the broad scale of alleged wrongdoing at Company A would risk creating an inquiry akin to a public inquiry, which the Court would not permit in ordinary civil litigation on proportionality grounds.
5. Late amendments and delay: the Court weighed the lateness of the Claimants' amendment application (filed 22 August 2025) against the timetable fixed earlier by the Court (which anticipated amendments would be sought at the Second CMH following disclosure). The Court noted that very few of the hundreds of amendments arose from Company A's disclosure, undermining the Claimants' explanation for delay. Delay reduces an applicant's entitlement to amend, particularly near trial, because of prejudice and practical difficulties.
6. Allegations of destroyed documents: the Court held that pleading that Company A had destroyed TPI payment records/emails did not justify the proposed amendments. Such broad allegations are speculative and do not support safe inferences as to what the documents would have shown for each Claimant. Where a concealment case is advanced to defeat a limitation defence, the pleading must identify relevant individuals and the specific intent required by s.32(1)(b) Limitation Act 1980; the Claimants did not plead this requisite specificity.
7. Ward Allegations: the Court concluded the 1992 burglary allegation (the Ward Allegations) is only relevant to the generic case and does not connect to any Claimant or to any Pleaded Journalist. As a result the Ward Allegations are irrelevant under the established principles governing propensity evidence and were struck out. Even if relevance had been arguable, the Court would have excluded the material as disproportionate and prejudicial because the matter has become a substantial and complex side-show that would absorb disproportionate resources.
8. Replies and consequential relief: the Court considered consequential strike-out of passages in the Claimants' Replies emerging from the same defects identified in the Particulars of Claim and struck out certain passages by parity of reasoning.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

The Court upheld its earlier approach to the parameters of the litigation and refused to permit the Claimants to broaden their case by relying upon general propensity evidence that different journalists or employees of Company A acted in the same way.

Key specific outcomes drawn from the judgment:

• The Claimants' late amendment application was subject to close scrutiny; certain amendments were refused (notably amendments seeking to plead broad allegations of deliberate destruction of Company A documents at Paras 16A and 16B), and other proposed amendments were addressed individually (details recorded in the Appendix to the judgment which tabulated each proposed amendment and the Court's decision).
• The Ward Allegations (an historical burglary allegation from 1992 involving two journalists) were struck out as irrelevant to the Claimants' individual claims; the Court would also have excluded the allegations on case management/disproportionality grounds in any event.
• Certain passages in the Claimants' Replies that depended on material struck from the Particulars of Claim were struck out by parity of reasoning.
• The Court confirmed it will permit Claimants to rely on admissible, relevant propensity evidence only where that evidence is specifically probative of the conduct of the particular Pleaded Journalist or TPI involved in the Pleaded Article or incident; generic or company-wide allegations of wrongdoing that do not connect to the specific incidents in issue will be excluded.

Implications:

• The immediate practical effect is a narrowing of the Claimants' pleaded case: the litigation is to be confined to a manageable and proportionate ambit focused on specific incidents and specific individuals where propensity evidence is probative.
• The judgment emphasises case management principles: the Court will prevent the litigation from evolving into an extensive inquiry into whether UIG was widespread at Company A, which the Court identified as the territory of a public inquiry rather than ordinary civil litigation.
• The trial timetable remains in force (trial fixed to commence on 14 January 2026) and the Court signalled urgency in resolving remaining applications to preserve that timetable; some outstanding applications were adjourned to a further hearing in early November 2025.
• The decision applies established precedent (notably O'Brien) to the particular fact pattern of UIG allegations and does not purport to create new legal principle beyond the reasoned application of existing authorities and case management rules.

Additional Procedural Notes

The judgment records that the Court's July Judgment (11 July 2025) set important definitions and principles that this judgment reiterates and applies. The Court also observed that the Claimants had accepted certain drafting changes (e.g., removal of the words "including" or "an example" where these unduly extended alleged wrongdoing) and that the Appendix to the judgment contains a table listing each proposed amendment/strike-out target and the Court's decision on it.

This summary is based exclusively on the text of the provided judgment and contains no information beyond that judgment. Where the judgment itself refers to an Appendix for detailed, itemised decisions on individual paragraphs or amendments, this summary does not reproduce that Appendix and confines itself to the reasoning and outcomes stated in the judgment.