Anonymised Summary of Opinion by Judge Edis

Factual and Procedural Background

This opinion records an application by the Solicitor General for leave to refer a sentence under section 36 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 on the ground that it was unduly lenient. The defendant pleaded guilty to two counts: count 2 (murder) and count 1 (an offence of operating equipment under clothing to observe another under section 67A(1) and (4) of the Sexual Offences Act 2003). The person who was killed (the Victim) is entitled to lifelong anonymity under the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1992; that name is not used here.

The defendant (aged 21 at the time of the opinion) pleaded guilty on 17 December 2024. On 28 February 2025 the defendant was sentenced in the Crown Court by Judge Garnham to life imprisonment for murder with a minimum term of 24 years and 47 days. A concurrent sentence of one month's imprisonment was imposed for the sexual offence (count 1). The Solicitor General sought leave to refer the minimum term on the ground of undue leniency.

Briefly, the facts found by the sentencing judge (not disputed on appeal) were that the defendant committed a serious sexual assault on the Victim while she was alive and conscious and then carried out a brutal homicidal assault, including repeated blows to the head and stamping, causing catastrophic brain injuries. The defendant disposed of the Victim's body in a nearby dyke while she remained alive, so drowning was a partial cause of death. The defendant had prepared by taking a backpack (containing a chef's knife), built a den nearby, and made efforts to dispose of evidence thereafter. The body was located two days after the offence; the defendant accepted responsibility when charged.

There was an extensive history of psychiatric and psychological assessment over more than a year. Early stages of the medical evidence raised the possibility that the defendant might be psychotic or feigning psychosis. By late 2024, none of the medical experts supported a defence of diminished responsibility; instead, the available medical evidence converged on a diagnosis of a personality disorder. The defendant had no previous convictions or cautions.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the sentence passed by the Crown Court was unduly lenient, such that leave should be granted under section 36 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 to refer it to this court for increase.
2. If undue leniency is established, what is the appropriate minimum term to be substituted, having regard to Schedule 21 starting points for murder involving sexual conduct, the aggravating and mitigating factors found by the judge, and the appropriate credit for a late guilty plea.

Arguments of the Parties

Solicitor General (Prosecution) — Attorney Polnay

• Submitted that the sentencing judge erred in finding that identified aggravating and mitigating factors balanced out; the aggravating factors were, in truth, more weighty than the mitigation.
• Submitted that the judge gave excessive credit for the late guilty plea (entered in December 2024). Although the Solicitor General accepted that some credit was appropriate because psychiatric reports were required, he contended that the credit awarded (15%) was excessive given the very late stage of the plea and the defendant's conduct in feigning psychosis. The prosecution suggested credit equivalent to a low range used for pleas at court in non-murder cases (10–15%), reduced by half for murder, as a comparative yardstick.
• Highlighted that the defendant feigned psychosis in a calculated attempt to obtain a lesser outcome; that conduct significantly complicated and prolonged investigations and was a serious aggravating feature.

Defence — Attorney Moses and Attorney Malik

• Accepted that some reduction in credit was appropriate but submitted that the reduction awarded by the judge was greater than the Solicitor General suggested. The defence sought to contextualise the judge's finding that the defendant feigned psychosis, arguing the period of pretence was short and that subsequent delays were not attributable to the defendant.
• Argued that the defendant was entitled to substantial (and, as advanced in written submissions, in effect full) credit for the plea because only in November 2024 did the medical picture finally make clear that a defence of diminished responsibility was unavailable.
• Submitted that some accounts given early (recorded in the Defence Statement) were not advanced as part of a defence at trial and should be considered in context rather than treated as deliberate deception throughout.

Table of Precedents Cited

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court began by noting the statutory mechanism: the application was made under section 36 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 seeking referral for an increase on the basis of undue leniency. The court accepted the sentencing judge's carefully articulated findings of fact (which were not challenged) and commended his objective approach to a horrific crime.

The court then evaluated two central strands of argument advanced by the Solicitor General: (1) that the sentencing judge erred in his balancing of aggravating and mitigating features, and (2) that the discount given for the very late guilty plea was excessive.

On the balance of aggravating and mitigating factors, the court observed:

• Schedule 21 provides that murders involving sexual conduct fall into a category of "particularly high" seriousness with a statutory starting point of 30 years for the minimum term; that starting point already incorporates many serious aggravating features common to such offences and care must be taken not to double count them.
• The sentencing judge identified a number of specific aggravating factors: modest premeditation and rudimentary planning; extreme violence causing inordinate suffering; significant restraint while the Victim was alive; disposal of the body and other attempts to conceal evidence; the lengthy interval before the body was found; the offender's intoxication; and targeting a lone female (which caused public anxiety but should not be double counted against the starting point).
• The judge identified mitigation: the defendant's youth (20 at the time), diagnosed personality disorder, lack of previous convictions, and traumatic childhood events. The judge assessed these as amounting to a modest reduction in culpability.
• However, the court concluded that the aggravating factors, taken together, outweighed the mitigation. Critically, the defendant had feigned psychosis in a calculated and manipulative way designed to obtain an unjust advantage (a diminished responsibility outcome). The court treated that feigning as a serious aggravating feature because it materially complicated and prolonged the investigation and prosecution and was aimed at producing an unjust result.

On the plea discount, the court reviewed the sentencing judge's allowance of 15% credit for a late plea (which the court noted equated to 30% in determinate terms). The court accepted that some credit was legitimately due because psychiatric and psychological reports were necessary, and paragraph F1 of the Sentencing Council guideline provides for exceptions in such cases. Nonetheless, the court found that the sentencing judge erred by granting too large a discount given the defendant's conduct (particularly the feigning of psychosis) which both prolonged the proceedings and was aimed at securing an undeserved advantage.

Rather than attempting to set a precise percentage figure, the court adopted a practical approach: it determined that the maximum credit properly attributable to the plea, in light of its findings, was two years off the proper minimum term. The court therefore set the appropriate minimum term prior to plea credit at 33 years, allowed two years' credit for the late guilty plea, producing a minimum term of 31 years, and directed deduction for the 501 days already spent on remand.

The court explained the immediate consequence: the Parole Board will not be able to consider release until that minimum term has elapsed, and release will depend on the Board's later assessment of risk and progress in custody.

Holding and Implications

Decision: The court granted the Solicitor General's application for leave to refer the sentence under section 36 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988, quashed the sentence imposed by the Crown Court, and substituted a minimum term of 31 years less 501 days, resulting in an effective custodial period of 29 years and 229 days.

Implications:

• Direct effect on the parties: the defendant's minimum term was increased from the term imposed below to the substituted term of 31 years less 501 days (effective term 29 years and 229 days). The defendant remains subject to life imprisonment and the Parole Board can only consider release after the substituted minimum term has elapsed.
• Reasoning of the court clarifies that feigning or deliberately fabricating psychiatric symptoms, where found to be a manipulative and calculated attempt to obtain a lesser outcome, can constitute a significant aggravating feature that may justify an increase in the starting point and a reduction in plea credit. The court emphasised avoidance of double counting but found that the specific conduct here warranted increasing the starting point from 30 years to 33 years before credit for plea.
• The opinion does not purport to establish a novel legal rule beyond applying established sentencing principles (including Schedule 21 starting points and guidance on plea credit and mitigation). No new binding precedent was claimed to be established in this opinion; the decision is an application of sentencing principles to the particular facts found by the sentencing judge.

Note: All names and identifying particulars in this summary have been anonymised to conform with the instructions supplied. This summary is confined to the content of the provided opinion and does not add or infer facts beyond the text quoted and paraphrased from that opinion.