Leahy & Ors v Medical Council of Ireland & Ors (Approved)

Factual and Procedural Background

Note on anonymization: all personal and organisational names from the original opinion have been replaced with consistent placeholders (for example, "Applicant 1", "Respondent A", "Presiding Judge", "Attorney A"). No facts have been added beyond those contained in the provided opinion.

This opinion records the decision of the court delivered by the Presiding Judge on 17 September 2025 in an application for leave to seek judicial review on notice to the respondents. The application was brought by three individuals identified here as Applicant 1, Applicant 2 and Applicant 3. Applicant 2 moved the application on behalf of Applicant 1 (the second applicant is the mother of the first applicant; the first applicant is an adult with additional needs). Applicant 3 is Applicant 2's husband and the stepfather of Applicant 1.

The notice of motion and the statement of grounds sought a range of remedies in narrative terms, many of which the court observed could not be granted. The reliefs identified in the notice of motion (paraphrased and anonymised) included:

• An order of certiorari quashing findings/decisions of Respondent A and Respondent B.
• An order of mandamus compelling the respondents to fulfil duties and to correct alleged abuse and inhumane harm, and to act in accordance with the law.
• A declaration recognising the applicants' suffering and loss and providing remedies such as apology, compensation, mediation and implementation of Report A.
• An injunction requiring the respondents to uphold, protect and reinstate the applicants' rights and to provide information, assistance and mediation.

The Presiding Judge identified that the only relief a court could grant in the applicants' pleaded case would be certiorari, but only if the relief was sought in relation to an actual administrative decision. The opinion identifies two specific decisions that the applicants appeared to seek to quash:

1. A report published by Respondent B dated 8 May 2015.
2. A decision of Respondent A in respect of a complaint made by Applicant 2, dated 1 September 2019, relating to events surrounding the birth of Applicant 1 in 2003. The Preliminary Proceedings Committee of Respondent A decided on 27 April 2021 there was not sufficient cause for further action; the full council of Respondent A considered the matter on 17 June 2021 and decided no further action should be taken; a letter dated 21 June 2021 communicated that decision to Applicant 2.

Respondents filed replying affidavits asserting that the proposed judicial review proceedings were hopelessly out of time. Applicant 2 filed an affidavit sworn on 9 June 2025 and filed on 19 June 2025 which re-stated why each respondent had been joined and reiterated complaints against Respondent A and Respondent B. The affidavit did not meaningfully address the delay in bringing proceedings or supply reasons supporting an extension of time, save for a brief point that Respondent A did not inform Applicant 2 of a right to a review (the precise right referred to was unclear). Applicant 2 also referred to her medical conditions without supporting medical evidence. The Presiding Judge recorded that these references, unsupported by medical evidence, were not adequate to justify an extension of time, particularly given that Applicant 2 and Applicant 1 had initiated multiple other claims between 2011 and 2024.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether leave should be granted to Applicants to seek judicial review on notice to the respondents.
2. Whether the Court should exercise its discretion to extend time to permit the proposed judicial review proceedings given the significant delay.
3. Whether certiorari is an appropriate remedy and, if so, in relation to which identified administrative decisions (the Respondent B report of 8 May 2015 and the Respondent A decision dated 1 September 2019).
4. Whether the existence of a litigation restraint order (LRO) and the applicants' pattern of prior litigation are relevant factors weighing against an extension of time or grant of leave.

Arguments of the Parties

Applicants' Arguments

The opinion records the following points advanced by Applicant 2 (on behalf of the applicants), as relevant to the decision:

• The applicants sought, in narrative form, certiorari, mandamus, declaration, and injunctive reliefs directed at multiple respondents and including implementation of Report A, apology, compensation and mediation.
• Applicant 2 re-asserted alleged errors in the decisions of Respondent A and the views expressed by Respondent B; she alleged procedural failings including allegedly doctored notes and non-compliance with procedures by respondents.
• Applicant 2 stated that Respondent A did not inform her of a right to a review (the precise nature of the right was unclear in the affidavit).
• Applicant 2 referred to her own medical conditions and otherwise sought to explain the delay by reference to lack of legal representation; however, the affidavit did not provide supporting medical evidence and did not explain why she had been able to pursue other litigation while allowing these claims to become time barred.

Respondents' Arguments

The respondents advanced the following arguments (as recorded by the Presiding Judge):

• The proposed judicial review proceedings were hopelessly out of time and therefore the application for leave should be refused unless the applicants demonstrated exceptionally compelling reasons to extend time.
• Extending time would prejudice the respondents and third parties because of the passage of time and the consequent loss or destruction of records; Respondent B identified records were no longer available due to retention/destroy policies, and medical practitioners identified difficulties in responding to very old complaints.
• The applicants had, in earlier years, been engaged in multiple legal actions and so their lack of legal representation could not justify the delay.
• The existence of an LRO and findings of repeated, systemically repeated litigation by the applicants were relevant adverse factors in the exercise of the Court's discretion.

Table of Precedents Cited

The opinion cites multiple authorities and judicial decisions. The table below catalogues each precedent or judicial decision expressly mentioned in the opinion, the principle cited from it (as recorded by the Presiding Judge) and the manner in which the Presiding Judge applied that principle to the facts of this application.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Presiding Judge's analysis proceeded through a series of discrete legal and factual assessments, summarised here in the order addressed in the opinion.

1. Relief actually available:

   The Judge began by noting that many of the remedies pleaded by the applicants (as drafted) could not be granted by a court. The only relief of immediate potential relevance, if properly pleaded and related to an actual decision, was certiorari directed at administrative decisions of Respondent A and Respondent B.

2. Identification of decisions challenged:

   The Judge identified two discrete decisions that appeared the proper focus for a certiorari claim: the Respondent B report dated 8 May 2015, and Respondent A's decision in relation to Applicant 2's complaint dated 1 September 2019 (with the Preliminary Proceedings Committee decision of 27 April 2021 and the Council decision of 17 June 2021 and associated letter of 21 June 2021).

3. Procedural delay and extension of time:

   The Judge emphasised the length of delay: one challenged decision dated almost ten years before the application and another almost four years before; both concerned events from 2003. The Judge applied the established approach that time should not be extended except in the most exceptional circumstances (the opinion cites Case A as an example of such circumstances) and, following Case B, required objective reasons to justify delay together with consideration of prejudice to respondents and third parties.

4. Applicant evidence on delay:

   The Judge examined Applicant 2's affidavit and concluded it did not provide adequate explanation for the delay. The affidavit failed to identify, with sufficient particularity or supporting evidence, reasons that would objectively justify the very substantial extension of time sought. The brief assertion that Respondent A had not informed Applicant 2 of a right to review was unclear; references to medical conditions were unsupported by medical evidence and were undermined by the applicants' contemporaneous pursuit of other claims between 2011 and 2024. Allegations concerning doctored notes and procedural non-compliance were matters known to the applicants since at least 2011 and did not explain the delay.

5. Prejudice to respondents and third parties:

   The Judge accepted respondents' evidence that prejudice would arise if time was extended. Respondent B had a policy resulting in the destruction of old records, and records necessary to investigate or respond to historic complaints were no longer available. A doctor complained about had already identified difficulties in responding given the passage of time. Respondent A had identified particular investigative difficulties where a complaint was not made until many years after the events.

6. Strength of the underlying case:

   The Court considered the substantive strength of the applicants' proposed claims as part of the discretion to extend time. The Judge characterised the applicants' pleaded case as extremely vague and unwieldy, making it difficult to identify errors of law or procedural unfairness. The applicants had not sought targeted relief against several respondents listed in the proceedings. On this basis the Judge concluded there was not a sufficiently strong underlying case to justify excusing the delay.

7. Effect of the litigation restraint order (LRO):

   The Court treated the existence of an LRO as part of the relevant circumstances. Previous judicial decisions (Judge B and Judge C in the opinion) had permitted limited leave in other contexts or imposed the LRO because of a pattern of repeated litigation raising the same issues. The Presiding Judge regarded the LRO and the finding of repeated litigation as additional factors operating against granting the requested extension of time and refusing leave.

8. Conclusion of analysis:

   Balancing these considerations — the inadequacy of the applicants' evidence to justify delay, the prejudice to respondents and third parties, the weakness and vagueness of the pleaded case, and the relevance of the LRO — the Presiding Judge concluded that the applicants had not established sufficient grounds for the Court to exercise its discretion to extend time or to grant leave to bring judicial review on notice to the respondents.

9. Costs and further procedural directions:

   The Judge indicated an initial view, applying s. 169 of the Legal Services Regulation Act 2015, that respondents are entitled to their costs because the applicants had not succeeded in securing leave. The Judge ordered that costs and any other final orders would be the subject of a further hearing, and listed the matter to return before the Presiding Judge at 10:00 am on 17 October 2025. The opinion records the applicants acted in person and that counsel for the respondents appeared (anonymised here as Attorney A, Attorney B, Attorney C and Attorney D).

Holding and Implications

CORE RULING: LEAVE TO SEEK JUDICIAL REVIEW ON NOTICE IS REFUSED.

Direct consequences for the parties (as recorded in the opinion):

• The application for leave to commence judicial review proceedings on notice to the respondents is refused for the reasons set out above (principally: the proceedings are hopelessly out of time; no sufficient or compelling reasons were identified to extend time; the underlying case was weak and vague; prejudice would be caused to respondents and third parties; and an LRO operates against granting an extension).
• The Presiding Judge's indicative view is that, under section 169 of the Legal Services Regulation Act 2015, the respondents are entitled to their costs of the leave application; a further hearing on costs and any other final orders is listed for 10:00 am on 17 October 2025.
• The applicants represented themselves in these proceedings.

Broader implications: The opinion does not purport to establish a new legal principle. It applies established principles concerning extension of time and the discretion to grant leave for judicial review (including the need for objective reasons to justify delay and consideration of prejudice), and records that existing judicial findings about a litigant's pattern of repeated litigation and the existence of an LRO are relevant to the exercise of discretion. The Presiding Judge did not indicate that any novel precedent was being created; the decision turned on the specific facts, delay, and the applicants' inability to justify extending time in the circumstances of this case.