Summary of Anonymised Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

This written judgment was delivered by Judge [Last Name]. The Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1992 restrictions apply to this appeal; publication must not include matter likely to identify the victims and the appeal has been listed under the cipher "VPT".

On 6 March 2025, in the Crown Court in The City, the Appellant pleaded guilty on re‑arraignment to five counts of indecent assault on male persons contrary to section 15(1) of the Sexual Offences Act 1956. On 22 April 2025, at the same court, Judge [Last Name] (the sentencing judge) imposed a total sentence of 21 months' imprisonment made up as follows: 2 months' imprisonment on count 2 (offending against the younger nephew); 12 months' imprisonment on each of counts 4, 6 and 10; and 19 months' imprisonment on count 8 (a further indecent assault against the older nephew). The judge ordered the sentences on counts 4, 6, 8 and 10 to run concurrently with each other but consecutively to the sentence passed on count 2, producing an overall term of 21 months. A five‑year restraining order was made and the judge recorded that the Appellant was required to comply with the notification provisions under Part 2 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 for 10 years.

The Appellant, now aged 66 at sentence, appeals against sentence with leave of the Single Judge.

Underlying facts (as found by the sentencing judge)

The offending occurred in the 1970s when the Appellant was a teenage boy (events occurring primarily between 1974 and 1976). Two nephews were victimised. The offences against the younger nephew (reflected by count 2) involved repeated incidents when the Appellant shared a bedroom with him: getting into the boy's bed, asking for hugs, pulling the boy on top of him and gyrating his hips with bodies rubbing together while both were clothed. The sentencing judge treated these offences as having occurred over about a year, with the Appellant aged 14 at the outset (the younger nephew thus about 7).

The offences against the older nephew (reflected by counts 4, 6, 8 and 10) occurred while the Appellant stayed at that household in 1974/75. The Appellant repeatedly followed the older boy to his bedroom, pushed him onto the bed (sometimes face down), put his hands on the boy's penis and bottom, stroked the boy while also stroking himself, and on some occasions got on top of the boy and touched penis and buttocks both over and then, after about two months, under clothing. These assaults lasted about five to ten minutes. The Appellant told the boy to keep quiet, threatened to blame him and warned that disclosure would "rip the family apart". The sentencing judge treated the pattern as about ten occasions and calculated that the Appellant was about 15 when these began (the older nephew therefore around 11).

Victim personal statements described long‑term harm: difficulties trusting others, ongoing mental health and self‑esteem problems, counselling needs, misplaced guilt, one victim reporting self‑harm and persistent suicidal ideation. When questioned by the police the Appellant declined to answer; he initially pleaded not guilty but his lawyers indicated he would plead guilty on a factual basis that was then accepted within a couple of months of the plea and case management hearing.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the sentencing judge erred in law by taking the maximum sentences available at the time of offending as the starting point for each offence.
2. Whether the overall sentence of 21 months' imprisonment was manifestly excessive in all the circumstances.
3. Whether the sentence should have been suspended (this point was considered by the court although it was not advanced by the Appellant on appeal).

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

• The Appellant's counsel argued that the sentencing judge had erred in law by taking the maximum sentences available to him as the starting point for each offence.
• The Appellant's counsel submitted that the final total sentence was manifestly excessive in all the circumstances.

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court set out (and the sentencing judge had navigated) a multi‑layered sentencing exercise dictated by the Sentencing Council's guidance applicable to historical sexual offending and to offending by children and young people. The court described the required analytical steps as follows:

1. Follow the guideline for Sentencing Historical Sexual Offences: sentence according to the current regime but be constrained by the maximum sentence available at the date of the offence; where appropriate, identify the modern‑day equivalent offence and apply a "measured reference" to current offence‑specific guidelines.
2. Apply the offence‑specific guidelines for the modern equivalent offences (here, sexual assault of a child under 13), considering culpability and harm and using those guidelines' categories and starting points.
3. Apply the guidelines for Sentencing Children and Young People, taking as the starting point the sentence likely to have been imposed at the time of the offending and bearing in mind the maximum that could then have been imposed on a child offender.
4. Consider the specific guideline for sexual offences committed by children and young people.
5. Account for guilty plea guidance (credit for admission of guilt), which the sentencing judge applied as a 20% reduction for the late guilty pleas.
6. Finally, apply the Imposition Guideline to determine whether custody was unavoidable and whether a sentence should be suspended.

On the facts, the sentencing judge identified the relevant historic maxima: at age 14 the Appellant could not have been sentenced to Borstal; the maximum then available for the relevant offending was a 3‑month detention centre order. For the offending that began when the Appellant was 15 the historic maximum was 2 years' Borstal training (followed by 2 years' supervision) — a modern equivalent the judge treated as properly reflected by a 4‑year custodial sentence in contemporary terms (a point derived from the court's decision in R v [Name]).

The judge treated the contemporary equivalent offences as category B2 under current guidelines (a starting point of 2 years' imprisonment and a range of 1–4 years). Count 8 was taken as the lead offence (touching under clothing). Counts 4, 6 and 10 reflected touching over and under clothing and were treated as less serious than count 8. The judge identified aggravating features (multiple offences, two victims, abuse of position and inducement to silence) and several mitigating factors: the guilty pleas (reflected in a 20% credit), the Appellant's otherwise good character and industrious life with positive references, health problems, and the Appellant's history of having himself been abused as a child (although the judge noted that this should have given the Appellant greater insight and so did not operate as a significant mitigation in moral terms).

Applying those assessments, the judge identified a notional sentence after trial for the lead offence (count 8) of 2 years' imprisonment, reduced to 19 months after credit for the late guilty plea. Counts 4, 6 and 10 were sentenced to 12 months each concurrently; count 2 was given a short consecutive sentence (3 months after trial, reduced to 2 months after plea) because it involved a second victim. The net effect was a total of 21 months' immediate custody. The sentencing judge stated that despite the historical nature of the offending immediate custody was justified by the seriousness and sustained pattern of abuse.

On appeal the court reviewed the Appellant's primary contention that the judge had erred in law by starting from historic maximums for each offence. The appellate court did not accept that submission. It observed that the judge had not simply applied the historic maxima mechanically; rather, he had followed the layered analytical process required by the guidelines and by R v [Name], taking measured reference to modern sentencing ranges while ensuring he did not exceed the maximum historically available to a child offender of the Appellant's then age. The Appellant's counsel accepted this point on reflection in oral submissions.

The court noted that the only sentence imposed that equated to the historic maximum was the short sentence for count 2 (reduced to 2 months on plea): that figure was reached after substantial reduction from an adult starting point and, on the judge's approach, fairly reflected the Appellant's youth (14 at the time). While the sentence for count 8 was determined by reference to an adult category B2 starting point (which, the court acknowledged, would not necessarily be appropriate for a single teenage offender in isolation), the overall sentencing exercise had to reflect the aggregate seriousness of repeated offending against two different victims. The appellate court concluded that the sentencing judge had carefully navigated the complexity of the case and that the total sentence of 21 months' imprisonment fell within the range of sentences properly open to the judge and was not manifestly excessive.

The court also considered whether the sentence should have been suspended. Although that point had not been argued before the appellate court, the court applied the Imposition Guideline and concluded that the repeated nature of the offending and its seriousness meant that immediate custody was an appropriate and lawful outcome.

Holding and Implications

APPEAL DISMISSED.

Direct effect on the parties: the sentence of 21 months' imprisonment imposed by the sentencing judge stands. The restraining order for five years and the requirement to comply with the notification provisions under Part 2 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 for ten years, as recorded by the sentencing judge, remain part of the sentence record.

Broader implications: the court applied existing Sentencing Council guidance and the court's decision in R v [Name]; it did not purport to establish new legal principles. The decision underlines that, in historical cases involving young offenders, a careful, layered approach is required — identifying historic maxima for the offender's then age, identifying modern equivalents and applying measured reference to current guidelines — and that immediate custody may be appropriate where repeated offending against multiple victims, even if historical, demonstrates sufficient overall seriousness.

Additional note: the appellate court recorded commendation for the sentencing judge's handling of a difficult case and acknowledged the quality of the prosecution's sentencing note prepared by Attorney [Last Name] (prosecuting counsel).