Summary of Legal Opinion (Anonymized)

Factual and Procedural Background

The Appellant was born in April 1997 and is described in the opinion as aged 29. The Appellant has two siblings and a congenital condition (Kabuki syndrome) together with other medical problems. The Appellant's mother provided the majority of his care while she was alive.

On 3 January 2005, when the Appellant was seven years old, the Appellant's father (the Defendant) killed the Appellant's mother (the Deceased). The Defendant was later convicted of manslaughter. After the death, the Appellant and his siblings lived for about two years with their maternal grandparents and then moved to live with their maternal aunt, who acts as the Appellant's litigation friend. The litigation friend had an extension added to her house, including two extra bedrooms and a downstairs toilet (required because the Appellant was incontinent and there was no wet room or ramp). A downstairs lounge was also created for the Appellant.

Civil proceedings were brought on the Appellant's behalf against The Hospital (an NHS Trust). Those proceedings were compromised for a payment of £38,710. A claim was also made on the Appellant's behalf to Company A (the Criminal Injuries Compensation Authority). It was common ground that the Appellant was entitled to a tariff award, child payments and care; there was disagreement about accommodation costs and Court of Protection costs.

Company A made interim payments of £11,000 and also made an award of £16,710 in respect of the costs of appointing a deputy in the Court of Protection. The matter has a complex procedural history. Material decisions recorded in the opinion include a First-tier Tribunal (Social Entitlement Chamber) decision dated 16 August 2022 by Judge Beale and Judge McGarr, and a subsequent Upper Tribunal (Administrative Appeals Chamber) judicial review hearing before Judge West on 27 February 2024 with a written decision dated 5 March 2024.

Legal Issues Presented

1. The proper construction of paragraph 42(b) of the 2001 Criminal Injuries Compensation Scheme and, in particular, the meaning and scope of the phrase "other resultant losses".
2. Whether the provision of accommodation (including adaptations or an extension), and costs associated with trusts and Court of Protection proceedings, can be recovered as "other resultant losses" under paragraph 42(b) of the 2001 Scheme (i.e., whether such items can properly be characterised as losses arising from the loss of parental services).
3. Whether the costs of an extension to accommodation (as distinct from adaptation) are recoverable under the Scheme.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

• The Appellant submitted that the phrase "other resultant losses" in paragraph 42(b) should be read broadly and could cover losses that arise from the Appellant's status as a qualifying claimant — effectively that the phrase might include anything which arises or results from that status.
• The Appellant contended that the provision of accommodation (adaptation or extension) could constitute parental services or be an indirect consequence of the loss of parental care and so should be recoverable under paragraph 42(b).
• The Appellant argued that trust costs and Court of Protection costs could, in appropriate circumstances, be recoverable as "other resultant losses".
• These contentions formed the basis of the grounds of appeal alleging errors of law in the Upper Tribunal's interpretation and application of paragraph 42(b).

Company A's / Respondent's Position

• Company A's case at the First-tier Tribunal included a position that the award of £16,710 for deputy costs had been made in error; the Authority, however, did not seek to recover that sum.
• Company A and the tribunals treated the accommodation needs (including the extension) and Court of Protection matters as arising from the Appellant's pre-existing disability rather than from the unlawful killing of the Appellant's mother; on that basis those items were not "resultant losses" from the loss of parental services under paragraph 42(b).
• The tribunals (as recorded in the opinion) concluded that trust costs and Court of Protection costs were not recoverable under paragraph 42(b) because they could not properly be characterised as costs to replace the care provided by the deceased parent.

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court set out and applied a conventional interpretative approach: paragraph 42 of the 2001 Scheme should be read as a whole and interpreted by reference to the ordinary meaning of its words, the context of the scheme and the scheme's evident purpose. The opinion cites Case A and Case B for this method of construction.

The court observed the nature and purpose of the Scheme: it provides payments from public funds to innocent victims of crimes of violence (or in respect of such persons) and differs from tortious claims — awards under the Scheme are capped (at £500,000 under the 2001 Scheme) and tariffs are often set below tort awards.

The core textual analysis focused on paragraph 42(b)'s language: "such other payments as a claims officer considers reasonable to meet other resultant losses." The court concluded that "other resultant losses" must be losses that resulted from the event that caused the loss of parental services — in this case the unlawful killing of the Appellant's mother which produced the loss of parental services. The court rejected the Appellant's submission that the phrase should be read to mean anything that arises from the Appellant's status as a qualifying claimant, explaining that the status itself does not cause losses; rather, it gives the right to claim for losses caused by the criminal act.

The court explained that the two occurrences of "other" in the paragraph are meaningful: they denote losses other than those covered by the tariff payment in paragraph 42(a). Paragraph 42(b) therefore authorises payments for losses resulting from the death (and consequent loss of parental services), beyond the tariff provided in paragraph 42(a), where a claims officer considers those payments reasonable.

The opinion treated other materials (the official guide to applicants and a Law Society legal commentary) as consistent with this reading. Both the guide and the commentary identify situations in which the deceased parent, because of the child's pre-existing disability, provided more than usual parental care and attention; the loss of that additional care could, in appropriate circumstances, form the basis for an award under paragraph 42(b).

Applying the interpretation to the facts, the court concluded that the Appellant's need for adapted accommodation and the Court of Protection applications arose from his pre-existing congenital disability and medical problems, not from the unlawful killing of his mother. Because those needs were not caused by the death (and loss of parental services), they did not qualify as "other resultant losses" under paragraph 42(b).

The court also addressed the First-tier Tribunal's broad statement that the cost of an extension "would be significantly widening the remit of the Scheme". The court held that such a categorical statement was too general. It explained that paragraph 35 of the Scheme (which deals with compensation for special expenses for injured claimants) expressly refers to "adaptations to the applicant's accommodation"; accordingly, in appropriate circumstances an adaptation that involved a minor extension (for example to convert a lavatory into a wet room) could properly be characterised as an adaptation recoverable under paragraph 35. That, however, did not apply in this case because the need for the extension was not caused by the deceased parent's death.

Finally, the court emphasized that importing the full complexities of personal injury accommodation damages (as illustrated by Case C and Case D) into the Scheme would be inappropriate. The court noted that any decision about recoverability will depend on the facts of each case and reminded that the Scheme imposes a cap on awards.

Holding and Implications

The appeal was dismissed.

Direct effects:

• The First-tier Tribunal's and the Upper Tribunal's decisions were upheld on the relevant points: paragraph 42(b) of the 2001 Scheme was properly interpreted to cover "other resultant losses" that arise from the unlawful killing and consequent loss of parental services; it does not extend to losses that arise solely from the claimant's status as a qualifying claimant.
• The Appellant's claims for the costs of the house extension and for Court of Protection/trust costs were not recoverable under paragraph 42(b) because those needs and costs arose from the Appellant's pre-existing disability and not from the death of the Appellant's mother.

Broader implications:

• The opinion applies the 2001 Scheme to the facts of this case and explains the limits of paragraph 42(b). It does not purport to introduce a new general rule beyond confirming that paragraph 42(b) is confined to losses resulting from the criminal act that caused the loss of parental services. The decision notes that adapted-accommodation costs may in appropriate circumstances be recoverable under different parts of the Scheme (for example paragraph 35 in the context of personal injury claims), but no broader precedent altering the Scheme's structure or tariff approach was established by this case.

Disposition

For the reasons set out in the opinion, the court dismissed the appeal and the panel (Judge Baker and Judge Bean recorded their agreement) upheld the conclusions of the tribunals below.