Smalling-Small v Home Office West Midlands

Factual and Procedural Background

This opinion concerns an application by the Appellant to set aside a limited civil restraint order made on 29 July 2025. The Appellant is a Jamaican national who first entered the United Kingdom on a student visa around 2003. Issues arose in 2004 regarding whether the Appellant had overstayed or entered the United Kingdom illegally. The Appellant was detained in May 2004, applied for interim relief including bail and a stop on removal, and was granted bail on 8 June 2004. The Appellant also sought judicial review of a removal decision dated 27 May 2004, but permission was refused by Collins J. in September 2004, who also refused bail and allowed removal to proceed. The Appellant was removed to Jamaica in approximately November 2004.

Subsequently, in 2016, an application to re-open the case was refused by Cranston J., who certified the application as totally without merit and issued an extended civil restraint order. The Appellant made further applications to appeal and to re-open that refusal in 2024 and 2025, all of which were refused and certified as totally without merit. These applications included claims that crucial documents had been withheld and that the Appellant had been granted permission to apply for judicial review, which the court rejected. The Appellant also relied on section 9 of the Human Rights Act 1998 to claim damages for alleged unlawful judicial acts, which the court found to be misconceived and out of time.

Following multiple unmeritorious applications, the court made a limited civil restraint order in July 2025 to prevent the Appellant from issuing further applications without permission. The present proceedings relate to the Appellant's application to set aside that limited civil restraint order.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the limited civil restraint order made on 29 July 2025 should be set aside.
2. Whether the Appellant's claims under section 9 of the Human Rights Act 1998, alleging unlawful judicial acts and seeking damages, justify reopening earlier refusals of permission to appeal or judicial review.
3. Whether prior orders refusing permission to apply for judicial review and to re-open cases were correct and remain binding.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

• The Appellant contended that earlier applications should have focused on human rights issues rather than revisiting previous applications.
• She asserted that she was wrongly treated in 2004, including being detained and removed unlawfully, and that her human rights under the Convention were violated.
• The Appellant claimed that certain court orders from 2004 were missing from official records, rendering subsequent judicial decisions void and breaching her rights to a fair procedure under Article 6 of the Convention and the Human Rights Act 1998.
• She relied on section 9 of the Human Rights Act 1998, arguing that individuals can bring free-standing claims for damages against judicial acts incompatible with Convention rights without needing to appeal the original decision first.
• The Appellant requested the limited civil restraint order be set aside to enable her to pursue claims for damages and compensation under Article 5(5) of the Convention.

Court's Response to Arguments

• The court found that the Appellant's earlier applications revisiting permission to apply for judicial review were misconceived and totally without merit.
• The court held that claims for damages under section 9 of the Human Rights Act 1998 must be brought within one year of the alleged unlawful judicial act and in the High Court, neither of which had occurred.
• The court emphasized that the Appellant's attempts to relitigate events from over 20 years ago were doomed to fail and were an improper use of limited public resources.
• The court concluded that the limited civil restraint order was appropriate to prevent further unmeritorious applications.

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court carefully examined the Appellant’s history of applications and submissions. It noted that the earlier refusal of permission to apply for judicial review was clear and final, as confirmed by Collins J. in 2004 and Cranston J. in 2016. The Appellant’s repeated attempts to re-open these decisions, either on the basis of alleged withheld documents or human rights claims under section 9 of the Human Rights Act 1998, were found to be unmeritorious and procedurally improper.

The court emphasized that claims for damages against judicial acts must be brought within one year and in the High Court, neither condition having been met by the Appellant. The court also highlighted the importance of protecting judicial and public resources from being consumed by repeated, meritless applications, particularly when the underlying facts concerned events that occurred over 20 years ago.

Given these considerations, the court concluded that the limited civil restraint order was justified to prevent further abuse of process and to ensure fairness to other litigants.

Holding and Implications

The court REFUSED the application to set aside the limited civil restraint order made on 29 July 2025. The order remains in place.

This decision means that the Appellant is restrained from making further applications without the permission of a judge, effectively ending attempts to relitigate the 2004 immigration and removal matters. No new precedent was established; the ruling enforces existing procedural rules and principles concerning civil restraint orders and the timely pursuit of claims under the Human Rights Act 1998.