Eronat v CNPC International (Chad) Ltd & Anor

Factual and Procedural Background

This application concerns the interpretation of a contractually agreed 30-day time limit for an appeal under section 69 of the Arbitration Act 1996. The dispute arose from a Deed of Indemnity dated 19th December 2003 between Plaintiff, Company A, Company B, and a third party, governed by Hong Kong law but providing for arbitration with an English seat under LCIA Rules. The dispute related to whether a claim by a third party against Company A and Company B fell within the indemnity and whether it was released by a later Deed of Release governed by English law.

Company A and Company B filed a Request for Arbitration in November 2021 claiming US $324 million from Plaintiff under the 2003 Deed of Indemnity. The arbitrators ruled in favor of Company A and Company B, awarding the sum plus interest and costs. The award was made on 11th April 2024 but was only sent to the parties on 16th April 2024. Plaintiff sought clarification about the appeal period but was advised the tribunal would not provide guidance. Plaintiff filed an appeal on 16th May 2024, 30 days after receipt but 35 days after the award was made.

The trial judge held that the 30-day appeal period ran from the date the award was made, not when it was received, and dismissed the appeal as out of time. The judge also held that the parties had excluded any right to apply for an extension of time, and even if not excluded, he would have refused an extension. Plaintiff was refused permission to appeal, which led to the present application.

Legal Issues Presented

1. What is the correct interpretation of the phrase "within thirty (30) days after the decision is rendered" in the arbitration agreement—does the period run from the date the award is made or the date it is communicated to the parties?
2. Whether the court has jurisdiction and power under the Arbitration Act 1996 to grant permission to appeal in this context.
3. Whether the court has the power to extend the time limit for appeal under section 79(1) of the Arbitration Act 1996 given the parties’ agreement.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

• The 30-day appeal period should run from the date the award was communicated to the parties, not the date the award was made.
• This interpretation aligns with fairness and the parties’ intention, allowing time to review the award, seek advice, and prepare an appeal.
• The parties intended a wide and permissive scope for appeals, as reflected in the arbitration clause.

Respondents' Arguments

• The phrase "decision is rendered" means the date when the award was made by the tribunal.
• The parties excluded any right to apply for an extension of time for appeal.
• The court should uphold finality and compliance with time limits in arbitration.

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court analyzed the meaning of "rendered" in the arbitration agreement's appeal clause. It found that although "rendered" could mean either the date the award was made or the date it was communicated, contextual and background evidence showed it referred to the date the award was made by the tribunal. The court considered the usage of "render" elsewhere in the clause and in the LCIA and ICC arbitration rules current at the time of contracting, all pointing to the making of the award rather than notification.

The court rejected the appellant’s argument that the appeal period should run from receipt of the award, noting that the parties would have contemplated a short delay between making and transmission of the award. It found no unfairness in the time limit starting when the award was made, particularly as the parties excluded any right to apply for an extension.

The court also held that the parties’ express waiver of rights to make applications under the Arbitration Act, except as provided, excluded any power to extend the appeal period. Even if such power existed, the judge’s discretionary refusal to grant an extension was unassailable on appeal. Furthermore, the court doubted it had jurisdiction to grant permission to appeal or to hear an appeal against refusal of extension.

Finally, the court noted but did not decide issues regarding the applicable law for interpretation and jurisdiction given the different governing laws for the Deed of Indemnity and Deed of Release.

Holding and Implications

The court REFUSED PERMISSION TO APPEAL, holding that the appeal was out of time because the 30-day period ran from the date the award was made, not when it was received. It also held that the parties had validly excluded any right to seek an extension of time, and the judge’s refusal to grant an extension was proper.

The direct effect is that the appellant’s appeal against the arbitration award was dismissed and the award stands. The decision does not set new precedent but confirms established principles on contractual interpretation of arbitration appeal time limits and the limits on extending such time where parties have excluded that right.