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G (A Child: Scope of Fact-Finding)
Factual and Procedural Background
This opinion concerns care proceedings involving a young mother and her second child, referred to as X. The central procedural question was whether the court should direct a fact-finding hearing regarding the death of the mother's first child, Z, who died at five months old approximately 6½ years earlier when the mother was herself a child. The judge at first instance decided against holding a fact-finding hearing. The local authority and the children's guardian appealed that decision.
The mother's background includes a difficult childhood with extensive social services involvement from age 5, including child protection plans for neglect, substance misuse, family dysfunction, and other concerns. The mother was placed in foster care as a teenager and gave birth to Z at age 16. Z was subject to a child protection plan due to concerns about the mother’s parenting, including her emotional regulation difficulties, drug use, and relationship breakdown. Z died at 5 months old after being found unresponsive in his cot; a coronial inquest returned an open verdict but noted head injury consistent with shaking/impact trauma.
The mother was arrested on suspicion of murder but no charges were brought. The local authority later initiated care proceedings regarding X, citing concerns about the mother’s mental health, cannabis use during pregnancy, and parenting capacity. The local authority sought a fact-finding hearing on the circumstances of Z’s death, which the judge refused. The local authority and guardian appealed that refusal.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the judge erred in refusing to order a fact-finding hearing into the mother's alleged responsibility for the death of her first child, Z.
- Whether a fact-finding hearing into Z's death was necessary for proper risk assessment and care planning for X.
- How the principles governing the standard of proof and risk assessment in care proceedings apply to the decision whether to hold a fact-finding hearing.
- The weight to be given to delay, cost, impact on the mother and child, and the prospects of a fair trial in deciding whether to hold a fact-finding hearing.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellants' Arguments (Local Authority and Children's Guardian)
- The judge wrongly concluded that allegations regarding Z’s death should not be subject to fact-finding, preventing an informed decision on risk to X.
- Risk to X could not be properly assessed without determining whether the mother caused Z’s death; the judge’s assumption that risk was based solely on impulsivity was speculative.
- The judge gave undue weight to impulsivity and insufficient weight to other relevant factors such as the mother’s mental health, cannabis misuse, and history.
- The judge erred in his approach to public interest in identifying perpetrators and in assessing the prospects of a fair trial.
- The judge incorrectly relied on proposed transitional housing arrangements and assessments made without findings on Z’s death.
- The binary nature of the standard of proof requires a finding on Z’s death before risk assessment can be properly conducted.
- A fact-finding hearing was necessary to determine the likelihood and nature of harm to X, given the severity of harm suffered by Z.
Respondent's Arguments (Mother)
- The judge correctly applied the law and exercised case management discretion in refusing a fact-finding hearing.
- Risk assessment and care planning can be effectively conducted based on the mother’s current characteristics, including impulsivity, without resolving historical allegations.
- The delay, expense, and stress of a fact-finding hearing would be disproportionate and harmful to the family.
- The local authority’s case at best suggested a momentary loss of control causing Z’s death, not sustained or malicious harm.
- There was no material impact on care planning for X from findings about Z’s death, given the passage of time and the mother’s current parenting situation.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Re H (Minors) (Sexual Abuse: Standard of Proof) [1996] AC 563 | Standard of proof in care proceedings requires facts to be proved on the balance of probabilities; unproven allegations are not facts. | Affirmed that conclusions at trial must be based on proven facts, and suspicions or unproven allegations cannot satisfy the threshold for intervention. |
| Re B (Children) (Care Proceedings: Standard of Proof) [2008] UKHL 35 | Binary system of proof: a fact either happened or did not; no room for findings of possibility without proof. | Confirmed the strict application of proof standards and the need for fact-finding before assessing risk in care proceedings. |
| Oxfordshire County Council v DP [2005] EWHC 1593 (Fam) | Factors for deciding scope of fact-finding hearings, including cost, delay, impact, and necessity for justice. | Used as a framework for the judge’s case management decision on whether to order fact-finding. |
| Re H-D-H (Children), Re C (A Child) [2021] EWCA Civ 1192 | Confirmed Oxfordshire approach and emphasized flexible, reasoned case management decisions upheld unless badly wrong. | Applied to uphold the judge’s discretion in balancing factors for fact-finding in this case. |
| Re T (Risk Assessment) [2025] EWCA Civ 93 | Framework for assessing risk of harm: type, likelihood, consequences, and mitigation. | Used to analyze whether fact-finding on Z’s death was necessary for assessing risk to X. |
| Re M and R (Child Abuse: Evidence) [1996] EWCA Civ 1317 | Requirement that courts decide disputed issues of harm on facts, not suspicion, for welfare and threshold decisions. | Supported the principle that risk assessments must be based on proven facts. |
| Re S-B (Children) [2009] UKSC 17 | Clarified standard of proof and the distinction between past harm and likelihood of future harm. | Reinforced that past harm must be proved on balance of probabilities for threshold findings. |
| Re O and N (Minors) (Care: Preliminary Hearing) [2003] UKHL 18 | Confirmed that both existing harm and likelihood of harm require proof of facts. | Applied to emphasize the need for fact-finding to establish risk basis. |
| Re F (A Child: Placement Order: Proportionality) [2018] EWCA Civ 2761 | Four questions to assess risk of future harm in care proceedings. | Adopted to structure the court’s analysis of risk to X. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court examined whether the judge’s refusal to order a fact-finding hearing into Z’s death was legally correct and justified in the circumstances. The judge had correctly identified the core question: whether a finding that the mother caused Z’s death would materially affect care planning and risk assessment for X.
The judge applied the principles from Oxfordshire and Re H-D-H, considering factors such as the interests of the child, the length and cost of investigation, the evidential prospects, necessity, relevance to care planning, impact on parties, prospects of a fair trial, and overall justice.
The judge reasoned that although the local authority’s case had a meaningful foundation, the death was likely due to a momentary loss of control rather than sustained malicious harm. He concluded that care planning for X could proceed on the basis of known risks related to the mother’s impulsivity and mental health without needing a formal finding about Z’s death. The judge found that the fact-finding would be lengthy, costly, and stressful, with limited benefit to care planning.
The court acknowledged the appellants’ argument that risk assessment requires proven facts and that the binary nature of proof means the court must decide whether the mother caused Z’s death. However, the majority held that the judge’s decision was a reasoned case management exercise within his discretion, supported by the evidence and legal principles. The judge’s approach to risk was a practical one, focusing on the mother’s current characteristics and parenting capacity rather than unresolved historical allegations.
The dissenting opinion emphasized that a fact-finding hearing was necessary to properly assess risk, given the gravity of Z’s death and the mother’s denial. It stressed that without a finding on Z’s death, risk assessors and the court could not fairly or safely evaluate the likelihood or nature of harm to X.
Ultimately, the majority found no error in the judge’s balancing of competing factors and upheld the refusal to order fact-finding.
Holding and Implications
The court DISMISSED THE APPEALS, affirming the judge’s refusal to order a fact-finding hearing into the death of the mother's first child.
The decision confirms that in complex care proceedings, judges have broad discretion to manage proceedings and may refuse fact-finding hearings if they conclude that such hearings would not materially advance care planning or risk assessment, especially where delay, cost, and stress are significant. The ruling emphasizes the importance of a reasoned case management approach balancing all relevant factors and applying established legal principles on the standard of proof and risk assessment.
No new precedent was established; rather, the court applied existing principles to the facts of this case, underscoring that fact-finding is not always required where risk can be assessed on the basis of proven facts and current evidence.
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