Gleason-Mitchell, R. v

Factual and Procedural Background

The case concerns the sentencing of the Defendant, a 24-year-old woman, who was convicted of causing or allowing the death of her child, Isabella, contrary to section 5 of the Domestic Violence, Crime and Victims Act 2004, as well as two counts of cruelty to a person under 16 years under the Children and Young Person's Act 1933. The Defendant was acquitted of murder by the jury but pleaded guilty to the lesser offences at the start of the trial. She was sentenced to a total term of 10 years' imprisonment, with concurrent sentences for the cruelty counts.

The Defendant had renewed a relationship with a man, referred to as the Co-Defendant, with whom she had previously been involved. Over approximately five weeks, the Co-Defendant inflicted escalating assaults on Isabella, which the Defendant was aware of but failed to prevent. The child ultimately died following these assaults. The Co-Defendant was convicted of murder and sentenced to life imprisonment with a minimum term of over 24 years.

The Defendant's guilty pleas were entered on the first day of the murder trial, which justified a reduction in sentence of just over 28%, reflecting the timing and circumstances of the pleas. The Solicitor General applied for leave to refer the sentences as unduly lenient, challenging the appropriateness of the sentence length and the judge's assessment of aggravating and mitigating factors.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the sentence of 10 years' imprisonment for causing or allowing the death of a child was unduly lenient.
2. Whether the judge erred in his assessment and balancing of aggravating and mitigating factors relevant to sentencing.
3. Whether the judge should have treated the "prolonged suffering prior to death" as a separate aggravating factor in addition to its consideration in culpability assessment.

Arguments of the Parties

Solicitor General's Arguments

• The correct sentencing starting point was 14 years for a category 1A offence, with a range of 12 to 18 years.
• The judge erred in balancing aggravating and mitigating factors, failing to give sufficient weight to aggravating factors, notably the prolonged and brutal suffering of the child.
• The judge wrongly declined to treat "prolonged suffering prior to death" as a separate aggravating factor at step 2 of the guideline, considering it only at step 1 for culpability, which amounted to underweighting harm.
• Concurrent sentences for cruelty offences were appropriate but also acted as significant aggravating factors that the judge failed to sufficiently weigh.

Defendant's Arguments

• The judge was fully aware of all relevant factors and was in the best position to balance them.
• There was no identifiable error in the judge’s approach to the sentencing guideline.
• The stepped approach to sentencing followed the guideline correctly and the resulting sentence was not unduly lenient.

Table of Precedents Cited

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court analysed the sentencing exercise undertaken by the trial judge, noting that he had presided over the trial and had a unique insight into the Defendant’s culpability and character. The judge had started with a 14-year term reflecting the highest culpability category for causing or allowing death of a child, balancing the fact that the Defendant did not inflict the violence herself but passively allowed it. The judge identified aggravating factors including concealment of injuries, lack of genuine remorse, and concurrent cruelty offences, as well as mitigating factors such as no previous convictions, mental health difficulties, prior good parenting, vulnerability to manipulation, and good behaviour in custody.

The Solicitor General's key contention was that the judge should have treated the prolonged suffering prior to death as a separate aggravating factor related to harm at step 2 of the guideline, distinct from its role in culpability at step 1. The court emphasised the legal distinction between culpability and harm under section 63 of the Sentencing Act 2020, but found the judge had in fact accounted for the harm when determining the starting point and sentencing range. The judge’s refusal to double count this factor was a legitimate exercise of judicial discretion.

The court acknowledged that other judges might balance the factors differently or apply a higher starting point, but concluded that the trial judge’s approach was not unduly lenient. The judge followed the sentencing guideline meticulously and was best placed to assess the Defendant’s culpability and the circumstances of the offence. The court therefore declined to increase the sentence.

Holding and Implications

The application to increase the sentence was dismissed.

The court granted leave to consider the reference but ultimately held that the trial judge’s sentence was not unduly lenient. The 10-year term, reflecting a discount for guilty pleas, was upheld. The decision confirms the principle that sentencing judges who have presided over the trial and have direct knowledge of the Defendant and evidence are best placed to assess culpability and the balance of aggravating and mitigating factors. No new precedent was established beyond the application of existing sentencing guidelines and statutory provisions.