Factual and Procedural Background
On 16 September 2019, the Plaintiff was involved in a road traffic accident with a vehicle driven by an employee of the first Defendant. The second Defendant was the insurer. The Plaintiff initiated the Pre-Action Protocol for Low Value RTA Claims ("the PAP") process on 17 July 2020 by submitting a claim notification form. The second Defendant admitted liability on 30 July 2020, completing Stage 1 of the PAP and enabling progression to Stage 2.
The claim did not progress through Stage 2 because the Plaintiff failed to provide a Settlement Pack, a key element of Stage 2 that includes medical reports and other evidence. The first medical examination occurred on 11 January 2023, and a draft medical report was received on 5 May 2023, long after the limitation period expired on 16 September 2022.
To protect against a limitation defence, the Plaintiff issued Part 8 proceedings on 6 September 2022, just before the limitation period expired, and sought a stay of proceedings. Deputy District Judge Openshaw stayed the Part 8 claim for one year until 16 September 2023, with liberty for the Defendants to apply to vary or set aside the stay. The Defendants did not apply within the liberty period but later, on 13 June 2023, sought an order to lift the stay and compel the Plaintiff to provide the Stage 2 Settlement Pack within 21 days, or have the Part 8 claim struck out.
District Judge Baldwin heard the application on 5 July 2023 and concluded that the court lacked jurisdiction to make orders directing progress within the PAP, as the claim was stayed and the PAP was a pre-action process outside the court's management. The Defendants appealed, but on 16 January 2024, His Honour Judge Wood KC dismissed the appeal, agreeing with DJ Baldwin's view that the court had no power to interfere with the PAP process at Stage 2.
Subsequently, the Plaintiff's solicitors removed the claim from the PAP portal, a step described as "unreasonable" by District Judge Jenkinson who allowed the Plaintiff's application to transfer the claim from Part 8 to Part 7. The claim, valued under £10,000, was allocated to the fast track and scheduled for trial.
Permission for a second appeal was granted by Laing LJ to address whether the court has jurisdiction to make directions in connection with a claim within the PAP when Part 8 proceedings have been issued to protect against limitation.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the court has jurisdiction to make case management directions relating to a claim within the PAP when Part 8 proceedings have been issued to protect the claim against a limitation defence.
- Whether the appeal is academic given that the claim has exited the PAP portal.
- Whether the court has power or should exercise discretion to order disclosure of privileged documents such as draft medical reports and settlement offers at the Stage 2 Settlement Pack stage.
- Whether the application for directions concerning the Stage 2 Settlement Pack should have been dismissed as a matter of discretion based on the Plaintiff’s explanation for delay.
Arguments of the Parties
Defendants' Arguments
- The court has jurisdiction under CPR 3.1(2)(p) to make orders managing the Part 8 claim and to compel the Plaintiff to comply with obligations under the PAP, including providing the Stage 2 Settlement Pack.
- The stay of the Part 8 proceedings should be lifted to allow progress within the PAP, with an unless order compelling compliance within 21 days or striking out the claim.
- The court’s power to make such orders is necessary to prevent dilatory conduct and ensure claims progress efficiently.
Plaintiff's Arguments
- The appeal is academic as the claim has exited the PAP portal and been transferred to Part 7 proceedings.
- The court lacks jurisdiction to interfere with the PAP process at Stage 2 because it is a pre-action protocol outside the court’s management.
- It would be unfair and a breach of privilege to compel disclosure of draft medical reports and settlement offers.
- The application for directions should be dismissed as a matter of discretion given the Plaintiff’s solicitor’s explanations for delay.
- The court’s role in granting stays under PD49F is administrative and does not involve inquiry into compliance with the PAP until the stay expires.
- Ordering direct steps within the PAP would increase judicial workload and undermine the cost-effectiveness of the PAP.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent |
Rule or Principle Cited For |
Application by the Court |
| Jet2 Holidays Limited v Hughes [2019] EWCA Civ 1858; [2020] 1 WLR 844 |
Application of CPR rules on contempt of court to pre-court proceedings. |
Confirmed that pre-action conduct can be subject to court rules and sanctions. |
| Cable v Liverpool Victoria Insurance Co. Limited [2020] EWCA Civ 1015; [2020] 4 WLR 110 |
Principles of abuse of process apply to PAP procedures. |
Non-compliance with PAP can amount to abuse of process, linking PAP to CPR and court control. |
| Hutcheson v Popdog Limited (News Group Newspapers Limited, third party) [2011] EWCA Civ 1580; [2012] 1 WLR 782 |
Test for hearing academic appeals. |
Outlined criteria for allowing appeals that may be academic between parties. |
| R (L, M, P) v Devon County Council [2021] EWCA Civ 358 |
Flexible approach to academic appeals. |
Supported discretion to hear academic appeals in appropriate cases. |
| R (SB) v Kensington and Chelsea Royal London Borough Council [2023] EWCA Civ 924 |
Flexible approach to academic appeals. |
Reinforced approach permitting hearing of academic appeals. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court began by recognizing the PAP as a self-contained pre-action process designed to avoid court proceedings and encourage settlement through cooperation. Ordinarily, the court lacks jurisdiction to make orders managing the PAP process because it occurs before any claim is issued.
However, once the Plaintiff issued Part 8 proceedings to protect against limitation, the court acquired jurisdiction over the claim under CPR 3.1(2)(p). The court held that the Part 8 claim constitutes "the case" for the purposes of case management powers, and thus the court can make directions related to progress within the PAP when it is linked to extant court proceedings.
The court rejected the argument that the stay granted under PD49F is a purely administrative function without judicial discretion. Instead, the stay is subject to reconsideration and conditions, including orders to compel compliance with PAP steps. The court found no rational basis to distinguish between indirect control of PAP progress via stays and direct orders compelling specific steps such as the provision of the Stage 2 Settlement Pack.
Paragraphs 13-15 of the Practice Direction on Pre-Action Conduct and Protocols expressly allow the court to order stays while parties comply with PAP steps, supporting the court's jurisdiction to make such orders once proceedings are issued.
The court acknowledged the proposed 21-day unless order sought by the Defendants was too draconian and the timing too short, but emphasized that some form of order compelling compliance with PAP obligations was within the court's power and should have been made.
The court dismissed concerns about increased judicial workload and cost inefficiency, noting that such orders would only be necessary in exceptional cases involving wholesale failure to comply with PAP steps and that the court's involvement ultimately promotes cost-effective resolution within the PAP.
Regarding the Plaintiff’s objections about privilege and disclosure, the court held that the Plaintiff's obligations under the PAP were clear and that the Defendants sought only to enforce those obligations, not to compel improper disclosure. The court also found the delays attributable to the Plaintiff and their solicitors, who failed to progress the claim or communicate effectively.
Finally, the court considered the appeal was not academic despite the claim's removal from the PAP portal, as the Plaintiff’s own unreasonable conduct caused the claim to exit the PAP, and the issue raised was of general importance requiring resolution.
Holding and Implications
The court ALLOWED THE APPEAL, holding that the court has jurisdiction under CPR 3.1(2)(p) and the relevant Practice Directions to make case management orders requiring compliance with PAP obligations once Part 8 proceedings have been issued.
This decision clarifies that while the PAP itself is a pre-action process outside the court’s direct control, the issuance of Part 8 proceedings engages the court’s case management powers over the claim, including the ability to compel progress within the PAP. The ruling emphasizes the court’s role in preventing dilatory conduct and ensuring procedural compliance in low value RTA claims protected by Part 8 proceedings.
The court did not set new precedent regarding the precise form of orders appropriate but made clear that overly draconian orders (such as short 21-day unless orders) may be inappropriate on first application. The decision also highlights that stays under PD49F are not automatic and can be subject to conditions and judicial review.
No broader implications beyond the direct effect on the parties were discussed, and the ruling does not alter the self-contained nature of the PAP absent issued proceedings.