Factual and Procedural Background
This appeal concerns the treatment of a detainee in police custody and the powers of custody officers to order the complete removal of a detainee's clothing without consent and with force. The detainee, referred to here as the Appellant, was arrested following reports of assault and taken to a police station. After being placed in a holding cell and refusing to answer risk assessment questions, the Appellant was forcibly subdued by police officers and taken to a cell where his clothes were forcibly removed by officers to place him in an anti-self-harm suit. The Appellant commenced proceedings against the Chief Constable claiming assault and battery in respect of the use of force during various phases of his detention, seeking damages for physical and psychiatric injuries, injury to feelings, special damages, and aggravated and exemplary damages. The trial court (the recorder) found liability only in relation to the forcible removal of clothing in one phase and awarded damages. On appeal, the appellate judge reversed some of the recorder’s findings, particularly regarding the necessity and reasonableness of the custody officer’s belief and the use of force, and questioned the quantum of damages awarded.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the custody officer’s belief under section 54(4)(a) of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE) must be both genuine and based on reasonable grounds, or whether a genuine belief alone suffices.
- Whether the custody officer held a reasonable belief that the detainee might use clothing to cause physical injury, as a matter of fact.
- Whether the use of force to remove the detainee’s clothing was necessary and reasonable.
- The appropriateness of the damages awarded for the unlawful use of force during the forcible removal of clothing.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- The custody officer’s power to seize clothing under s. 54(4)(a) should require a reasonable belief, not merely a genuine belief, due to the significant interference with detainees’ rights under Articles 3 and 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights.
- Removal of clothing without a reasonable belief that it was necessary to prevent harm was unlawful.
- The use of force to remove the clothes was unnecessary and disproportionate, especially as the detainee was not given warning or opportunity to comply voluntarily.
- The damages awarded by the trial judge were appropriate and reflected the significant humiliation and psychiatric injury caused.
Respondent's Arguments (Chief Constable)
- The statutory language of s. 54(4)(a) requires only a genuine belief, not a reasonable belief, and Parliament deliberately omitted the qualifier "reasonable" in this provision.
- The custody officer’s belief was lawful and based on the detainee’s refusal to answer risk assessment questions combined with his agitated and violent behaviour.
- The use of force to remove the clothing was necessary and reasonable given the circumstances, including the detainee’s prior violent conduct and the urgency to prevent self-harm.
- The damages awarded were excessive and should be substantially reduced, as the psychiatric injury was mild to moderate and largely attributable to the overall experience rather than the specific incident of clothing removal.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent |
Rule or Principle Cited For |
Application by the Court |
| R (on the application of O) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2022] UKSC 3 |
Principles of statutory interpretation emphasizing ordinary meaning and legislative purpose. |
Applied to interpret s. 54(4)(a) of PACE, affirming that the custody officer must hold an actual belief without a reasonableness requirement. |
| Khan v Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis [2008] EWCA Civ 723 |
Distinction between powers exercisable on belief and those requiring reasonable grounds. |
Supported the conclusion that omission of "reasonable" in s. 54(4)(a) was deliberate and significant. |
| Pepper v Hart [1993] AC 593 |
Use of Parliamentary materials in statutory interpretation under strict conditions. |
Rejected reliance on Parliamentary debates for s. 54(4)(a) due to lack of ambiguity in the provision. |
| PD v Chief Constable of Merseyside [2015] EWCA Civ 114 |
Considerations of reasonableness in custody officer’s belief and application of Code C Annex A. |
Distinguished as recording first instance findings; did not establish a requirement of reasonable belief under s. 54(4)(a). |
| Yousif v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [2016] EWCA Civ 364 |
Recorded findings on reasonableness of belief but did not establish legal requirement. |
Used to show that references to reasonableness were factual findings, not legal requirements. |
| Pile v Chief Constable of Merseyside Police [2020] EWHC 2472 (QB) |
Application of Human Rights Act s. 3 and compatibility with Convention rights. |
Confirmed that s. 3 interpretative obligation is not engaged in every case involving removal of clothing. |
| Goodenough v Chief Constable of Thames Valley Police [2021] EWCA Civ 1422 |
Limits on appellate interference with trial judge’s evaluative decisions. |
Applied to support restraint in overturning trial judge’s factual assessments. |
| Prescott v Potamianos (Re Sprintroom) [2019] EWCA Civ 932 |
Standard for appellate review of evaluative decisions by trial judges. |
Applied to assess whether appellate judge was justified in substituting his evaluative conclusions. |
| Afriyie v Commissioner of the City of London Police [2024] EWCA Civ 1269 |
Appellate approach to factual findings based on video evidence. |
Supported appellate judge’s position that video evidence reduces deference to trial judge’s conclusions. |
| Choudhary v Martins [2008] 1 WLR 617 |
Approach to awarding separate damages for connected heads (injury to feelings, psychiatric injury, aggravated damages). |
Referenced in discussion of potential over-compensation in damages awarded. |
| McDonald v McDonald [2016] UKSC 28 |
Limits on courts’ interpretative powers under Human Rights Act s. 3. |
Applied to reject the inference of a reasonableness requirement where statutory language is clear. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court undertook a detailed statutory interpretation exercise focusing on the language of s. 54(4)(a) of PACE, which permits a custody officer to seize clothes and personal effects if the officer "believes" the detainee may use them to cause harm or interfere with evidence. The court emphasized the absence of the word "reasonable" qualifying "belief" in this subsection, contrasting it with other provisions in PACE where "reasonable grounds" are explicitly required. This omission was held to be deliberate by Parliament, indicating that the custody officer’s belief need only be genuine, not objectively reasonable.
The court rejected the Appellant’s argument that a higher threshold of reasonable belief should be inferred due to the interference with Convention rights (Articles 3 and 8). It held that the interpretative obligation under the Human Rights Act 1998 (s. 3) does not require rewriting clear statutory language, and that any incompatibility with Convention rights can be addressed through separate legal claims.
The court considered relevant Codes of Practice, including Code C and Annex A, concluding that while the spirit of protections for detainees’ dignity should apply, the specific procedural safeguards in Annex A concerning strip searches for concealed articles do not apply to seizure of clothing to prevent self-harm.
Regarding factual findings, the appellate judge found that the trial judge (the recorder) erred by requiring a reasonable belief and by misconstruing the custody officer’s motivation and the circumstances. The appellate judge held that the custody officer did hold the requisite genuine belief based on the detainee’s refusal to answer risk questions, agitation, and violent conduct (including biting an officer). The appellate judge also found the use of force necessary and reasonable given the detainee’s behaviour and the risk of self-harm, rejecting the recorder’s view that the detainee should have been given more time to calm down before force was used.
The appellate judge and the court noted that much of the incident was captured on CCTV, reducing the usual deference appellate courts give to trial judges’ factual findings. They found the recorder’s judgment to be repetitive, unstructured, and legally flawed, justifying appellate intervention on the evaluative conclusions.
On damages, the appellate judge expressed the view that the award was excessive given the mild to moderate psychiatric injury diagnosed and the limited contribution of the unlawful act to the injury, but declined to determine the precise amount, leaving this to the Court of Appeal if necessary.
Holding and Implications
The court’s final decision was to DISMISS THE APPEAL.
This means that the appellate judge’s interpretation of s. 54(4)(a) as requiring only a genuine belief by the custody officer, not a reasonable belief, stands. The use of force to remove the detainee’s clothing was lawful and necessary in the circumstances. The trial judge’s findings to the contrary were overturned. The damages awarded by the trial judge were considered too high, but as the appeal failed on liability, the issue of quantum was left unresolved.
No new precedent was set beyond clarifying the interpretation of s. 54(4)(a) and affirming the standard of appellate review in cases involving video evidence and evaluative factual findings.