Mohamed, R. v

Factual and Procedural Background

This opinion concerns an application by His Majesty's Solicitor General to refer a sentence under section 36 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 on the basis that it was unduly lenient. On 3 October 2024, at the Crown Court at Leicester, the Defendant pleaded guilty to two summary offences and later changed his plea to guilty to an indictment count of robbery. On 19 December 2024, the Defendant was sentenced by HHJ Spencer KC to 21 months' imprisonment suspended for 24 months for the robbery offence, with no separate penalties for the summary driving offences but endorsements on his driving licence. A victim surcharge order was also imposed.

The robbery occurred in the early hours of 24 May 2024 in Leicester, where the Defendant, with two unidentified males, forcibly took valuables from the victim, who was threatened with a knife and detained in a vehicle. The victim was stripped of valuable items including a high-value coat, electronic devices, and clothing. Police later detained the Defendant wearing the victim's coat and recovered the stolen property. The Defendant was identified by the victim and charged the same day. Initial pleas were not guilty, but on 3 October 2024, the Defendant pleaded guilty to all charges.

The Defendant, born in 1998 and aged 27 at sentencing, had prior convictions including a robbery conviction in 2018. The maximum sentence for robbery is life imprisonment. The sentencing court considered the Sentencing Council’s Definitive Guideline for robbery offences, with the Defendant’s culpability agreed as high due to the use of a bladed article. There was dispute over the harm category, with the prosecution arguing for category 2A (serious harm) and the defence for category 3 (minimal harm). The victim’s personal statement detailed significant psychological and lifestyle impacts following the offence.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the sentencing judge erred in categorising the harm caused by the robbery offence, thereby adopting an unduly low starting point for sentencing.
2. Whether the sentencing judge failed to properly weigh aggravating and mitigating factors in determining an appropriate sentence.
3. Whether the reduction of the sentence by 25% for a guilty plea was excessive given the timing of the plea.
4. Whether the overall sentence imposed was unduly lenient and outside the range of sentences reasonably open to the sentencing judge.

Arguments of the Parties

Solicitor General's Arguments

• The sentencing judge took too low a starting point by not categorising the offence as category 2A, which would require a notional starting point of 5 years' custody.
• The judge failed to properly follow through on his own factual findings regarding the victim’s harm, which should have led to a higher harm category and longer sentence.
• The judge undervalued aggravating factors such as the Defendant’s previous robbery conviction, group offending, targeting of a lone victim at night, high-value goods stolen, and detention of the victim in a vehicle.
• The mitigating factors relied upon by the judge were marginal or irrelevant, including the Defendant’s age (outside typical mitigating range), parity with the co-defendant (who received a more severe sentence for different offences), and time spent on remand.
• The 25% reduction for the guilty plea was excessive given it was entered relatively late, and should have been no more than 20%.
• The overall sentence failed to reflect the seriousness of the offending and was unduly lenient.

Respondent's Arguments

• The sentence, while potentially lenient, was not unduly so and fell within the sentencing judge’s reasonable discretion.
• The sentencing judge’s assessment that the harm fell within category 3 was a matter of judicial evaluation and was properly open to the court.
• Some aggravating factors exist but the timing of the offence should not be considered aggravating as it overlaps with victim vulnerability.
• The offence was opportunistic rather than targeted.
• Mitigating factors such as minimal planning, the Defendant’s age, lack of recent relevant convictions, and the realistic prospect of rehabilitation (fresh start with family) outweighed aggravating factors.
• The 25% guilty plea reduction was not excessive given the Defendant pleaded guilty earlier than the co-defendant who was not prosecuted for robbery.
• The Defendant’s youth and release from custody also weigh against increasing the sentence, considering double jeopardy concerns.

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court carefully reviewed the sentencing judge's application of the Sentencing Council guidelines, particularly the categorisation of harm and culpability. While culpability was correctly assessed as high due to the use of a bladed article, the court found error in the judge's harm categorisation, which fell ambiguously between categories 2 and 3. The court concluded the evidence, including the victim personal statement, supported a category 2A classification, warranting a higher starting point for sentencing.

The court identified four principal errors in the sentencing judge’s reasoning: (1) improperly mitigating the sentence because the Defendant was the only offender caught, (2) giving undue weight to the co-defendant’s lesser sentence and dropped robbery charge, (3) granting excessive credit for the guilty plea given its late timing, and (4) reducing the custodial term based on time already served rather than applying this at the end of sentencing.

The court emphasised that suspension of the sentence was not legally permissible given the appropriate sentence length exceeded two years. The sentencing judge’s notional sentence of 28 months was found to be unrealistically low. The court determined the notional sentence after trial should have been six years' imprisonment, with a 20% guilty plea discount resulting in an effective sentence of four years and nine months' imprisonment.

Holding and Implications

The court GRANTED LEAVE to refer the sentence under section 36 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988, quashed the suspended sentence order, and substituted a sentence of 4 years and 9 months' imprisonment. The Defendant was directed to surrender to custody, with the sentence to run from the date of surrender.

The decision directly affects the Defendant by significantly increasing the custodial sentence and removing the suspension. No new legal precedent was established; rather, the court applied established principles regarding sentencing discretion, harm categorisation, and the assessment of undue leniency under the statutory framework.