Bradley, R. v

Factual and Procedural Background

This opinion concerns an application by His Majesty's Solicitor General to refer a sentence to the court under section 36 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 on the ground that it was unduly lenient.

The Respondent Offender, aged 32 at the time of this opinion and 27 at the time of the offence, has no previous convictions. On 2 October 2024, in the Crown Court at Derby, the Respondent pleaded guilty to wounding with intent contrary to section 18 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861. A second count of dangerous driving was ordered to lie on the file.

On 13 December 2024, the Respondent was sentenced by His Honour Judge Martin Hurst to 24 months' imprisonment suspended for 18 months, with 180 hours of unpaid work, a surcharge order, a compensation order, and a costs order.

The offence arose from an incident on 22 October 2020, when the Respondent attacked the victim after mistakenly believing the victim had harassed his stepdaughter. The attack involved punching, kicking, and stamping on the victim, who sustained injuries including a haematoma and abrasions. The attack was captured on CCTV footage.

The Respondent initially denied the offence, pleaded not guilty in December 2022, and later changed his plea to guilty in October 2024 following a sentencing indication. The procedural history included multiple adjournments and delays not attributable to the parties.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the sentence imposed on the Respondent for wounding with intent was unduly lenient under section 36 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988.
2. Whether the sentencing judge erred in categorising the level of culpability and in the length and suspension of the sentence.
3. The proper application of sentencing guidelines and the exercise of the court's discretion in increasing a sentence following an Attorney General's Reference.

Arguments of the Parties

Submissions for the Solicitor General

• The sentencing judge erred by miscategorising the culpability level, underestimating the appropriate sentence length, and wrongly suspending the sentence.
• The correct sentence should have been significantly longer than 24 months, making suspension inappropriate.
• The sentencing indication procedure was not properly followed, contrary to established case law.
• The attack was a revenge or targeted assault, warranting a higher culpability category (A or at least an upward adjustment within B).
• The use of the offender's foot to stamp on the victim amounted to the use of a weapon equivalent, justifying a higher starting point.
• The offence being committed in front of a child constituted an aggravating factor.
• The delay in proceedings should not have been given significant mitigating weight, as much was caused by the Respondent's false defence and late guilty plea.
• The decision to suspend the sentence was unreasonable given the gravity of the offence and appropriate punishment.

Submissions for the Respondent

• An Attorney General's Reference is not an appeal; while the sentence may be lenient, it is not unduly so.
• The judge was entitled to place the offence in category B3 and to exercise discretion in sentencing without precise mathematical reductions.
• The judge provided clear reasons for departing from the guideline starting point.
• Considering the pre-sentence report, good character, and rehabilitation prospects, suspension of the sentence was appropriate.
• Even if the sentence was unduly lenient, the court should exercise discretion not to increase it due to factors including the plea after indication, lack of prosecution objection, good character, progress on unpaid work, and double jeopardy concerns.
• The Respondent has complied with the suspended sentence and has family and employment considerations that would be adversely affected by immediate custody.

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court began by reaffirming the established principles under section 36 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988, emphasizing that a sentence is only unduly lenient if it falls outside the range reasonably open to the sentencing judge, and that leave to refer should be granted only in exceptional cases.

The court acknowledged procedural shortcomings in the sentencing indication process, referencing the Goodyear and Egan decisions, but noted that such procedural defects do not automatically invalidate the sentence.

In assessing culpability and harm, the court accepted the sentencing judge's placement of the offence in category B3 harm category 3, but found merit in the Solicitor General's argument that the starting point should not have been reduced below three years, given the nature of the attack as a revenge or targeted assault involving stamping on the victim.

Despite this, the court exercised its discretion not to increase the sentence. This decision was influenced by multiple factors: the sentencing indication given, the absence of prosecution objection at sentencing, the delay between offence and charge (partly not attributable to the Respondent), the Respondent's lack of further offending, acceptance of wrongdoing, compliance with the suspended sentence terms, and the potential disproportionate impact of immediate custody on the Respondent's family and employment.

The court emphasized that while the law cannot condone vigilante conduct, the particular circumstances justified maintaining the sentence imposed.

Holding and Implications

The court granted leave under section 36 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 to consider the reference but ultimately REFUSED THE REFERENCE and did not interfere with the sentence imposed by the Crown Court.

The direct effect is that the Respondent's suspended sentence remains in place. The court did not set a new precedent but reaffirmed the discretionary nature of increasing sentences on Attorney General's References and the importance of contextual factors, including procedural compliance and the impact of immediate custody on the offender's family and rehabilitation prospects.