Young v Downey

Factual and Procedural Background

On 20 July 1982, the Plaintiff, aged 4½ years, witnessed the immediate aftermath of a bombing at a military barracks, where her father, Corporal Young, was stationed. She saw soldiers returning covered in blood and embedded with nails following an explosion and expressed to her mother that “Daddy should be coming now,” but her father never returned, having died the following day from his injuries. The Plaintiff brought a claim against the Defendant, the alleged perpetrator of the bombing, seeking damages for psychiatric injury resulting from witnessing these traumatic events and their aftermath.

The trial judge dismissed the Plaintiff’s claim, holding that she had not demonstrated the necessary appreciation that her father had been involved in the explosion and rejected expert psychiatric evidence supporting her fear and resultant psychiatric injury. The Defendant did not participate in the proceedings. The appeal challenges the trial judge’s findings, particularly the rejection of expert evidence and the legal requirements for establishing proximity in claims for psychiatric injury.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the Plaintiff could demonstrate the necessary proximity in the relationship to recover damages for psychiatric injury caused by witnessing traumatic events involving a loved one.
2. Whether there is a free-standing legal requirement that a claimant must show appreciation that the primary victim was involved in the traumatic event to establish proximity.
3. Whether the trial judge was correct to reject the expert psychiatric evidence on the Plaintiff’s understanding and fear at the time of the incident.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

• There is no separate requirement that the Plaintiff must show she appreciated her father’s involvement in the explosion; existing legal principles on proximity are sufficient.
• The Plaintiff did provide evidence, supported by expert reports, that she feared her father might have been involved and sought reassurance.
• The trial judge erred in rejecting the expert psychiatrist’s evidence, relying instead on his own inexpert opinion about a four-year-old’s mental capabilities.
• The Defendant’s non-participation meant the judge should not have disbelieved or rejected the expert evidence without challenge, as supported by precedent.

Respondent's Arguments

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the Defendant’s legal arguments, as the Defendant declined to participate in the proceedings.

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court analysed the factual background and the trial judge’s findings, particularly his rejection of the expert psychiatric evidence. The Court emphasised the established legal framework for secondary victim claims, focusing on the five "control mechanisms" identified in Alcock and recently reaffirmed in Paul. These include the close relationship with the primary victim, presence at or near the scene of the traumatic event or its immediate aftermath, and the sudden shock causing psychiatric injury.

The Court rejected the trial judge’s introduction of a new, separate requirement that the Plaintiff must have appreciated her father’s involvement in the explosion. It held that this was a factual matter rather than a legal prerequisite and that the existing principles sufficiently address proximity.

Critically, the Court found that the trial judge impermissibly relied on his own inexpert opinion regarding the mental capabilities of a 4½-year-old child, overriding the expert psychiatric evidence of Dr Cooling without proper foundation or challenge. The Court held that the judge should have accepted Dr Cooling’s evidence that the Plaintiff had some fear and appreciation of danger to her father, which caused her psychiatric injury.

The Court concluded that the Plaintiff had established the necessary relationship of proximity to the Defendant because her injury arose from witnessing events she feared had put her father in danger. Consequently, the trial judge’s factual findings were clearly wrong and warranted reversal.

Holding and Implications

The Court ALLOWED the appeal, reversing the trial judge’s dismissal of the claim for damages for psychiatric injury.

The Court awarded the Plaintiff damages of £121,500, including aggravated damages, as previously assessed by the trial judge in respect of her psychiatric injuries.

The decision clarifies that no additional legal requirement exists beyond established proximity principles for secondary victims to recover for psychiatric injury. It affirms the importance of deferring to expert psychiatric evidence over judicial speculation about a child’s mental capacity. The ruling does not establish new precedent but reinforces adherence to established legal tests and proper evidential evaluation.