Factual and Procedural Background
The Plaintiff, the niece of the Defendant, resided with the Defendant at his home from approximately 2011 or 2012, along with two of her children. The Plaintiff claimed to have invested approximately €224,000 in renovations and alterations to the property, which she also used to run a pottery business. She further asserted that she paid all utility bills and acted as a carer for the Defendant. The Plaintiff contended that an agreement existed whereby, in exchange for her financial contributions and care, she would acquire an interest in the property and ultimately inherit it.
A sharp factual dispute arose between the parties regarding the extent of the Plaintiff's expenditure and other matters. In September 2024, the Defendant notified the Plaintiff by text that she was to vacate the property, requiring her to remove her belongings within four weeks. The Plaintiff's solicitor then threatened to issue an injunction application alleging unlawful eviction.
Proceedings and an interlocutory injunction application were issued by the Plaintiff in October 2024, supported by affidavits. The Defendant responded with affidavits disputing the Plaintiff's claims and alleging mistreatment by the Plaintiff. Multiple rounds of affidavits revealed significant factual conflicts and a deeply damaged family relationship. The Plaintiff decided not to pursue the injunction application further, acknowledging that oral evidence would be required to resolve factual disputes, and the matter was adjourned accordingly.
The Plaintiff's claim evolved into a claim for damages, and it became accepted that she would not resume occupation of the property. A contested costs application arose regarding the injunction application that the Plaintiff had discontinued.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the costs of an interlocutory injunction application, which the Plaintiff issued but unilaterally discontinued, should be reserved or awarded to the Defendant.
- The applicability of section 169(1) of the Legal Services Regulation Act 2015 and Order 99, Rule 2(3) of the Rules of the Superior Courts to the costs of interlocutory applications.
- The appropriate exercise of the Court's discretion in awarding costs where an interlocutory application is abandoned without any intervening event, concession, undertaking, or settlement.
Arguments of the Parties
Plaintiff's Arguments
- The affidavits disclosed conflicts of fact that would have precluded the grant of the interlocutory injunction sought.
- Because of these factual disputes, the costs of the injunction application would inevitably have been reserved.
- It would be unfair to award costs against the Plaintiff when she chose not to pursue an application unlikely to succeed.
- The Plaintiff disputed the applicability of Order 99, Rule 2(3) and contended that, even if applicable, costs should be reserved due to unresolved factual conflicts.
- The Plaintiff emphasized that no cross-examination could occur at the interlocutory stage, so no final findings could be made on factual disputes.
- The Plaintiff argued that the Defendant's email of 9 October 2024 was sent under the influence of other persons and the real position could only be ascertained after affidavits were exchanged.
Defendant's Arguments
- There was no change in circumstances, concession, or undertaking since the injunction application was issued.
- The Defendant was "entirely successful" within the meaning of section 169(1) of the Legal Services Regulation Act 2015 and is entitled to recover costs unless it would be unjust not to do so.
- The Plaintiff unilaterally abandoned the application she initiated, and equity requires a consequence for discontinuing a costly court process.
- Order 99, Rule 2(3) applies, mandating an award of costs upon determination of any interlocutory application.
- The Defendant's position that he would not permit the Plaintiff to reside at his home was clear before the application was issued, making the injunction application without merit.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent |
Rule or Principle Cited For |
Application by the Court |
| Pembroke Equity Partners Limited v. Corrigan [2022] IECA 142 |
Clarification of Court's discretion regarding costs of interlocutory applications; presumption that a party entirely successful in interlocutory application is entitled to costs. |
Guided the Court in applying the presumption that costs follow the event in interlocutory matters. |
| Tekenable Ltd. v. Morrissey [2012] IEHC 391 |
Costs allocation when interlocutory injunction application does not proceed due to factual conflicts. |
Considered but distinguished; the Court rejected reservation of costs based on this precedent due to different factual context. |
| O'Dea v Dublin City Council [2011] IEHC 100 |
Costs liability when a party discontinues proceedings; consideration of interlocutory application costs. |
Supported the principle that a party discontinuing proceedings is prima facie liable for costs. |
| Irish Bacon Slicers Limited v Weidemark Fleischwaren GmbH & Co. [2014] IEHC 293 |
Costs consequences when injunction application is resolved by last-minute undertakings; concept of "real sense" of success. |
Used to illustrate that a party can be deemed successful in real terms even without formal determination. |
| Keogh v AV Pound & Company Limited [2021] IEHC 640 |
Costs orders when interlocutory application becomes moot; appropriateness of costs in the cause. |
Distinguished on facts; emphasized not speculating on outcomes but recognized different context where application became moot. |
| McFadden v. Muckno Hotels Limited [2020] IECA 110 |
Costs allocation when interlocutory injunction application is discontinued without determination. |
Considered; held that Order 99, Rule 2(3) applies only where there is a determination; general discretion applies otherwise. |
| Godsil v. Ireland [2015] 4 IR 535 |
Definition of "event" for costs purposes; a court's determination on merits not essential for costs to attach. |
Supported the view that an event can exist without a contested hearing; relevant to costs determination here. |
| Callagy v. Minister for Education (Supreme Court, unreported, 23 May 2003) |
Costs liability on discontinuance; party who abandons proceedings liable for opponent's costs. |
Affirmed the principle that a plaintiff who discontinues proceedings must pay defendants' costs. |
| McCarthy v. Murphy [2016] IEHC 391 |
Interlocutory applications do not finally decide factual or legal controversies; no cross-examination at interlocutory stage. |
Confirmed that interlocutory applications do not resolve disputes finally but costs can still be awarded. |
| ACC Bank plc v. Hanrahan [2014] 1 IR 1 |
Costs of interlocutory hearings may be reserved when determination depends on factual assessments better made at trial. |
Recognized as a relevant authority but distinguished given the Plaintiff's acceptance of damages remedy here. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court began with the general discretion to award costs, noting that the party entirely successful is presumptively entitled to costs. It emphasized that it must not speculate on the likely outcome of the injunction application that the Plaintiff chose not to pursue. The Plaintiff gained no benefit from issuing the injunction application, nor was there any concession or undertaking from the Defendant that would render the application moot.
The Court considered relevant legislation, particularly Order 99, Rules 2(1), 2(3), and 3(1), and section 169(1) of the Legal Services Regulation Act 2015. It found that section 169(1) applies to interlocutory applications via Order 99, Rule 3(1), reinforcing the presumption that costs follow the event.
Reviewing case law, the Court acknowledged that costs may be reserved when interlocutory applications hinge on factual disputes that cannot be resolved without trial evidence. However, the Plaintiff's unilateral decision to discontinue the application without any intervening event or concession distinguished this case from precedents where costs were reserved or no order was made.
The Court rejected the Plaintiff's argument that costs should be reserved based on the assumption that the injunction would have failed. It held that such speculation is improper and that the Plaintiff's abandonment of the application, without any benefit or settlement, means the Defendant has "in a real sense" succeeded.
The Court further considered the applicability of Order 99, Rule 2(3), which mandates costs awards upon determination of interlocutory applications. While it was not strictly necessary to decide its application here, the Court found no impediment to justly adjudicating costs under the general discretion.
In conclusion, the Court determined that the Plaintiff should bear the costs of the injunction application she discontinued. This decision was grounded in the facts, pleadings, affidavits, submissions, relevant statutory provisions, and judicial authorities. The Court emphasized the importance of discouraging costly applications that are unlikely to succeed and the unfairness of permitting a party to abandon such an application without cost consequences.
Holding and Implications
The Court's final decision is that the Plaintiff is liable for the costs incurred by the Defendant in defending the interlocutory injunction application which the Plaintiff voluntarily discontinued.
Holding: The Plaintiff must pay the Defendant’s costs of the injunction application.
Implications: This decision enforces the principle that a party who unilaterally discontinues an interlocutory application without any intervening event, concession, or benefit to themselves presumptively bears the costs of that application. The ruling reinforces the Court’s discretion to award costs against parties who initiate costly and unmeritorious interlocutory proceedings and subsequently abandon them, thereby discouraging such conduct. No new precedent was established beyond the application of existing principles to the facts of this case.