Factual and Procedural Background
These proceedings arise from a private rented sector offer made by the Appellant, Company A (a local housing authority), to the Respondent, Plaintiff, on 11 June 2020. Plaintiff refused the offer but claimed, relying on a prior Court of Appeal decision (Norton v Haringey), that the offer letter was defective and asserted that Company A continued to owe her the main housing duty under section 193(2) of the Housing Act 1996. A Deputy High Court Judge (Judge Dias) granted Plaintiff's application for a declaration that the duty continued. Company A now appeals against that decision.
Plaintiff had been found eligible for assistance, homeless, in priority need, and not intentionally homeless. Company A had provided temporary accommodation from May 2017. The 11 June 2020 letter offered a private rented sector tenancy outside the local area and stated that the offer would discharge Company A's housing duty whether accepted or refused. Plaintiff did not attend the viewing and remained in temporary accommodation, which was later cancelled. Plaintiff's solicitors requested a review of the suitability of the accommodation in September 2020, which Company A rejected as out of time. In May 2023, Plaintiff's current solicitors requested that Company A acknowledge its continuing duty, which Company A refused. Plaintiff then issued a claim for judicial review challenging Company A's refusal to accept the ongoing duty.
The Deputy High Court Judge ruled in Plaintiff's favour, declaring that Company A continued to owe the housing duty. Company A appeals that decision.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether Company A's letter of 11 June 2020 effectively discharged its main housing duty under section 193(2) of the Housing Act 1996, given the omission of certain statutory information as identified in Norton v Haringey.
- Whether the main housing duty ceases automatically upon refusal or acceptance of a private rented sector offer, or whether a further decision by Company A is required to end the duty.
- Whether Plaintiff was entitled or able to request a statutory review under section 202(1)(b) or (g) of the Housing Act 1996 in respect of the offer and/or the alleged cessation of the duty.
- Whether Plaintiff's claim for judicial review should be permitted given the existence of alternative statutory remedies (review and appeal) which were not pursued in time.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- Plaintiff had two opportunities to request a statutory review in 2020: once in respect of the offer letter itself, which reflected a decision to end the duty upon acceptance or refusal; and again after Plaintiff refused the offer, when Company A concluded its duty had ceased.
- A "decision" by the local housing authority can be confirmatory and does not require a formal or explicit declaration; the intention behind the offer and subsequent actions sufficed as a decision.
- Because Plaintiff had an alternative remedy through statutory review and appeal, judicial review should not be allowed.
Appellee's Arguments
- Plaintiff could not have requested a review in 2020 because Company A never made a decision ending the duty; the duty does not end automatically on refusal or acceptance but only when the authority makes a decision to that effect.
- The offer letter was defective for failing to inform Plaintiff of the effect of section 195A(2) of the Housing Act 1996, as established in Norton.
- Without a decision ending the duty, there was no reviewable decision under section 202(1)(b), thus no alternative remedy was available, justifying judicial review.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent |
Rule or Principle Cited For |
Application by the Court |
| Norton v Haringey [2022] EWCA Civ 1340 |
Requirement to inform applicants of the effect of section 195A(2) in private rented sector offer letters. |
Held the offer letter was defective for failing to inform of section 195A(2) effects; applied to find the duty had not ended. |
| Warsame v Hounslow LBC [2000] 1 WLR 696 |
A decision that a housing duty has ceased is a reviewable decision under section 202(1)(b). |
Supported the proposition that the local authority must make a decision whether the duty has ceased, rather than automatic cessation. |
| Ravichandran v Lewisham LBC [2010] EWCA Civ 755 |
Distinction between prospective discharge by making an offer and a decision confirming duty cessation; both are reviewable. |
Clarified that an offer indicating prospective discharge is reviewable and a decision confirming cessation is also reviewable. |
| R v Home Secretary, Ex p Swati [1986] 1 WLR 477 |
Judicial review should consider availability of alternative remedies and generally will not be granted if appeal mechanisms exist. |
Applied to emphasize judicial review as a remedy of last resort. |
| R (Glencore Energy UK Ltd) v Revenue and Customs Commissioners [2017] EWCA Civ 1716 |
Judicial review is ordinarily a remedy of last resort; statutory review and appeal procedures should be preferred. |
Used to support refusal of judicial review where statutory review and appeal procedures are available. |
| The Father v Worcestershire CC [2025] UKSC 1 |
Judicial review only granted if no suitable alternative remedy exists, except in exceptional circumstances. |
Confirmed that statutory appeal rights operate as a defence to judicial review claims. |
| R v Brent LBC, Ex p O'Connor (1999) 31 HLR 923 |
Application of alternative remedy principle in homelessness cases. |
Supported the view that judicial review is generally inappropriate where statutory review and appeal rights exist. |
| R v Merton LBC, Ex p Sembi (2000) 32 HLR 439 |
Same as above; judicial review as last resort in homelessness decisions. |
Applied to reinforce the availability of alternative remedies. |
| Nipa Begum v Tower Hamlets LBC [2000] 1 WLR 306 |
Judicial review should not be a backstop to statutory review and appeal mechanisms except in exceptional cases. |
Used to reject judicial review where statutory remedies were not pursued. |
| Nikolaeva v Redbridge LBC [2020] EWCA Civ 1586 |
Illustrated complexities in determining whether an offer was refused. |
Referenced to acknowledge potential disputes over refusal but did not alter the automatic cessation principle. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court analysed the statutory framework of the Housing Act 1996, particularly sections 193(2), (3), (5), (6), (7), (7AA), and (7AB), and the right to review under section 202. It noted that section 193(7AA) provides for automatic cessation of the main housing duty upon acceptance or refusal of a private rented sector offer, provided the applicant has been informed of specific matters, including the right to request a review and the consequences of refusal or acceptance.
The Court found that the offer letter of 11 June 2020 was defective for failing to inform Plaintiff of the effect of section 195A(2), as established in Norton, but this defect did not preclude Plaintiff from requesting a review.
Applying precedents such as Warsame and Ravichandran, the Court recognised that a local housing authority’s decision that its duty has ceased is reviewable under section 202(1)(b), and that a prospective discharge by making an offer is also reviewable. However, the Court rejected the Deputy High Court Judge’s conclusion that the duty only ceases when the authority makes a decision to that effect, holding instead that the duty ceases automatically upon refusal or acceptance of a private rented sector offer when the required information has been provided.
The Court further held that Plaintiff had remedies available through statutory review and appeal procedures, which she failed to pursue within the prescribed time limits. Given Parliament’s clear intention that such statutory procedures are the appropriate means to challenge housing duty decisions, the Court exercised its discretion against allowing judicial review in this case.
The Court emphasised that judicial review is a remedy of last resort and should not be permitted where alternative statutory remedies exist and have not been used, absent pressing or exceptional circumstances, which were not shown here.
Finally, the Court noted that the claim for judicial review was improperly focused on a letter of 30 May 2023 which merely stated Company A's position rather than constituting a true decision subject to judicial review.
Holding and Implications
DISMISSED
The Court allowed the appeal and dismissed Plaintiff’s claim for judicial review. The ruling confirms that the main housing duty under section 193 of the Housing Act 1996 ceases automatically upon refusal or acceptance of a private rented sector offer when the statutory information requirements are met. It also reinforces that statutory review and appeal procedures under sections 202 and 204 are the appropriate remedies for challenging decisions regarding housing duties, and judicial review will generally be refused where those remedies are available but not pursued. No new precedent was set beyond clarifying the application of existing legal principles in this context. The direct effect is that Plaintiff’s claim for judicial review is barred due to failure to use the available statutory remedies within the prescribed time.