Koroma, R. v

Factual and Procedural Background

On 12 October 2023, the Appellant was convicted at the Central Criminal Court of two offences: murder and arson. On 16 October 2023, HHJ Poulet KC sentenced the Appellant, then aged 48, to life imprisonment for murder with a minimum term of 29 years less 537 days spent on remand, and a concurrent determinate sentence of 7 years for arson contrary to section 1(2) and (3) of the Criminal Damage Act 1971. A statutory victim surcharge was imposed.

The murder occurred in the early hours of 24 January 2022 at the Appellant's home in Brixton, where he fatally stabbed his wife four times and then attempted to destroy evidence by setting fire to her body and the bedroom. The Appellant had planned the murder for at least 48 hours prior and attempted to destroy the victim's mobile phone. The motive was unclear but involved a history of marital discord, threats, and the victim's plans to end the relationship.

The sentencing court did not have a pre-sentence report but relied on a statement from the victim's son. The judge identified a starting point of 15 years' imprisonment for murder per Schedule 21 to the Sentencing Code, increasing it substantially due to aggravating factors including premeditation, abuse, the presence of the Appellant’s son during the offence, use of a knife, false blame cast on the son, and concealment of the crime by fire. The arson offence was classified as culpability level B and harm level 1, leading to a concurrent 7-year sentence.

Following a subsequent Court of Appeal decision in R v Sesay & Ors, the minimum term was agreed to be expressed precisely as 27 years, 6 months and 9 days. An application for extension of time to renew leave to appeal was granted, and leave to appeal was allowed to proceed on the merits.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the minimum term of 26 years for the murder offence was excessive.
2. Whether the judge erred in treating the nature of the Appellant’s defence (wrongly blaming his son) as an aggravating factor.
3. Whether the principle of totality was properly applied in considering the concurrent sentences and the overall minimum term.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

• The minimum term of 26 years was too long given the starting point of 15 years and the aggravating factors.
• The judge erred in finding the Appellant’s defence blaming his son was an aggravating factor, citing R v Lowndes and R v Norris for the principle that attacking another in defence is not aggravating.
• The planning was not significant; neither the knife nor petrol were brought specifically for the murder.
• The additional 3 years for arson was unjust and disproportionate; insufficient weight was given to the Appellant's actions in alerting others and the emergency services.
• The judge failed to fully apply the principle of totality ensuring sentences are just and proportionate.

Respondent's Arguments

• The judge was entitled to find significant planning within 48 hours prior to the murder and to identify multiple aggravating features.
• The principle from Lowndes that lying about another’s involvement is not aggravating was respected; however, in this case the Appellant’s blame on his son caused real harm and suffering, justifying its consideration as aggravating.
• The Appellant’s son was wrongly implicated as mentally disturbed and a murderer, compounding his suffering and necessitating his testimony at trial.
• The Sentencing Council’s General Guideline supports increasing seriousness where others suffer from wrongful blame by the offender.
• The judge correctly classified the arson offence and the overall sentence was not manifestly excessive given the circumstances.

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court began by reaffirming the sentencing framework for murder under the Criminal Justice Act 2003 and Schedule 21 of the Sentencing Code, emphasizing that starting points are guidelines and must be adjusted based on case-specific aggravating and mitigating factors to achieve a just and proportionate sentence.

The court considered the Appellant’s argument that the minimum term of 26 years was excessive, especially given the limited planning and the fact that neither weapon nor accelerant was brought to the scene specifically for the murder. While accepting the judge’s findings on planning and aggravating factors, the court found that the increase from the 15-year starting point to 26 years was too great.

Regarding the aggravating factor of the Appellant’s defence blaming his son, the court analyzed the principle from Lowndes and Norris that attacking another in defence is not aggravating. However, it distinguished the present case because the wrongful blame caused actual suffering to the son, who was a vulnerable teenager and suffered compounded grief. The court held that this justified considering the blame as an aggravating feature.

The court also examined the arson sentence and its effect on the minimum term. It acknowledged the seriousness of the arson and the judge’s correct classification but emphasized the principle of totality requiring the overall sentence to be just and proportionate. It concluded that the 7-year concurrent sentence for arson was appropriate and should remain undisturbed.

Balancing these considerations, the court reduced the minimum term for murder from the notional 29 years to 25 years, which, after deducting time spent on remand, resulted in a minimum term of 23 years, 6 months and 9 days.

Holding and Implications

The court ALLOWED the appeal to the extent that the minimum term for the offence of murder is reduced to 23 years, 6 months and 9 days.

The determinate sentence of 7 years for arson remains concurrent and unchanged. The decision directly affects the Appellant’s minimum term but does not establish new legal precedent beyond clarifying the application of existing principles regarding aggravating factors related to wrongful blame and the principle of totality in sentencing. The ruling underscores the importance of individualized assessment in sentencing and carefully weighing aggravating features against the totality of the circumstances.