Deeprose, R. v

Factual and Procedural Background

On 8 November 2024, the court considered two unrelated cases listed together due to a common legal issue: whether a vehicle driven to the scene of an offence can be regarded as a weapon taken to the scene. This issue impacts sentencing starting points for murder and attempted murder offences. The court determined an appeal against sentence by the Appellant Papworth and a renewed application for leave to appeal against sentence by the Appellant Deeprose, alongside a renewed application by Papworth for an extension of time to appeal against his convictions.

At the hearing's conclusion, Papworth's renewed application for leave to appeal against conviction was refused and his appeal against sentence dismissed. The court reserved its decision on Deeprose's application due to unresolved issues relating to driving disqualification.

The court subsequently provided detailed written reasons for these decisions.

Legal Issues Presented

1. In what circumstances, if any, is an offender to be taken as having taken a vehicle as a weapon to the scene of an offence?
2. Whether the use of a vehicle as a weapon engages the sentencing starting points and guidelines applicable to weapons taken to the scene under Schedule 21 of the Sentencing Act 2020.
3. Whether the sentencing judge erred in categorising the culpability of the Appellant Deeprose in relation to attempted murder offences involving a vehicle used as a weapon.
4. Whether the sentencing judge erred in imposing an extended determinate sentence on Deeprose.
5. Whether the sentencing judge erred in the calculation and announcement of the driving disqualification imposed on Deeprose.
6. Whether the Appellant Papworth's convictions and sentences, including the minimum term for murder, were appropriate and supported by the evidence.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

• The Appellant's Attorney argued that although a car can be used as a weapon, Parliament did not intend for vehicles to be treated as weapons "taken to the scene" under paragraph 4 of Schedule 21 of the Sentencing Act 2020. Driving a car is a mode of transport and does not equate to "taking a weapon to the scene" as understood in relation to knives or other weapons.
• It was contended that applying paragraph 4 to vehicles creates conceptual difficulties, such as defining the "scene" and the distance driven, and that the culpability of using a car as a weapon differs fundamentally from that of using a knife.
• In relation to Deeprose, it was submitted that the sentencing judge erred by placing the attempted murder offences in a higher culpability category, arguing the acts were spontaneous rather than premeditated and that the extended determinate sentence was excessive.
• In relation to Papworth, it was argued that his conduct did not meet the legal test for murder or attempted murder, suggesting lesser offences such as causing death by dangerous driving or manslaughter were more appropriate due to intoxication and impaired judgment.
• The uplift applied to Papworth’s minimum term was challenged as excessive given the starting point already reflected high culpability.

Respondent's Arguments

• The prosecution Attorneys contended that the ordinary meaning of paragraph 4 of Schedule 21 includes vehicles used as weapons. Driving a car to the scene with intent to use it as a weapon constitutes "taking a weapon to the scene."
• They argued that the evidence must prove the intention to use the vehicle as a weapon, and that the mode of transport by driving does not negate the fact that the vehicle was taken to the scene as a weapon.
• In Deeprose's case, it was submitted that the sentencing judge was entitled to find premeditation and place the offences in the high culpability category, with the extended determinate sentence justified by the risk posed to the public.
• Regarding the driving disqualification, the prosecution acknowledged that the explanation of the disqualification period could have been clearer but maintained the judge’s findings on culpability and sentence were correct.

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court analysed the statutory framework under the Sentencing Act 2020, particularly Schedule 21, which sets out structured starting points for minimum terms in murder cases. Paragraph 4(2) refers to offenders who take a knife or other weapon to the scene intending to commit an offence or have it available as a weapon and use it in committing murder. The court observed that the language is not limited to knives but extends to any weapon, as established in previous cases involving sticks, bottles, hammers, and rolling pins.

Given the established principle that a car can be a weapon, the court found no reason to exclude vehicles from the scope of paragraph 4. The critical factor is the offender’s intention: the vehicle must be taken to the scene not merely as transport but with the intention to use it or have it available as a weapon, and it must be used as such in committing the offence.

The court rejected the argument that the ordinary meaning of "taking a weapon to the scene" excludes vehicles, noting that the statutory language differs from that of the Prevention of Crime Act 1953 and that the latter’s focus on carrying offensive weapons does not extend to vehicles.

The court emphasised that the level of culpability associated with taking a weapon to the scene is high, reflecting planning and premeditation, and that this culpability applies equally to vehicles used as weapons.

In applying these principles to the cases before it, the court found that in Deeprose’s case the judge was entitled to find that he took the car to the scene intending to use it as a weapon, justifying the high culpability categorisation and the extended determinate sentence. The court upheld the sentence as not manifestly excessive.

Regarding Deeprose’s driving disqualification, the court identified procedural error: the judge did not announce the disqualification period in open court, and the recorded order did not reflect the judge’s oral pronouncement. This was unlawful as the mandatory minimum disqualification was not properly imposed.

In Papworth’s case, the court found ample evidence that he set out intending to use his car as a weapon, justifying the application of paragraph 4 and the 25-year starting point for the minimum term. The court found the nine-year uplift to the minimum term appropriate, reflecting associated offences and the gravity of conduct. Papworth’s grounds of appeal against conviction and sentence were rejected as lacking merit.

Holding and Implications

The court’s final decisions are as follows:

• On the overarching issue: A vehicle can constitute a weapon taken to the scene of an offence if it is taken with the intention of using it or having it available as a weapon, and is so used. This interpretation aligns with the statutory language and sentencing principles.
• In the case of the Appellant Deeprose: Leave to appeal against sentence was granted, but the appeal was dismissed. The sentencing judge’s findings on culpability and the extended determinate sentence were upheld. However, the driving disqualification order was found to be unlawful due to procedural error and must be corrected.
• In the case of the Appellant Papworth: The renewed application for leave to appeal against conviction was refused, and the appeal against sentence dismissed. The court upheld the minimum term and the uplift applied by the sentencing judge.

The decisions directly affect the parties by confirming the sentences and convictions, except for the correction of the driving disqualification in Deeprose’s case. No new binding precedent is established beyond the clear affirmation that vehicles may be treated as weapons taken to the scene under the relevant sentencing provisions.