Factual and Procedural Background
On 4 September 2023, the Appellant was convicted of the murder of the deceased, hereafter referred to as "DB". On 8 September 2023, the Appellant was sentenced to life imprisonment with a minimum term of 16 years less 541 days spent on remand. The Appellant appealed against conviction with leave of the single judge. The sole ground of appeal challenged the trial judge's decision not to leave the partial defence of loss of control to the jury, contending that there was arguably sufficient evidence under section 54(1) of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009, as interpreted in relevant case law.
On 14 March 2022, DB exited a first floor flat occupied by the Appellant in a location in Liverpool. Shortly after, DB collapsed and was pronounced dead at the scene from fatal stab injuries. The postmortem revealed multiple wounds, including two deep stab wounds inflicted by a large, sharp bladed weapon. It was undisputed at trial that the Appellant had stabbed DB with a kitchen knife, although she claimed no memory of the stabbing and did not assert a positive defence.
The Appellant and DB were known to each other. Evidence including a timeline and CCTV footage detailed their interactions on the day of the incident, including their arrival together at the Appellant’s flat where the stabbing occurred. The Appellant activated a domestic violence alarm shortly after DB left the flat. Police found extensive bloodstaining and a bloodstained kitchen knife at the scene. The Appellant was in a distressed state, sustaining a puncture wound to her right thigh, and was arrested on suspicion of murder.
The Appellant underwent hospital treatment and was interviewed under caution. She gave varying accounts, initially denying stabbing DB and suggesting DB had stabbed himself after stabbing her. At trial, the Appellant admitted to stabbing DB but maintained no memory of the event. Expert psychiatric evidence diagnosed the Appellant with a personality disorder with emotionally unstable traits or complex PTSD. The trial judge ruled that there was insufficient evidence to leave the partial defence of loss of control to the jury but left issues of self-defence and diminished responsibility to be considered by the jury.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the trial judge erred in refusing to leave the partial defence of loss of control to the jury, given the evidence presented under section 54(1) of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- The Appellant contended that there was sufficient circumstantial evidence of loss of control to require the issue to be left to the jury, including the nature of the stabbing as a "frenzied attack".
- She pointed to physical evidence such as damage to clothing and the scene, the Appellant’s lack of violent disposition, her distressed behaviour after the incident, and her memory loss as indicative of loss of self-control.
- The Appellant argued that the judge should have evaluated the evidence with a threshold of what the jury might conclude, rather than making findings of fact about the nature of the attack.
- She suggested a possible qualifying trigger in the form of a non-consensual sexual assault by DB, which the Appellant claimed would have caused her to "flip".
Respondent's Arguments
- The Respondent submitted that the stab wound to the Appellant’s leg did not assist on the issue of loss of control.
- Medical records indicated the Appellant had anger issues and prior violent incidents, undermining claims of good character and loss of control.
- The Respondent maintained that the suggestion of a sexual assault was speculative and unsupported by evidence, as the Appellant denied any sexual contact on the night in question.
- The Respondent supported the judge’s conclusion that there was insufficient evidence to leave loss of control to the jury.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent |
Rule or Principle Cited For |
Application by the Court |
| R v Goodwin [2018] EWCA Crim 2287 |
Guidance on factors to consider when deciding whether to leave loss of control to the jury. |
The court relied on the non-exhaustive list of factors and the principle that a judge should avoid speculative issues in jury directions. |
| R v Islam [2019] EWCA Crim 2419 |
Observation that defendants charged with murder often cannot rely on both self-defence and loss of control defences simultaneously. |
Supported the judge’s approach in treating self-defence and loss of control as distinct and potentially incompatible defences. |
| R v Gurpinar [2015] EWCA Crim 178 |
Sequential analysis of the three components of loss of control under section 54(1) of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009. |
The court applied this principle to conclude that if there is insufficient evidence on the first component (loss of self-control), there is no need to consider the others. |
| R v Clinton [2012] 3 WLR 515 |
Clarification that the components of loss of control are likely to arise simultaneously but must be analysed sequentially and rigorously by the judge. |
Used to affirm that the judge must make a rigorous evaluation before leaving loss of control to the jury. |
| R v Jewell [2014] EWCA Crim 414 |
Requirement that trial judges assess the weight and quality of evidence before leaving loss of control to the jury. |
The court found the judge’s vigorous assessment appropriate and within his gatekeeping role. |
| R v Skilton [2014] EWCA Crim 154 |
Trial judges should avoid cluttering jury deliberations with issues unsupported by evidence. |
Supported the judge’s refusal to leave speculative loss of control issues to the jury. |
| R v Jovan [2017] EWCA Crim 1359 |
Clarification that self-defence and loss of control are not mutually exclusive but distinct defences requiring separate consideration. |
The court acknowledged that self-defence may be left to the jury even if loss of control is not. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court undertook a detailed and sequential analysis of the components of the partial defence of loss of control as set out in section 54(1) of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009. The starting point was whether there was sufficient evidence of loss of self-control by the Appellant. The court agreed with the trial judge that the evidence did not support describing the attack as "frenzied" or indicative of a loss of self-control, noting that most injuries were superficial and the fatal wounds were limited.
The alleged damage to the living room was deemed insignificant and not suggestive of a violent struggle. The Appellant’s character was scrutinised, with medical records undermining claims of good character. The Appellant’s distressed behaviour post-incident was considered reactive rather than indicative of prior loss of control.
The court rejected the Appellant’s speculation about a non-consensual sexual assault, finding no evidential basis to support this as a qualifying trigger under the statute. The judge’s role as gatekeeper was affirmed, with the court noting that he properly assessed the quality and weight of the evidence and did not overstep by making factual findings beyond his remit.
The court also addressed the interrelationship between self-defence and loss of control, agreeing with the trial judge’s decision to leave self-defence to the jury while excluding loss of control, consistent with established case law.
Holding and Implications
The appeal against conviction was DISMISSED.
The court upheld the trial judge’s ruling that there was insufficient evidence to leave the partial defence of loss of control to the jury. The decision confirms the rigorous gatekeeping role of trial judges in assessing evidential sufficiency before allowing such defences to be considered by a jury. No new precedent was established, and the decision’s direct effect is to affirm the Appellant’s conviction and sentence.