RG v International Protection Appeals Tribunal & Ors (Approved)

Factual and Procedural Background

This judicial review application concerns the transfer of the Applicant from Ireland to France under Regulation (EU) No. 604/2013 ("the Dublin III Regulation"). The Applicant initially applied for international protection in France on 25 March 2022 and subsequently in Ireland on 21 September 2022. Following a take-back request issued by the International Protection Office ("IPO") to France on 27 September 2022, France accepted responsibility for the Applicant's asylum claim. The IPO issued a transfer decision on 16 February 2023, which was upheld on appeal by the International Protection Appeals Tribunal ("IPAT") on 20 September 2023.

The Applicant was transferred to France on 13 February 2024 but contended that this transfer was unlawful due to the alleged failure of the Irish authorities to exchange relevant information and health data with the French authorities as required by Articles 31 and 32 of the Dublin III Regulation. The Applicant also challenged the validity of the Minister for Justice's Article 17(1) decision dated 12 February 2024, which refused discretionary relief to examine the application for international protection in Ireland.

The proceedings include multiple affidavits, medical reports from Dr. Giller dated 16 April 2023, 30 January 2024, and 29 February 2024, and submissions relating to the Applicant's mental health condition, risk of suicide, and the legality of the transfer process. The High Court refused an injunction application on 19 December 2023. The matter was heard before the Court on 20 June 2024.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the Minister for Justice failed to properly consider the alleged change of circumstances arising from the Applicant's deteriorating mental health between the High Court's decision on 19 December 2023 and the Article 17(1) decision on 12 February 2024.
2. Whether the transfer of the Applicant to France was lawful in light of the requirements to exchange relevant information and health data under Articles 31 and 32 of the Dublin III Regulation.
3. Whether the Article 17(1) decision was validly made by an officer acting under the Minister's authority, or whether it was ultra vires due to improper delegation contrary to the Carltona principle and relevant Irish Supreme Court authority.
4. Whether the Applicant's transfer exposed him to a real and proven risk of inhuman or degrading treatment contrary to the EU Charter, the Geneva Convention, and the European Convention on Human Rights ("ECHR").
5. The scope and application of the Minister's discretion under Article 17 of the Dublin III Regulation, including the legal threshold for exceptional circumstances warranting a departure from the presumption of lawful transfer.
6. The applicability and interpretation of Article 29(3) of the Dublin III Regulation concerning the return of a person transferred erroneously or where a transfer decision is overturned after the transfer.

Arguments of the Parties

Applicant's Arguments

• The Minister failed to consider the change of circumstances evidenced by the second medical report dated 30 January 2024, which showed the Applicant developed suicidal ideation at the thought of being returned to France.
• The transfer was effected unlawfully without proper exchange of relevant information and health data with French authorities as required by Articles 31 and 32 of the Dublin III Regulation.
• The Article 17(1) decision dated 12 February 2024 was ultra vires because it was signed by an International Protection Officer (an "Officer of the Minister") lacking lawful authority to exercise the Minister's discretion, contrary to the Supreme Court decision in NVU v Refugee Appeals Tribunal.
• The Minister's Article 17 decision was irrational, failed to consider all relevant information including medical reports, and inadequately addressed the Applicant's fundamental rights under the Constitution, the EU Charter, and the ECHR.
• The Applicant should be returned to Ireland pursuant to Article 29(3) of the Dublin III Regulation as the transfer was unlawful.

Respondents' Arguments

• The Minister lawfully exercised discretion under Article 17(1) of the Dublin III Regulation and properly considered the medical and psychological reports.
• The Applicant's health data, including psychiatric condition and suicidal tendency, were communicated to French authorities via the prescribed Common Health Certificate in compliance with Articles 31 and 32.
• The Carltona principle applies, and the Article 17(1) decision made by the Minister's officer is constitutionally the decision of the Minister.
• The Applicant did not establish a real and proven risk that the transfer would expose him to inhuman or degrading treatment.
• The Applicant was not transferred erroneously and therefore Article 29(3) does not apply.
• The Applicant's challenges to evidence not pleaded in the Statement of Grounds are inadmissible.

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court carefully evaluated the Applicant's claims regarding the alleged change in circumstances based on updated medical evidence, particularly the second medical report dated 30 January 2024. It found that the medical evidence did not establish a significant change sufficient to meet the high threshold of "exceptional circumstances" required to depart from the presumption of lawful transfer under the Dublin III Regulation.

The Court noted that the Applicant's mental health condition, including PTSD and suicidal ideation, was known to the Minister and communicated to the French authorities via the prescribed Common Health Certificate pursuant to Article 32(1). The absence of a detailed ongoing treatment plan or medication requirements limited the scope of the Applicant's claim of risk.

The Court considered the Minister's Article 17(1) decision, which engaged with the Applicant's arguments comprehensively, including healthcare access, accommodation, and human rights considerations. The decision was found to be lawful, fair, and within the Minister's discretion, with no significant errors of assessment.

Regarding the authority to make the Article 17(1) decision, the Court applied the Carltona principle, holding that the decision by the Minister's officer was constitutionally the decision of the Minister. The Applicant's argument that the decision was ultra vires was rejected based on established Irish and UK authority.

The Court found that the transfer complied with Articles 31 and 32 of the Dublin III Regulation, including the exchange of relevant information and health data. The Applicant's contention that health data was not provided was not supported by the evidence, and the Court emphasized the procedural safeguards for correcting any inaccurate information.

Finally, the Court concluded that the Applicant was not transferred erroneously and therefore was not entitled to relief under Article 29(3) of the Dublin III Regulation.

Holding and Implications

The Court REFUSED the Applicant's application for judicial review and dismissed all reliefs sought, including challenges to the Article 17(1) ministerial decision and the lawfulness of the transfer to France.

The decision confirms the applicability of the Carltona principle to ministerial decisions under the Dublin III Regulation and affirms the high threshold for establishing exceptional circumstances warranting a departure from the presumption of lawful transfer. It clarifies that the exchange of health data requirements under Articles 31 and 32 were satisfied in this case and that challenges to transfers must be grounded in properly pleaded grounds.

No new legal precedent was established beyond the application of existing principles to the facts. The direct effect of the ruling is to uphold the Minister's discretion and the legality of the Applicant's transfer to France in accordance with the Dublin III Regulation.