MTA v The Lord Chancellor

Factual and Procedural Background

The Plaintiff, a young man suffering from severe mental ill-health including acute psychosis, was made subject to a County Court injunction with a power of arrest under section 1 of the Anti-Social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014 on 17 February 2020. Subsequently, he was arrested on three occasions (18 May, 10 June, and 29 June 2020) for suspected breaches of this injunction, detained overnight each time, and brought before the court. On 19 May 2020, he was remanded in custody for three weeks pending a determination of his capacity in relation to the breach proceedings and whether he should be committed. On the return date, the court found he lacked the requisite capacity and released him. Eventually, the injunction was set aside on the basis of his lack of capacity.

On 16 February 2021, the Plaintiff, represented by the Official Solicitor as litigation friend, issued proceedings seeking damages under sections 7 and 8 of the Human Rights Act 1998 against the Metropolitan Police Commissioner and the Lord Chancellor. The claim alleged that the detentions constituted unlawful deprivation of liberty under Article 5.1 of the European Convention on Human Rights due to the injunction having no legal effect because of the Plaintiff's lack of capacity. The Lord Chancellor was sued in respect of judicial acts (the original injunction and the remand order of 19 May 2020) which were said to have no legal effect for the same reason.

The Lord Chancellor applied to strike out the claim against him on the basis that it was an abuse of process to bring such proceedings without first appealing the impugned orders. The application was dismissed by Freedman J on 25 January 2023. The Lord Chancellor appealed with permission granted by Coulson LJ.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether it is an abuse of process for a claimant to bring free-standing proceedings for damages under section 9(1)(c) of the Human Rights Act 1998 against the Lord Chancellor in respect of judicial acts without first appealing the impugned orders.
2. Whether a "blanket rule" exists requiring prior appeal before such claims may be brought.
3. The extent to which the principle of collateral challenge applies to free-standing damages claims under the Human Rights Act in this context.
4. The constitutional implications for the Lord Chancellor defending claims that challenge judicial decisions without prior appeal.

Arguments of the Parties

Lord Chancellor's Arguments

• There is a "blanket rule" that it is an abuse of process to bring claims under section 9(3) of the Human Rights Act by originating process in respect of judicial orders which could and should have been appealed.
• Even if no absolute rule exists, bringing free-standing proceedings without prior appeal is an abuse of process in the circumstances of this case.
• Free-standing claims involve an illegitimate collateral challenge to judicial decisions not appealed, circumventing appeal procedures, time limits, and permission requirements.
• The Lord Chancellor faces a "constitutional quandary" because defending such claims risks undermining judicial independence, while settling them implies acceptance that judicial decisions were unlawful.

Plaintiff's Arguments

• The impugned orders have been found by the County Court itself to be of no effect due to the Plaintiff's lack of capacity, thus no collateral challenge arises in the damages claim.
• The absence of an appeal does not constitute abuse of process because the Plaintiff was released from detention and had no substantive advantage in appealing.
• It would not undermine judicial independence for the Lord Chancellor to settle claims for damages arising from judicial acts found unlawful.
• The Human Rights Act contemplates free-standing proceedings for damages under section 9(1)(c) without a mandatory requirement for prior appeal.

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court began by summarizing the relevant statutory framework, including the Anti-Social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014, the Civil Procedure Rules, and the Human Rights Act 1998, focusing particularly on sections 6, 7, 8, and 9. The Court noted that the Plaintiff's detention was predicated on judicial orders later found to have no legal effect due to his lack of capacity.

Addressing the Lord Chancellor's contention of abuse of process, the Court emphasized that the impugned orders had already been declared of no effect by the County Court itself, which distinguished this case from those involving collateral challenges to final decisions of courts of co-ordinate jurisdiction. The Court explained that the principle against collateral challenge aims to prevent one court from undermining another's decision, but here the same court had reviewed and invalidated the orders, negating that concern.

The Court rejected the existence of a "blanket rule" that free-standing damages claims under section 9(1)(c) must be preceded by an appeal, relying heavily on the interpretation in Mazhar v Lord Chancellor. It noted that while an abuse of process might arise in some circumstances, no such abuse was demonstrated here.

Regarding the constitutional argument, the Court reasoned that settling or defending claims for damages arising from judicial acts found unlawful does not undermine judicial independence or the rule of law. The Lord Chancellor's statutory duty to uphold judicial independence does not preclude him from settling claims when advised it is appropriate.

The Court further observed that requiring prior appeals in cases where the claimant has already been released from detention could impose unnecessary procedural burdens without substantive benefit. It also highlighted the absence of an absolute prohibition on collateral challenges in the case law, favoring a flexible, merits-based approach to abuse of process.

Holding and Implications

The Court DISMISSED the Lord Chancellor's appeal, holding that:

• There is no absolute or "blanket" rule requiring a claimant to appeal impugned judicial orders before bringing free-standing proceedings for damages under section 9(1)(c) of the Human Rights Act 1998.
• The Plaintiff's claim is not an abuse of process because the impugned orders were found by the County Court itself to have no effect, eliminating concerns of illegitimate collateral challenge.
• The constitutional argument that defending such claims undermines judicial independence is unfounded in the circumstances.

The direct effect is that the Plaintiff may continue his damages claim without having first appealed the impugned orders. The Court did not establish any new precedent limiting the circumstances in which free-standing claims under section 9(1)(c) may be brought, leaving open the possibility that abuse of process may arise in other factual contexts. No broader procedural rule was imposed.