Factual and Procedural Background
On 25 July 2023, following a trial at the Central Criminal Court before the Recorder of London and a jury, the Appellants, Jamal Grant and Elvis Grant, were each convicted of the murder of the victim. Their co-defendant, Lamar Grant, was acquitted of murder but convicted of manslaughter. All three were also convicted of perverting the course of public justice. Sentencing took place on 8 August 2023, with life sentences for Jamal and Elvis Grant and a determinate sentence for Lamar Grant. Jamal and Elvis Grant renewed applications for leave to appeal against sentence, which had been refused by a single judge, while Lamar Grant appealed with leave. The hearing involved legal representation for all parties and submissions by the Crown.
The background to the offences includes an incident in May 2018 when Jamal Grant was stabbed and accused the victim of the stabbing. In June 2022, the victim was attacked on a residential estate by the three offenders, resulting in a fatal stab wound. The offenders disposed of weapons and clothing after the attack, leading to their conviction for perverting the course of justice. At trial, Jamal Grant admitted presence but claimed self-defence, which was rejected. Each offender had a history of prior convictions of varying seriousness. The sentencing judge considered victim impact statements, submissions from counsel, and letters concerning the offenders. The judge found aggravating and mitigating factors and imposed sentences accordingly. The appeal hearing involved review of these findings and submissions challenging aspects of the sentencing decisions.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the sentencing judge erred in assessing aggravating and mitigating factors in determining the minimum terms for the murder convictions of Jamal and Elvis Grant.
- Whether the sentencing judge erred in categorising Lamar Grant's culpability within category B of the manslaughter sentencing guideline rather than a lesser category.
- Whether the sentences for the offence of perverting the course of justice were appropriate and whether the consecutive or concurrent nature of these sentences was correctly determined.
- Whether the appeals against sentence by Jamal Grant, Elvis Grant, and Lamar Grant should be allowed or dismissed.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellants' Arguments
- Jamal Grant's Counsel: Submitted that the judge gave excessive weight to aggravating factors such as group offending, degree of planning, risk to others, and the daylight nature of the attack. Argued that the attack was spontaneous, group offending was overstated since only Jamal inflicted the stab wound, and the disposal of weapons was commonplace and should not aggravate the sentence. Emphasised the significant mitigating factor of lack of intent to kill, with only a single stab wound inflicted.
- Elvis Grant's Counsel: Adopted the oral submissions made on behalf of Jamal Grant and additionally argued that group offending should not have been treated as an aggravating factor, citing statutory provisions.
- Lamar Grant's Counsel: Argued that the judge placed too high a culpability category on Lamar Grant, failing to adequately consider his minor role in the incident. Contended that no evidence showed Lamar used the baseball bat and that he stood at a distance from the stabbing. Submitted that Lamar's previous convictions were juvenile and unrelated to manslaughter. Claimed the sentence was manifestly excessive, including the consecutive sentence for perverting the course of justice.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent |
Rule or Principle Cited For |
Application by the Court |
| AG Reference (R v Parry) [2023] EWCA Crim 421 |
Assessment of appropriate culpability categories and sentencing for co-offenders convicted of manslaughter. |
The court found the precedent not helpful due to factual differences. It acknowledged the single judge's discretion to categorise culpability and rejected the argument that Lamar Grant's culpability fell into a lower category. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court carefully reviewed the sentencing judge's identification and weighting of aggravating and mitigating factors. It found that the judge was entitled to consider group offending as an aggravating factor despite submissions to the contrary, noting that the statutory list of aggravating factors is not exhaustive. The judge was also entitled to find some degree of planning, risk to others, and the public nature of the attack as aggravating, applying appropriate weight to each.
Regarding the mitigating factor of lack of intent to kill, the judge made a downward adjustment within the permissible range based on the evidence of a single stab wound and the absence of intent to cause death. The court was satisfied that the judge's assessment of previous convictions and their relevance was appropriate.
In relation to Lamar Grant, the court agreed with the judge's conclusion that his culpability fell within category B of the manslaughter guideline. The judge's assessment, having presided over the trial and heard all evidence, was entitled to weigh the evidence of Lamar's active participation, disposal of clothing, and involvement in the group attack. The court rejected the submission that Lamar's role was minor enough to warrant a lower culpability category.
On the offence of perverting the course of justice, the court found no error in the judge's determination of sentence or the decision to impose a consecutive term for Lamar Grant, noting the judge's consideration of totality.
Holding and Implications
The court refused the renewed applications for leave to appeal against sentence by Jamal Grant and Elvis Grant and dismissed Lamar Grant's appeal against sentence.
The decision upholds the sentences imposed for murder, manslaughter, and perverting the course of justice, confirming the sentencing judge's discretion in assessing aggravating and mitigating factors and categorising culpability. The ruling enforces the principle that sentencing must reflect the offender's role and the circumstances of the offence as found by the trial judge, who is best placed to assess the evidence. No new precedent was established; the court applied established sentencing guidelines and principles to the facts of this case.