Factual and Procedural Background
This opinion consolidates several unconnected applications for leave to appeal sentences involving life imprisonment, primarily for murder offences. The common legal issue concerns the crediting of periods spent on remand in custody or on bail towards the minimum term to be served under a life sentence. The court provides guidance on the principles and procedures for calculating and announcing minimum terms, as well as addressing specific appeals by four appellants sentenced to life imprisonment or imprisonment for life.
The procedural context includes applications for leave to appeal against sentences imposed in Crown Courts across various locations, with some applications renewed and referred by the Registrar. The court also discusses the procedural requirements when the prosecution or victim's family is not represented, and the process for correcting technical errors in sentencing under section 385 of the Sentencing Code.
Legal Issues Presented
- How should periods of remand in custody, bail subject to qualifying curfew, or custody pending extradition be credited when setting the minimum term for life sentences under sections 322 and 323 of the Sentencing Code?
- What is the proper procedure and judicial obligation regarding the announcement and calculation of the minimum term and the specification of remand days during sentencing for life imprisonment?
- Can administrative corrections be made to the minimum term after the statutory period under section 385 has expired, or must such corrections be made by appeal?
- What are the principles governing the correction of errors related to crediting remand time in life sentences?
- In specific cases, were errors made in the calculation or announcement of the minimum term and remand credit, and if so, what are the appropriate remedies?
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant Yousif Sesay's Arguments
- The sentencing judge erred by failing to specify the exact number of remand days to be credited towards the minimum term.
- There was unjustified disparity between the minimum term imposed on Sesay (22 years) and that imposed on a co-accused, Ludford (21 years), despite similar circumstances.
Appellant Laurence Griffiths's Arguments
- The life sentence was disproportionate and unnecessary to protect the public; an extended determinate sentence would suffice.
- The trial judge misdirected by stating Griffiths had intent close to intent to kill, whereas he was convicted of wounding with intent to cause really serious harm.
- The judge failed to properly identify the number of days to be credited as time served on remand.
Appellant Keal Richards's Arguments
- The minimum term of 33 years was excessive due to insufficient consideration of age and disability.
- The judge did not order a pre-sentence report or allow time for character references.
- There was ambiguity in the announcement and recording of remand days credited towards the minimum term.
Appellant Carl Silcox's Arguments
- The judge lacked sufficient evidence to conclude the murder involved sexual conduct, which affected the starting point for the minimum term.
- The sexual conduct did not involve wholly exceptional brutality to justify a 30-year starting point.
- The judge failed to give adequate weight to mitigating factors such as lack of intent to kill and absence of premeditation.
- The court order amending the remand days credited was unlawful and not reflective of the sentence pronounced in open court.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent |
Rule or Principle Cited For |
Application by the Court |
| R v Cookson [2023] 2 Cr App R (S) 12 |
Minimum term is part of the sentence and not subject to administrative review; errors corrected under section 385 or by appeal. |
Confirmed that minimum term must be announced with arithmetic calculation; errors in calculation require correction by appeal if statutory period expired. |
| Hoggard [2014] 1 Cr App R (S) 41 |
Formula for crediting time spent under qualifying curfew or custody awaiting extradition. |
Advised use of formula when judges give directions on crediting such periods. |
| Gordon [2007] EWCA Crim 165 |
Remand days credit is a temporary order subject to correction if errors emerge. |
Supported the principle that remand credit can be corrected in open court if disputed. |
| AA [2014] EWCA Crim 2483 |
Duty of advocates to ensure accurate remand period information is before the court. |
Reiterated the importance of accurate information for sentencing and strict application of time limits. |
| R v Irving [2010] EWCA (Crim) 189 |
Defence advocates' duty to provide proper remand period information to sentencing court. |
Emphasized advocacy responsibility in sentencing process. |
| R v Leacock [2013] EWCA Crim 1994 |
Application of strict future time limits for raising remand period issues. |
Confirmed the necessity of timely presentation of remand information. |
| R v Pink [2014] EWCA (Crim) 579 |
Reiteration of duty to assist court with remand time information within set timeframes. |
Supported the enforcement of procedural deadlines. |
| Burinskas [2014] EWCA Crim 334 |
Principles for imposing life sentences on dangerous offenders. |
Applied in assessing the appropriateness of life sentence for an offender posing serious risk. |
| Boland and Tinsley [2007] EWCA Crim 90 |
Criteria for elevating starting point in murder cases involving sadistic conduct. |
Referenced in discussion of seriousness required for starting point increase. |
| Maynard Ellis [2021] EWCA Crim 317 |
Clarification of exceptional brutality requirement for sadistic conduct in sentencing. |
Used to contrast with sexual conduct in murder sentencing. |
| McSweeney [2024] EWCA Crim 1250 |
Recognition that murder involving sexual conduct is particularly serious due to the sexual element. |
Supported the court's view that sexual conduct elevates seriousness independently of brutality. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court began by clarifying the statutory framework governing the setting of minimum terms for life sentences, particularly sections 322 and 323 of the Sentencing Code, which require that periods spent on remand in custody, on bail subject to qualifying curfew, or awaiting extradition be taken into account when fixing the minimum term. The minimum term forms an integral part of the sentence and must be announced with precision by the sentencing judge, including the arithmetic calculation reflecting deductions for remand time.
The court emphasized that administrative corrections to the minimum term are only permissible within a statutory 56-day period under section 385 of the Sentencing Code. Beyond this period, corrections require an appeal, and increases in the minimum term on appeal are restricted by section 11(3) of the Criminal Appeal Act 1968 unless offset by other sentence reductions.
The court rejected the notion that the process used for determinate sentences—where HMPPS calculates remand credit automatically—can be applied to life sentences. For life sentences, the judge must specify in open court the exact number of remand days credited. This ensures clarity for digital recording and application by HMPPS and transparency for the offender and interested parties.
In relation to the individual appeals, the court analyzed the facts, sentencing remarks, and procedural history. It identified errors in the announcement or specification of remand credit in each case, quashing and substituting minimum terms where appropriate to reflect proper crediting of remand days. The court also addressed substantive arguments relating to sentence disparity, the appropriateness of life sentences, and the classification of offences involving sexual conduct or sadistic behaviour, applying established principles and relevant precedents.
The court further underscored the duty of advocates and parties to provide accurate remand information to the court and the importance of timely raising of sentencing issues to avoid procedural complications.
Holding and Implications
The court made the following final determinations for the four specific applications:
- Yousif Sesay: Allowed appeal in a limited respect by adjusting the minimum term to 21 years and 64 days to correctly reflect remand credit. Leave to appeal was refused on grounds of unjustified sentencing disparity.
- Laurence Griffiths: Refused leave to appeal against the life sentence itself but allowed appeal to quash and substitute the minimum term to 7 years and 60 days, reflecting a precise remand credit of 305 days.
- Keal Richards: Refused substantive grounds of appeal but allowed limited appeal to quash and substitute a minimum term of 32 years and 83 days to correctly account for 282 days remand credit.
- Carl Silcox: Refused substantive grounds challenging the sexual conduct classification but allowed limited appeal to quash and substitute a minimum term of 23 years and 219 days, reflecting the remand credit properly announced in court.
The court emphasized that these corrections do not establish new precedent but reaffirm the strict statutory and procedural requirements governing the setting and announcement of minimum terms in life sentences. Accurate specification of remand credit is essential, and errors must be corrected through appropriate legal channels. The decisions ensure clarity and fairness in sentencing but do not alter established sentencing principles.