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Wathen-Fayed v Secretary of State for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities

Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The case concerns a planning permission granted by a Planning Inspector appointed by the Secretary of State for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities ("the Secretary of State") following a local Inquiry. The appeal was made by the First Interested Party ("Company A") against the refusal by the District Planning Authority, the Second Interested Party ("Company B"), of an application for planning permission for a development in the Green Belt near The City, The State. The development proposed was a crematorium with associated facilities on a 4.5-hectare site of open fields previously used for grazing horses. The site is located adjacent to a main road and near an Area of Outstanding Natural Beauty.

The site lies within Flood Risk Zone 1 but is identified as at risk of groundwater flooding. Company A submitted a site-specific Flood Risk Assessment asserting no significant flood risk. The Inspector found the development to be inappropriate in the Green Belt but justified it by very special circumstances, including community need. Planning permission was granted subject to conditions, including a surface water drainage scheme approval.

The Appellant, a local resident and member of a residents' group opposing the development, sought statutory review of the Inspector’s decision which was dismissed by the Deputy High Court Judge. The Appellant now appeals on four grounds focused on the interpretation and application of the Cremation Act 1902 and flood risk policies.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the proposed development contravenes the restrictions in section 5 of the Cremation Act 1902 regarding proximity of crematoria to dwellings and public highways.
  2. Whether the Inspector and Judge erred in their interpretation and application of the Cremation Act 1902's provisions to the proposed development.
  3. Whether the Inspector misinterpreted or failed to properly apply national flood risk policies and guidance, including the sequential test under the National Planning Policy Framework and Planning Practice Guidance.
  4. Whether the Inspector was misled by Company A’s Flood Risk Assessment in relation to surface water flood risk and alternative site availability.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The proposed development would contravene section 5 of the Cremation Act 1902 because ancillary or incidental parts of the crematorium (such as memorial gardens, service yards, and access roads) fall within prohibited distances from dwellings and highways.
  • The Inspector and Judge failed to properly consider the statutory prohibition and its impact on the deliverability of the development, undermining the case for very special circumstances.
  • The Judge’s interpretation of the Cremation Act 1902 was too narrow, focusing only on public health and excluding other purposes such as protection of religious and other sensibilities.
  • The Inspector misapplied flood risk policies by not adequately considering alternative sites with lower flood risk and by being misled by the Flood Risk Assessment.
  • The distinction between storage and disposal of ashes was challenged, contending that storage on site was incidental or ancillary to cremation and should be subject to the statutory distance restrictions.

Respondents' Arguments

  • The Inspector’s decision complied with the Cremation Act 1902; the statutory restrictions apply to buildings or parts of buildings where the burning of human remains occurs, not to ancillary structures or open areas such as memorial gardens or parking.
  • The primary purpose of the Act’s locational restrictions is public health, and the interpretation excluding open areas and ancillary non-burning functions is correct.
  • The Flood Risk Assessment was properly considered, and the Inspector exercised sound planning judgment in concluding no sequential test was required given the site’s flood risk and mitigation measures.
  • The appellant’s expanded arguments on statutory interpretation were new and not before the Inspector or Judge, and the Judge’s reasoning was legally impeccable.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
London Historic Parks and Garden Trust v Minister of State for Housing and others [2022] EWHC 929 (Admin); [2022] JPL 1196 Materiality of statutory prohibitions in planning decisions and the requirement to consider very special circumstances. Referenced to support the proposition that contravention of statutory prohibitions can be material to planning decisions.
R(Ghai) v Newcastle City Council [2010] EWCA Civ 59; [2011] QB 591 Definition of "building" and interpretation of the Cremation Act 1902 in the context of crematoria structures. Used to confirm that a crematorium must be a constructed building and to interpret statutory provisions accordingly.
R (on the application of Substation Action Save East Suffolk Ltd) v Secretary of State for Energy Security and Net Zero [2024] EWCA Civ 12 Interpretation and application of flood risk policies under the Framework and Planning Practice Guidance. Applied to affirm that the sequential test is a matter of planning judgment and does not require absolute exclusion of sites with any flood risk.
R (on the application of O (A Child)) and R (on the application of Project for the Registration of Children as British Citizens) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2022] UKSC 3; [2023] AC 255 Principles of statutory interpretation, including contextual and purposive approaches. Guided the court’s approach to interpreting the Cremation Act 1902 provisions.
R (on the application of PACCAR Inc) v Competition Appeal Tribunal [2023] UKSC 28; [2023] 1 WLR 2594 Limitations on using subordinate legislation as aids to statutory interpretation. Supported the court’s conclusion that the 2008 Regulations could not be used to interpret the 1902 Act.
R v Price (1884) 12 QBD 247 Historical context regarding public nuisance and cremation practices. Considered to understand legislative intent behind the 1902 Act.
Lord Cowley v Byas (1877) 5 Ch D 944 Interpretation of statutory distance restrictions relating to burial grounds and dwelling houses. Referenced to explain the origins and purpose of distance restrictions in burial and cremation legislation.
Wright v Wallasey Local Board (1887) 18 QBD 783 Purpose of statutory distance restrictions as public health measures. Supported the conclusion that the 1902 Act’s restrictions were primarily for health protection.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court undertook a detailed statutory construction of the Cremation Act 1902, focusing on the definition of "crematorium" in section 2 and the locational restrictions in section 5. It concluded that the term "crematorium" refers to a building fitted with appliances for burning human remains and includes incidental or ancillary parts of that building or subordinate structures directly connected to the cremation process.

The court rejected the appellant's broader interpretation extending to open areas such as memorial gardens, parking, access roads, or any outdoor spaces, reasoning that the statutory use of the word "constructed" in section 5 confines the definition to buildings or parts thereof, not open spaces. The primary purpose of the locational restrictions was found to be the protection of public health from emissions associated with the cremation process, rather than broader concerns such as religious sensibilities, which were secondary.

The court also considered the relevance of subordinate legislation and guidance but held that regulations enacted long after the 1902 Act could not be used to interpret it. The Department of Environment’s Crematoria Guidance was acknowledged but not determinative.

Regarding flood risk, the court found that the Inspector correctly understood and applied the National Planning Policy Framework and Planning Practice Guidance. The sequential test is a matter of planning judgment and does not mandate exclusion of all sites with any flood risk if mitigation is possible. The Inspector rationally concluded that the Flood Risk Assessment was reliable and that no sequential test was required, also considering alternative sites which were not reasonably available.

In summary, the court upheld the Inspector's findings that the development complied with the Cremation Act 1902 and that the flood risk considerations were properly addressed.

Holding and Implications

The court DISMISSED the appeal.

The holding confirms that the statutory restrictions in section 5 of the Cremation Act 1902 apply to buildings or parts of buildings where cremation occurs, including incidental or ancillary structures directly related to the cremation process, but do not extend to open areas such as memorial gardens, parking, or access roads. It clarifies the statutory interpretation of "crematorium" and confirms that planning decisions must consider statutory restrictions but that these do not necessarily invalidate planning permissions when the statutory requirements are met.

Regarding flood risk, the decision reinforces that the application of the sequential test under national policy is a matter of planning judgment, not an absolute rule, and that proper mitigation and consideration of alternative sites are key factors. The decision has direct effect on the parties by affirming the planning permission, but does not establish new legal precedent beyond the interpretation of the 1902 Act and application of flood risk policy in this context.

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Wathen-Fayed v Secretary of State for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities

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Wathen-Fayed v Secretary of State for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities
(May 10, 2024)