Bissessur v McMillen (Approved)

Factual and Procedural Background

Adeline Keppel died intestate on 25 April 2001, followed by her sister Rita Keppel, who also died intestate on 7 January 2011. Both sisters had lived at a property in East Wall in the City of Dublin, which remains registered in Adeline's name and constitutes the primary asset of their estates.

On 10 February 2020, the Defendant applied ex parte under section 27(4) of the Succession Act 1965 for liberty to apply for and extract grants of letters of administration intestate in Rita Keppel's estate. The High Court granted this order. A similar application was made and granted on 8 February 2021 concerning Adeline Keppel's estate. The Defendant based these applications on her identification as the daughter of a second cousin of the Keppel sisters. Grants of letters of administration were extracted on 23 May 2022.

Subsequently, on 29 June 2023, the Plaintiff commenced proceedings seeking to set aside the High Court orders and annul the grants on the basis that the Defendant "well knew" that second cousins of the Keppel sisters with priority to administer the estates were alive when the grants were sought. The Plaintiff named five such second cousins but provided no evidential basis for this claim.

The Plaintiff is not a relative of the Keppel sisters nor claims any entitlement to the estates or the grants of administration. Her sole interest is as a squatter occupying the East Wall property, alongside another individual, without legal entitlement. The Defendant, as personal representative of the estates, commenced Circuit Court proceedings in June 2022 seeking possession of the property. The Circuit Court ordered the Plaintiff to vacate the premises, and a subsequent judicial review of that order was dismissed by the High Court.

The Defendant filed a motion to strike out the Plaintiff's case on the grounds of lack of locus standi and abuse of process.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the Plaintiff has locus standi to challenge the High Court orders granting the Defendant liberty to extract grants of letters of administration in the estates of Rita and Adeline Keppel.
2. Whether the Plaintiff’s claim that the orders were obtained by fraud is substantiated and sufficient to set aside those orders.
3. The applicability of section 27(4) of the Succession Act 1965 in granting administration to persons without priority entitlement, based on special circumstances.
4. The appropriateness of striking out the Plaintiff’s proceedings on grounds of abuse of process or lack of standing.

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiff's Arguments

• The Plaintiff alleges that the Defendant "well knew" of surviving second cousins of the Keppel sisters who had priority to administer the estates, thus the grants were obtained improperly.
• The Plaintiff claims to have made enquiries, including through a genealogy organisation, which established the existence of approximately twenty second cousins alive at the time of Rita Keppel’s death, two of whom she named as having priority over the Defendant.
• The Plaintiff questions the familial relationship between the Keppel sisters and the Defendant, raising doubts about the common ancestry based on birth and marriage records.
• The Plaintiff criticises the Defendant’s affidavits for inaccuracies and omissions regarding knowledge of relatives and the status of certain individuals.
• The Plaintiff seeks to maintain the proceedings to protect the integrity of the court process, alleging the orders were obtained by fraud.
• The Plaintiff asserts a constitutional argument referencing protection even for squatters under Article 40.5, suggesting standing to challenge the Defendant’s actions.

Defendant's Arguments

• The Defendant denies any wrongdoing or fraudulent conduct in obtaining the grants of administration.
• She asserts that section 27(4) empowers the court to grant administration to any person where special circumstances exist, without requiring priority entitlement.
• The Defendant highlights that she took out an Administration Bond and is bound to administer the estates according to law, with ongoing investigations to trace all entitled relatives.
• The Defendant argues that the Plaintiff lacks locus standi as she has no entitlement to the estates or grants and is pursuing the claim solely to delay possession proceedings and for improper purposes.
• The Defendant points to the Circuit Court’s refusal to look behind the grants and the absence of evidence supporting the Plaintiff’s claims of fraud or adverse possession.

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court first confirmed that the affidavit of the genealogist was before the High Court at the time of the Defendant’s applications. It acknowledged that section 27(4) of the Succession Act 1965 permits the court to grant administration to any person deemed appropriate due to special circumstances, without strict adherence to the order of priority under the Rules of the Superior Courts.

The Defendant’s justification for the grant was the urgent need to protect the East Wall property from squatters, a special circumstance warranting the grant despite the existence of potential relatives with higher priority.

The Plaintiff’s claim that the Defendant obtained the grants fraudulently was found to be wholly unsubstantiated. The court noted the absence of particulars or evidence supporting the allegation, despite opportunities to do so, including cross-examination in the Circuit Court and affidavits sworn in this application.

The court emphasized the importance of locus standi, noting that the Plaintiff neither claimed any entitlement to the estates nor any priority to administer them. Her interest was limited to occupation of the property without legal right.

Relying on precedent, the court held that only persons with a direct interest or entitlement to the estate can challenge grants of administration. The Plaintiff’s attempt to challenge the orders as a squatter was rejected as lacking standing and as vexatious litigation.

The court also rejected the Plaintiff’s constitutional argument referencing protection for squatters, clarifying that possession proceedings, not these administrative proceedings, were the proper forum to address such claims.

Finally, the court found the proceedings were pursued for an improper purpose, namely to delay possession proceedings, and that they were bound to fail.

Holding and Implications

The court DISMISSED the Plaintiff’s proceedings to set aside the High Court orders and annul the grants of letters of administration.

The dismissal was based primarily on the Plaintiff’s lack of locus standi and the unsubstantiated nature of the fraud allegation. The decision underscores the principle that only persons with a direct legal interest or entitlement in an estate have standing to challenge grants of administration.

No new precedent was established. The direct effect is that the Defendant remains the lawful administrator of the estates and may continue possession proceedings to recover the East Wall property from the Plaintiff and others occupying it without legal right.