Williams v Williams & Ors

Factual and Procedural Background

The Appellant brought an action against two siblings and the executors of his father's estate, asserting entitlement to ownership of two farms in Wales, farmed as a single holding. The claims were based on two alternative grounds: first, that the farms had been contributed as assets to a partnership established between the Appellant and his parents in 1985, entitling him to the entire interest upon their deaths; and second, that proprietary estoppel applied because the parents encouraged him to believe the farms would be his, and he acted in reliance on that assurance.

The case was tried by a High Court judge in Cardiff in June 2022, who dismissed both claims and later refused permission to appeal. The Appellant applied for permission to appeal on multiple grounds, including issues relating to partnership property and beneficial ownership of one farm, Cefn Coed, which was acquired in the joint names of the Appellant and his parents without an express declaration of trust. The High Court judge held that the parties were tenants in common in equal shares, entitling the Appellant to a one-third share.

The Appellant was granted limited permission to appeal on Grounds 3 and 5 by a Lord Justice of Appeal, with the permission specifically limited to the question of whether the Appellant was entitled to a beneficial interest in Cefn Coed. The Respondents sought clarification on whether permission included the issue of Cefn Coed being a partnership asset, which was denied.

Following unsuccessful attempts by the Appellant to challenge the scope of permission, including a refused application to the Supreme Court, he sought an extension of time to submit a replacement appeal skeleton arguing Grounds 3 and 5. The Lord Justice of Appeal reviewed this application and clarified that permission to appeal did not extend to Ground 3 concerning whether Cefn Coed was a partnership asset, and that attempts to re-open refused grounds amounted to an abuse of process. The Appellant was directed to serve a replacement skeleton limited to the issues on which permission had been granted.

The present application concerns a review of that order, focusing on whether the Appellant already has permission to appeal on Ground 3, whether the substantive appeal court can grant leave on a ground previously refused, and what should be done about the extension of time for service of the skeleton argument.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the Appellant already has permission to appeal on Ground 3 of his Grounds of Appeal.
2. Whether the Court hearing the substantive appeal can grant leave to appeal on a ground previously refused by a single judge on paper.
3. What procedural steps should be taken regarding the extension of time for service of the Appellant's skeleton argument.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

• The Appellant contended that he already had permission to appeal on Ground 3 as granted by the Lord Justice of Appeal in unambiguous terms in the original decision.
• He argued that the substantive appeal court should allow him to argue Ground 3 despite previous refusals, to avoid injustice.
• He made an oral application under CPR r 52.30 to re-open the permission decision on Ground 3.
• He suggested that decisions made on paper by a single judge do not bind the full court or amount to final judicial decisions.

Court's Response to Arguments

• The Court rejected the assertion that permission on Ground 3 had been granted, relying on the correction under the slip rule that excluded Ground 3 from the granted permission.
• The Court held that decisions by a single Lord or Lady Justice on paper are judicial decisions and constitute orders within the meaning of the Civil Procedure Rules (CPR).
• The Court confirmed that once permission is refused on a ground, that decision is final and cannot be re-opened at the substantive appeal hearing except in exceptional circumstances under CPR r 52.30.
• The Court declined to grant permission to re-open the decision under CPR r 52.30, noting that the rule is reserved for serious procedural errors and not for substantive merits of appeal grounds.

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court began by considering the nature of the permission granted by the Lord Justice of Appeal. Although the decision box granted permission on Grounds 3 and 5, the reasons clarified that permission was limited to the question of beneficial interest in Cefn Coed, excluding the partnership asset issue under Ground 3. The Court accepted that this discrepancy was an accidental slip, corrected under CPR r 40.12 (the slip rule), which allows courts to correct accidental errors in judgments or orders at any time.

The Court held that decisions granting permission to appeal made by a single Lord or Lady Justice on paper constitute judicial orders within the meaning of the CPR. Such decisions are final determinations unless re-opened under exceptional circumstances prescribed by CPR r 52.30.

The Court rejected the Appellant's argument that paper decisions are not binding or judicial, emphasizing that the CPR explicitly contemplates such decisions as exercises of judicial power. The Court further emphasized the importance of finality in permission decisions to avoid abuse of process and unnecessary prolongation of litigation.

Regarding the possibility of re-opening the permission decision at the substantive appeal hearing, the Court reaffirmed established authority that this is not permitted except in narrow, exceptional circumstances involving serious procedural error such as bias or fraud. The Appellant's attempt to invoke CPR r 52.30 orally was considered but refused, as the circumstances did not meet the high threshold required.

The Court concluded that the Appellant does not have permission to appeal on Ground 3, and the substantive appeal court cannot grant leave on previously refused grounds unless exceptional criteria are met, which were not demonstrated here.

Finally, the Court addressed the procedural question regarding the extension of time for serving the Appellant's skeleton argument. Given the limitation of permission to Ground 5, the Appellant was directed to rely on his original skeleton argument excluding Grounds 2 and 3.

Holding and Implications

The Court's final decision is to REFUSE the Appellant's application to rely on Ground 3 of his Grounds of Appeal and to review the order limiting his appeal to Ground 5 only.

The direct consequence is that the Appellant may not raise Ground 3 or any other grounds previously refused at the substantive appeal hearing, nor renew similar applications. This preserves the finality of permission decisions made by a single judge on paper and prevents abuse of process by attempts to circumvent such refusals.

No new precedent was established; the Court reaffirmed existing principles regarding the finality of permission decisions and the limited scope for reopening under CPR r 52.30.