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Muldowney v The Governor of Mountjoy Prison & Ors (Approved)
Factual and Procedural Background
The Plaintiff, employed as a prison officer at Mountjoy Prison since 2006, issued a personal injuries summons in July 2019 alleging ongoing and repeated bullying behaviour by the Defendants from around 2010. The summons failed to provide full particulars as required by section 10(2)(f) and (g) of the Civil Liability and Courts Act 2004, specifically lacking detail on the acts constituting the wrongs, circumstances of commission, and instances of negligence. Due to these deficiencies, the Court ordered a stay of proceedings in June 2021 until compliance with section 10 was achieved. Despite multiple correspondences and opportunities, including a stay order and motions to dismiss, the Plaintiff failed to comply or advance the claim substantively over a period exceeding four and a half years. The Defendants sought dismissal of the claim pursuant to section 10(3)(a)(ii) of the 2004 Act and for want of prosecution due to delay.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the Plaintiff’s failure to comply with the particulars requirements of section 10(2)(f) and (g) of the Civil Liability and Courts Act 2004 justifies dismissal of the claim under section 10(3)(a)(ii).
- Whether the Plaintiff’s delay in prosecuting the claim is inordinate and inexcusable, warranting dismissal for want of prosecution.
- Whether the balance of justice favors dismissal given the Plaintiff’s non-compliance and delay.
- Whether the delay and deficiencies create a real risk of an unfair trial or unjust result under the principles established in Primor plc v. Stokes Kennedy Crowley and O'Domhnaill v. Merrick.
Arguments of the Parties
The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Primor plc v. Stokes Kennedy Crowley [1996] 2 I.R. 459 | Test for delay in prosecution: (1) inordinate delay, (2) inexcusable delay, (3) balance of justice. | Guided the Court’s sequential analysis of the Plaintiff’s delay, establishing that the delay was inordinate, inexcusable, and that the balance of justice favored dismissal. |
| O'Domhnaill v. Merrick [1984] IR 151 | Jurisdiction to dismiss proceedings where there is a real risk of unfair trial or unjust result, regardless of blameworthiness. | Supported the Court’s consideration of prejudice to a fair trial caused by delay, leading to dismissal on grounds of risk of unfair trial. |
| Cassidy v. The Provincialate [2015] IECA 74 | Distinction between Primor and O'Domhnaill tests regarding delay and prejudice. | Clarified the Court’s approach to the differing burdens and tests for delay-related dismissal. |
| Cave Projects Limited v. Gilhooley & Ors. [2022] IECA 245 | Comprehensive analysis of delay jurisprudence and application of the Primor test. | Informed the Court’s detailed consideration of delay principles and the interests of justice. |
| Birkett v. James [1978] AC 297 | Principle that a late start to proceedings increases the obligation to prosecute promptly. | Applied to emphasize Plaintiff’s heightened obligation to proceed expeditiously given the late commencement of proceedings. |
| McNamee v. Boyce [2016] IECA 19 | Delay in prosecution: court may consider pre-commencement delay and its impact on post-commencement delay assessment. | Supported the finding of inordinate delay and the sufficiency of moderate prejudice to justify dismissal. |
| Ahearne v. O'Sullivan & Ors [2023] IECA 134 | Recognition that memory fades over time, causing prejudice to fair trial. | Supported the Court’s conclusion that delay likely caused moderate prejudice impacting witness reliability and fairness of trial. |
| Maxwell v Irish Life Assurance plc [2018] IEHC 111 | Judicial notice that memories fade and become less reliable with time. | Reinforced the Court’s finding on prejudice arising from delay. |
| Superwood Holdings plc v Scully [1998] IESC 37 | General proposition regarding fading memory and resulting prejudice. | Supported the Court’s assessment of prejudice due to passage of time. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court began by identifying the Plaintiff’s failure to comply with the detailed particulars requirements under section 10(2)(f) and (g) of the Civil Liability and Courts Act 2004, which require specification of the acts constituting the wrongs and each instance of negligence. The Plaintiff’s personal injuries summons was found to be deficient, offering only general and circular allegations without specifics on who, when, where, or how the alleged bullying occurred. Despite the Court’s June 2021 order staying proceedings until compliance, and multiple correspondences from the Defendants demanding particulars, the Plaintiff failed to amend the summons or provide verifying affidavits.
The Court applied the Primor test to assess delay, concluding that the Plaintiff’s delay was inordinate—excessive and outside normal limits—and inexcusable, given the absence of any explanation or affidavit from the Plaintiff. The Court noted that the Plaintiff’s solicitor’s affidavit was hearsay, lacking personal knowledge or verification from the Plaintiff himself, and therefore insufficient to justify delay or comply with section 10.
Regarding the balance of justice, the Court acknowledged the constitutional right of access to courts and the terminal prejudice dismissal would cause the Plaintiff. However, it held that such terminal prejudice is inherent in dismissal applications and cannot alone prevent dismissal where delay and non-compliance persist.
The Court further found that the delay and lack of particulars created a real risk of an unfair trial due to fading witness memories over a prolonged period—spanning up to 16 years from the earliest alleged incidents. The Plaintiff’s failure to provide particulars prevented the Defendants from investigating or preparing a defence, causing real prejudice.
Consequently, the Court concluded that dismissal was warranted under both section 10(3)(a)(ii) of the 2004 Act and the principles governing dismissal for want of prosecution and unfair trial risk.
Holding and Implications
The Court’s final decision is DISMISSAL OF THE PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM pursuant to section 10(3)(a)(ii) of the Civil Liability and Courts Act 2004 and for want of prosecution due to inordinate and inexcusable delay.
The direct effect is that the Plaintiff’s claim is terminated, reflecting the Plaintiff’s ongoing failure to comply with statutory pleading requirements and to prosecute the claim with due expedition. No new legal precedent was established; rather, the decision applies established principles emphasizing the importance of timely prosecution and proper pleadings to ensure fairness to all parties and the integrity of the judicial process.
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