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Gawley v Start Mortgages Designated Activity Company (Approved)
Factual and Procedural Background
The Plaintiff initiated proceedings seeking damages and an order removing liens or charges from a Land Registry Folio related to a property in County Dublin. The claims arise from a prior possession order granted in 2011 against the Plaintiff and a non-party, with subsequent substitution of the First Defendant as plaintiff in those proceedings and liberty granted to issue execution. The First Defendant applied to strike out the current proceedings as frivolous, vexatious, or bound to fail, relying on the doctrine of res judicata and the rule in Henderson v. Henderson. The Plaintiff opposes this application and has sworn affidavits contesting ownership and the validity of mortgage documents. The procedural history includes prior High Court and Court of Appeal decisions confirming the First Defendant's entitlement to possession and mortgage ownership, with no appeal against the original possession order. The Plaintiff has also filed a motion for discovery of documents related to the mortgage, which is pending and not before this Court.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the proceedings brought by the Plaintiff are frivolous, vexatious, or bound to fail and thus subject to strike out under the Court's inherent jurisdiction or Order 19 Rules 27 and 28 of the Rules of the Superior Courts.
- Whether the Plaintiff's claims are barred by the doctrine of res judicata or issue estoppel, particularly concerning prior orders relating to mortgage ownership and possession.
- Whether the Plaintiff can pursue claims related to alleged overcharging of interest, which were not dealt with in prior proceedings.
Arguments of the Parties
First Defendant's Arguments
- The proceedings are frivolous, vexatious, and bound to fail as they constitute a collateral attack on prior final orders and are barred by res judicata and the rule in Henderson v. Henderson.
- Issues raised were or could have been litigated in earlier proceedings and thus cannot be re-litigated.
- The Plaintiff's failure to make mortgage payments since 2014 prejudices the First Defendant.
- The Plaintiff cannot succeed in removing liens or charges as necessary parties, such as the Land Registry authority, are not before the Court.
- The application to strike out is justified under the Court's inherent jurisdiction and procedural rules to prevent abuse of process.
Plaintiff's Arguments
- The Plaintiff disputes the ownership of the mortgage by the First Defendant and contends that original mortgage documents have never been produced to substantiate ownership.
- The Plaintiff claims entitlement to examine original documents to verify authenticity and alleges irregularities in the documentation.
- The Plaintiff asserts that the issues are not about payment but about ownership and redeemability of the mortgage.
- The Plaintiff maintains that if documents had been produced in prior proceedings, the current action would not be necessary.
- The Plaintiff contends that claims relating to overcharging interest were not and could not have been raised in prior proceedings and thus are not barred.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Henderson v. Henderson [1843] 3 Hare 100 | Rule that a party must bring their whole case in one proceeding; prevents re-litigation of issues that could have been raised previously. | Applied to bar the Plaintiff from re-litigating issues decided or that could have been decided in prior proceedings. |
| Fay v. Tegral Pipes Ltd [2005] IESC 34 | Principles governing strike-out applications for frivolous, vexatious, or bound to fail claims under Order 19 and inherent jurisdiction. | Guided the Court's approach to assessing whether the Plaintiff's claims were abuse of process and whether they disclosed a reasonable cause of action. |
| Barry v. Buckley [1981] IR 306 | Inherent jurisdiction to stay or dismiss proceedings that abuse court process. | Supported the Court's exercise of inherent jurisdiction to prevent abuse of process by the Plaintiff's claims. |
| Ewing v. Ireland [2013] IESC | Emphasizes the need for focused pleadings and the sparing use of strike-out powers to protect court resources. | Reinforced the Court's duty to prevent unstateable cases from proceeding. |
| Riordan v. Ireland (No. 5) [2001] 4 IR 463 | Factors indicating vexatious proceedings such as re-litigation, improper purpose, and failure to pay costs. | Informed the Court's evaluation of whether the Plaintiff's proceedings were vexatious. |
| Lopes v. Minister for Justice [2014] IESC 21 | Clarifies the relationship between procedural rules and inherent jurisdiction in striking out proceedings. | Used to distinguish when to apply procedural rules versus inherent jurisdiction in this case. |
| Tanager DAC v. Kane [2018] IECA 352 | Statutory conclusiveness of the Land Registry and limits on challenging registration in possession proceedings. | Applied to hold that the Plaintiff could not challenge the correctness of the Register or ownership in possession proceedings. |
| Start Mortgages DAC v. Kavanagh [2023] IEHC 37 | Public interest in finality of litigation and reliance on unappealed orders. | Supported the principle that the Plaintiff could not challenge long-standing possession orders. |
| In Re Vantive Holdings Limited [2009] IESC 69 | Inherent jurisdiction to stay or dismiss proceedings that abuse due process and undermine administration of justice. | Supported the Court's authority to dismiss the Plaintiff's claims as abuse of process. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court began by outlining the statutory and inherent jurisdiction to strike out proceedings that are frivolous, vexatious, or bound to fail, referencing Order 19 Rules 27 and 28 and established case law. It emphasized that such jurisdiction is exercised sparingly and only in clear cases to prevent abuse of process and to protect judicial resources.
The Court examined the Plaintiff’s claims in light of the prior 2009 proceedings and subsequent judgments, which had conclusively determined the ownership of the mortgage, the validity of possession orders, and the entitlement of the First Defendant to execute those orders. The Court found that the Plaintiff’s attempts to re-litigate these issues amount to impermissible collateral attacks barred by res judicata and issue estoppel, pursuant to the rule in Henderson v. Henderson.
The Court noted that the Plaintiff had multiple opportunities in earlier proceedings to raise concerns about ownership and document authenticity but failed to do so or appeal adverse rulings. The prior judgments, including those of the High Court and Court of Appeal, had affirmed the finality of these matters and the statutory conclusiveness of the Land Registry.
Regarding the Plaintiff’s claim of overcharging interest, the Court recognized this as a distinct issue not previously adjudicated and therefore not barred by res judicata. The Court acknowledged that while the claim’s merits were not determinable at this stage, it could not be said to be doomed to fail on the pleadings.
The Court also considered procedural aspects, including the refusal of adjournments to allow the Plaintiff further time or legal representation, balancing the interests of justice and prejudice to the First Defendant, given the age of the possession order and prior litigation history.
Holding and Implications
The Court DISMISSED the Plaintiff’s claims set out in paragraphs 1 to 14 and 16 to 19 of the Statement of Claim as frivolous, vexatious, and bound to fail, pursuant to Order 19 Rule 27 of the Rules of the Superior Courts.
The only claim permitted to proceed concerns breach of contract related to alleged overcharging of interest, which was not previously adjudicated.
The Court will hear the parties on directions for service of an amended Statement of Claim and other pleadings pertaining to the surviving claim.
This decision enforces the principle of finality in litigation and prevents abuse of process by barring re-litigation of issues already decided. It does not set new precedent but applies established doctrines of res judicata, issue estoppel, and procedural strike-out powers to the facts presented.
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