Department of Agriculture, Environment and Rural Affairs v McClure

Factual and Procedural Background

The Department of Agriculture, Environment and Rural Affairs (the "Appellant") prosecuted the Defendant summarily for the offence of knowingly or otherwise discharging a polluting matter into a waterway, contrary to Article 7(1)(a) of the Water (Northern Ireland) Order 1999. The Defendant was acquitted by a district judge in the magistrates' courts. Subsequently, the Appellant applied for a case to be stated for the opinion of the Court of Appeal, focusing on whether the strict liability offence could be proven against a defendant who was not present at the time of the discharge but who owned and controlled the farm where the pollution originated and whose servants or agents undertook the work causing the discharge.

The agreed prosecution evidence indicated that a report of dead fish in a river prompted an inspection revealing a concrete pipe from the Defendant’s farm discharging into the waterway. The Defendant was not present at the farm during the discharge, having just returned from holiday. The Defendant acknowledged slurry transfer between tanks the previous day but denied presence during the incident. The farm was jointly owned by the Defendant and his son. Water samples confirmed the presence of poisonous and polluting matter harmful to aquatic life.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Is the offence under Article 7(1)(a) of the 1999 Order one of strict liability?
2. Can the offence be committed by an owner and occupier of premises who did not personally or physically carry out the offending discharge?

Arguments of the Parties

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court began by interpreting the statutory language of Article 7(1)(a) of the 1999 Order, noting that the mens rea element is expressed as "knowingly or otherwise," indicating that proof of knowledge is not required and thus establishing the offence as one of strict liability. The court relied on established authority, particularly Alphacell v Woodward, to confirm that the offence is strict liability and that the statutory wording does not permit reading in a knowledge requirement for the actus reus of discharge.

The court then addressed the key issue of whether liability could extend to a defendant who did not personally commit the discharge. It recognized the general criminal law principle that liability requires personal fault and that respondeat superior is not generally applicable in criminal law. However, statutory provisions may impose liability on principals or owners for acts of their servants or agents if the statute’s language and purpose justify it.

Applying the test from Mousell and considering the public policy underpinning the legislation—including protection of human health, fish stocks, and the environment—the court concluded that the statutory "he" in Article 7(1)(a) encompasses the conduct of the landowner’s servants or agents. The court found no evidence of an act of God, third-party intervention, or conduct beyond the defendant’s control. The practical difficulty of identifying the actual perpetrator and the strong public interest in environmental protection supported imposing liability on the Defendant as joint farm owner.

Holding and Implications

The court held that the district judge erred in law by acquitting the Defendant. The court REVERSED the acquittal and directed that the case be remitted to the magistrates’ court with a direction to convict the Defendant. The court further directed that sentencing may be carried out by the same district judge.

The decision directly affects the parties by affirming that strict liability environmental offences can be committed by an owner who did not personally discharge pollutants but whose agents did so within the scope of their employment. No broader precedent beyond the immediate case was established, but the ruling reinforces the application of strict liability and vicarious liability principles in environmental regulatory offences.