Contains public sector information licensed under the Open Justice Licence v1.0.
Myles, R. v
Factual and Procedural Background
On 10 August 2022, in the Crown Court at Maidstone, the Appellant was convicted of murder following a trial that began on 27 June 2022. A co-accused, referred to as Co-Accused, pleaded guilty to murder partway through the trial on 21 July. Both were sentenced to life imprisonment, with the Appellant receiving a minimum term of 22 years less time spent on remand. The Appellant now appeals against his conviction with leave granted by a single judge.
The deceased was a man who lived in a flat where, on 2 January 2022, a small group gathered including the Appellant, Co-Accused, and a third individual. The third individual left during the afternoon and later returned around 9 p.m. to find the deceased grievously injured on the floor. Emergency services were called, and the deceased was taken to hospital where he later died from severe head and facial injuries caused by blunt force trauma and stamping. Evidence indicated that only the Appellant and Co-Accused were present at the time of the assault. Both left the flat before 9 p.m., taking the deceased’s bank card with them, and were arrested at 11 p.m. Each blamed the other for the injuries during interviews, but the Appellant denied inflicting any violence in his defence statement.
At trial, the Appellant gave evidence describing an incident where Co-Accused attacked the deceased with a vodka bottle and stamped on him after being told to leave the flat. The Appellant admitted to stamping and kicking the deceased’s head in a loss of control triggered by anger linked to concerns about his son’s welfare and allegations involving the deceased. The Appellant and Co-Accused remained at the flat for some time after the assault before leaving.
At the conclusion of evidence, the Appellant sought to have the partial defence of loss of control left to the jury, having already pleaded guilty to manslaughter on the basis of lack of intent. The trial judge ruled that there was insufficient evidence to leave the defence of loss of control to the jury, applying the statutory requirements under section 54 of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether there was sufficient evidence of loss of self-control by the Appellant to allow the partial defence to be considered by the jury under section 54 of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009.
- Whether the trial judge erred in not adopting the most favourable view of the Appellant’s evidence as required by precedent.
- Whether the judge gave proper consideration to the absence of premeditation in relation to loss of self-control.
- Whether the qualifying trigger requirement was met, specifically if circumstances of an extremely grave character caused a justifiable sense of being seriously wronged.
- Whether a person of the Appellant’s sex and age with a normal degree of tolerance and self-restraint might have reacted in the same or similar way as the Appellant.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- The judge failed to adopt the most favourable view of the Appellant’s evidence as a reasonable jury might have done, contrary to the precedent set in Clinton [2012] EWCA 2.
- Insufficient weight was given to the lack of evidence of premeditation, which is relevant to loss of self-control.
- The judge erred by implying that loss of self-control requires involuntary conduct, whereas the Appellant testified he was not in control when he kicked the deceased.
- The acts of stamping and kicking should not be artificially separated; both could be attributed to loss of self-control.
- Loss of self-control does not require a complete loss of control; partial loss suffices.
- The judge overemphasised the Appellant’s purposeful actions, such as switching from stamping to kicking, rather than considering overwhelming emotional passion.
- A reasonable jury could have accepted the Appellant’s evidence that he was overwhelmed by emotional passion and unable to stop himself.
Respondent's Arguments
- The trial judge correctly applied the law and assessed the evidence in full context.
- The Appellant’s conduct after the assault, including theft of the deceased’s bank card and observed behaviour, indicated deliberate and considered participation rather than loss of control.
- The judge’s ruling was consistent with the statutory requirements and relevant case law.
- The Appellant’s intoxication was relevant and diminished the applicability of the defence.
- Even if loss of control was accepted, the qualifying trigger and reasonable person elements were not satisfied.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Goodwin [2018] EWCA (Crim) 2287 | Guidance on the approach a trial judge must take when deciding whether to leave the defence of loss of control to the jury, including a non-exhaustive list of factors to consider. | The judge applied the principles from Goodwin to sequentially assess loss of self-control, qualifying trigger, and the response of a reasonable person, concluding insufficient evidence existed. |
| Clinton [2012] EWCA 2 | The requirement that a trial judge adopt the most favourable view of the defendant's evidence when deciding whether to leave a partial defence to the jury. | The appellant argued the judge failed to comply with Clinton; the court rejected this, finding the judge’s assessment was proper and balanced. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court undertook a detailed examination of the evidence and the statutory framework for the partial defence of loss of control under section 54 of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009. The judge’s role was to determine whether there was sufficient evidence on each of the three statutory elements to allow the defence to be considered by the jury. The first element required that the Appellant’s acts resulted from a loss of self-control. The judge found no sufficient evidence of this, which was dispositive.
The court noted the Appellant’s claim of loss of control had to be assessed in context, including the absence of any complaint about the deceased’s alleged misconduct prior to the incident, the Appellant’s behaviour before and after the assault, and the fact that the Appellant and Co-Accused left the flat together with the deceased’s bank card and were observed behaving in a manner inconsistent with loss of self-control.
Although the Appellant stated he “lost it” and described switching from stamping to kicking, the judge reasonably interpreted these actions as deliberate and controlled rather than involuntary. The court agreed that the judge’s decision was not erroneous and that a reasonable jury could not have concluded otherwise.
The court also considered the other statutory elements—the qualifying trigger and the reaction of a reasonable person—but found no sufficient evidence to satisfy these limbs either. The Appellant’s evidence regarding the qualifying trigger was undermined by his ongoing association with the deceased and lack of belief in any actual wrongdoing by the deceased. The violent nature of the assault far exceeded what a person of normal tolerance and self-restraint would have done, particularly when voluntary intoxication was taken into account.
Overall, the court found the trial judge’s ruling to be unimpeachable and consistent with the statutory requirements and case law.
Holding and Implications
The appeal is DISMISSED.
The court upheld the trial judge’s determination that there was no sufficient evidence to support the partial defence of loss of control. Consequently, the Appellant’s murder conviction stands. This decision directly affects the parties by confirming the conviction and sentence but does not establish any new legal precedent beyond affirming the proper application of existing law.
Please subscribe to download the judgment.
Comments