Contains public sector information licensed under the Open Justice Licence v1.0.
Paulkaite-Ciumbariene v Faughan Foods UnLtd Company (Approved)
Factual and Procedural Background
The Plaintiff, an operative employed by the Defendant Company A, initiated personal injury proceedings following an alleged accident on 3 June 2017, where the Plaintiff's finger was trapped in a machine. The Plaintiff issued a personal injuries summons on 23 February 2018. The Defendant entered an Appearance on 20 April 2018 and delivered a Defence on 17 January 2019, denying liability and seeking to join two other parties as co-Defendants—an Italian-registered manufacturer and an Irish-registered distributor of the machine involved.
By order dated 29 July 2019, the two co-Defendants were joined, and the Plaintiff was given four weeks from the order's perfection on 31 July 2019 to issue an amended personal injury summons and statement of claim. The Plaintiff failed to take these steps. The Defendant issued a motion on 1 November 2022 seeking dismissal of the Plaintiff's claim for want of prosecution, citing the delay and the court's inherent jurisdiction.
The Defendant's affidavit detailed repeated unsuccessful attempts to obtain information and compliance from the Plaintiff between July 2021 and June 2022, with no response from the Plaintiff's solicitor. The Plaintiff's solicitor later filed an affidavit on 8 July 2023 explaining delays due to technical difficulties, failure to issue a motion to extend time, staff maternity leave, and Covid-19 restrictions, as well as a serious health diagnosis in early 2023. However, these explanations were not accepted as excusable delays by the court.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the delay in prosecuting the Plaintiff's claim is inordinate;
- If so, whether the delay is inexcusable;
- Whether, given any inordinate and inexcusable delay, the balance of justice favours dismissal of the claim or allowing it to proceed;
- Whether dismissal is justified under the court's inherent jurisdiction due to risk of unfair trial or unjust result.
Arguments of the Parties
Defendant's Arguments
- The Plaintiff has failed to prosecute the claim diligently, with nearly three years of inordinate delay after the order joining co-Defendants.
- The Plaintiff did not serve the amended summons on the joined co-Defendants as required.
- The Defendant has suffered prejudice due to the delay, including diminished availability of witnesses and compromised memories.
- The delay violates the Defendant’s right to a fair trial within a reasonable time under Article 6 ECHR.
- The Defendant’s professional reputation and indemnity insurance are negatively affected by the outstanding claim and delay.
- The Defendant seeks dismissal under Order 122 Rule 11 RSC and the court’s inherent jurisdiction.
Plaintiff's Arguments
- The Plaintiff did not make a late start to proceedings, thus bearing no additional burden on timeliness initially.
- Technical difficulties and administrative errors explain but do not justify the delay.
- The Plaintiff’s solicitor’s serious health issues contributed to the delay but cannot excuse the entire period of inaction.
- The Plaintiff intends to proceed with the claim and disputes dismissal.
- There is no evidence of specific prejudice to the Defendant sufficient to justify dismissal.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Primor plc v. Stokes Kennedy Crowley [1996] 2 I.R. 459 | Established the three-step test for dismissal for want of prosecution: (1) is delay inordinate; (2) is delay inexcusable; (3) balance of justice assessment. | The court applied the Primor test as the primary approach to assess delay and dismissal. |
| O'Domhnaill v. Merrick [1984] I.R. 151 | Inherent jurisdiction to dismiss proceedings where there is a real risk of unfair trial or unjust result, regardless of culpability for delay. | The court distinguished O'Domhnaill from Primor and considered it secondary, focusing on Primor here. |
| Sheehan v. Cork County Council [2023] IEHC 46 | Reaffirmed Primor principles and emphasized the need to end "a culture of endless indulgence" in delay. | The court referenced Sheehan for current application of Primor principles but noted factual differences. |
| Gallagher v. Letterkenny General Hospital [2019] IECA 156 | Distinguished between explanations that attract sympathy and those that constitute an excuse for delay. | The court applied this principle to reject Plaintiff's explanations as excuses. |
| Cave Projects Limited v. Gilhooley & Ors [2022] IECA 74 | Emphasized the need for a causal connection between delay and prejudice and that prejudice is not to be presumed. | The court relied heavily on Cave to require specific evidential basis for prejudice and refused to presume it. |
| Birkett v. James [1977] 2 All ER 801 | Established that a late start to proceedings increases the burden on the Plaintiff to prosecute expeditiously. | The court noted the Plaintiff did not have a late start, thus no added burden initially. |
| Framus Ltd. v. CRH plc [2012] IEHC 316 | Defined "inordinate delay" as irregular, outside normal limits, immoderate or excessive delay. | The court used this definition to characterize the Plaintiff’s delay as inordinate. |
| AIG Europe Ltd v. Fitzpatrick [2020] IECA 99 | Reinforced that prejudice must be established with evidence and not presumed. | The court cited this to reject general assertions of prejudice from delay. |
| Bank of Ireland v Kelly | Jurisdiction to dismiss for delay is not punitive or disciplinary but based on justice and fairness. | The court emphasized dismissal is a last resort and not a punishment for Plaintiff's delay. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court undertook a detailed application of the Primor three-step test. First, it found the Plaintiff’s delay to be inordinate, calculating nearly three years of delay from the expiration of the four-week period granted by the 2019 order until the Defendant’s motion in November 2022.
Second, the court held the delay to be inexcusable. The Plaintiff’s solicitor’s explanations—technical difficulties in issuing amended summonses, failure to issue a motion to extend time, staff maternity leave, and Covid-19 restrictions—were deemed insufficient to excuse the delay. The solicitor’s serious health diagnosis in March 2023 was sympathetic but occurred well after the delay had accrued and did not justify the prior inaction.
Third, in the balance of justice assessment, the court considered alleged prejudice to the Defendant. It found that the Defendant had not established a causal connection between the delay and any concrete prejudice. The Defendant claimed diminished witness availability and compromised memories, but the Plaintiff had pleaded no witnesses to the accident existed, undermining this assertion. The court emphasized that prejudice must be evidenced and not presumed, citing the Cave decision.
The court also rejected the Defendant’s general assertions that the delay harmed its reputation and professional indemnity insurance, noting the lack of specific evidence of damage.
Importantly, the court found no indication that a fair trial was no longer possible, with no evidence of lost or destroyed key evidence or expert witnesses. Therefore, dismissal would be disproportionate and punitive at this stage.
The court concluded that although the Plaintiff was guilty of inordinate and inexcusable delay, the balance of justice favored allowing the claim to proceed, subject to conditions. It proposed making an "unless order" requiring the Plaintiff to apply to extend time within a specified period or face dismissal with costs.
The court also noted that any application to extend time must be made on notice to all three Defendants, ensuring all parties can present their positions. The court left open the possibility of future dismissal if the Plaintiff fails to comply or if prejudice arises subsequently.
Holding and Implications
The court's final ruling was to REFUSE THE DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS the Plaintiff's claim at this stage.
The Plaintiff’s delay was found to be both inordinate and inexcusable; however, the balance of justice did not favor dismissal because the Defendant failed to establish specific prejudice or that a fair trial was impossible.
The court indicated it would issue an "unless order" requiring the Plaintiff to apply to extend time for compliance with the 2019 order within a set period, failing which the claim would be dismissed with costs awarded to the Defendant.
This ruling preserves the Plaintiff’s right to proceed while emphasizing the necessity of timely prosecution and compliance with court orders. No new precedent was established; the decision applies established principles emphasizing fairness, evidential basis for prejudice, and proportionality in delay-related dismissals.
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