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U3 v Secretary of State for the Home Department & Anor
Factual and Procedural Background
This opinion concerns an appeal regarding the functions of the Special Immigration Appeals Commission (SIAC) when hearing an appeal against the Secretary of State's decision to deprive a British citizen ("Appellant") of her nationality on national security grounds, and a related refusal of entry clearance. The Appellant challenged two decisions: the deprivation of citizenship ("decision 1") and refusal of entry clearance ("decision 2"). SIAC dismissed both appeals after a week-long hearing. The Appellant was represented by counsel, as was the Secretary of State and an intervener. A closed hearing was also held but did not affect the reasoning in this judgment.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the Supreme Court's description in Begum of SIAC's functions on a section 2B appeal was necessary to its decision.
- What are SIAC's functions on a section 2B appeal, including:
- Whether SIAC must apply judicial review principles to the appeal.
- Whether SIAC has a power or duty to make findings of fact.
- Whether SIAC erred in law in its approach in this case, including:
- Whether SIAC erred in making the findings of fact it did make.
- Whether SIAC erred in its approach to the evidence.
- Whether SIAC erred in its consideration of the second national security statement.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- SIAC took too narrow a view of its powers by limiting itself to determining whether the Secretary of State made a public law error in decisions 1 and 2.
- SIAC should have made various findings of fact which could have led to allowing the appeal.
- SIAC erred in law by applying judicial review principles too restrictively and by not adequately addressing evidence postdating the deprivation decision.
- SIAC failed to give sufficient attention or reasons for rejecting expert evidence and erred in the article 8 balance.
- SIAC erred in not considering material facts occurring after decision 1 and in its analysis of evidence.
Secretary of State's Arguments
- Defended SIAC's approach, supporting the application of public law principles in reviewing national security assessments.
- Argued that SIAC was correct to give due weight and deference to the Secretary of State's assessment of national security risk.
- Maintained that SIAC should not substitute its own judgment for that of the Secretary of State on national security risk.
Intervener's Arguments (JUSTICE)
- Broadly supported the Appellant's position that SIAC's powers on appeal are wider than mere public law review.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Secretary of State for the Home Department v Rehman [2001] UKHL 29; [2003] 1 AC 153 | Clarifies that national security assessments involve evaluative and predictive judgments, requiring deference to the executive; distinguishes between fact-finding and discretion. | Used to define limits of SIAC's review powers on national security appeals; SIAC must respect Secretary of State's assessment unless there is a public law error. |
| Begum v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2021] UKSC 7; [2022] AC 765 | Sets out the nature and limits of SIAC's functions on section 2B appeals, emphasizing constitutional and institutional considerations and the need for deference to executive judgments in national security. | Held binding by this court; its reasoning guided the scope of SIAC's appellate functions and the approach to evidence and findings of fact. |
| General Medical Council v Michalak [2017] UKSC 71; [2017] 1 WLR | Differentiates between appeals and judicial review; an appeal allows full merits review while judicial review focuses on legality and procedure. | Supported the position that section 2B appeals are not judicial reviews but appeals with broader scope. |
| Fage UK Limited v Chobani [2014] EWCA Civ 5; [2014] FSR 29 | Sets out principles on appellate review of factual findings, emphasizing deference to trial judge's consideration of evidence. | Applied to assess SIAC's approach to findings of fact and evidential reasoning. |
| Volpi v Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ 464; [2022] 4 WLR 48 | Clarifies standards for appellate courts reviewing factual findings and reasons for judgment. | Used to evaluate whether SIAC sufficiently explained or rationally supported its findings of fact. |
| Subesh v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] EWCA Civ 56; [2004] INLR 417 | Confirms that appellate bodies have unqualified rights of appeal on fact and law, not limited to errors of law only. | Supported the interpretation that SIAC has power to make findings of fact on appeal. |
| Indrakumar v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2003] EWCA Civ 1677 | Explains appellate interference with factual findings depends on whether the decision was wrong, with more deference in credibility assessments. | Informed the court's approach to SIAC's factual findings. |
| R (Pearce) v Parole Board of England and Wales [2023] UKSC 13; [2023] 2 WLR 839 | Confirms that decision-makers assessing future risk may rely on unproven allegations alongside established facts; no binary fact/non-fact divide. | Supported the approach that SIAC and the Secretary of State can consider unestablished allegations in national security risk assessments. |
| P3 v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2012] EWCA Civ 1642; [2022] 1 WLR 2869 | Clarifies that SIAC must scrutinise all evidence with expert intelligence and apply due deference, without supine acceptance of Secretary of State's conclusions. | Referenced to define the scope of SIAC's review and its duty to critically assess evidence. |
| Chahal v United Kingdom (1996) 23 EHRR 413 | Establishes requirement for an effective independent tribunal review of national security decisions affecting Convention rights. | Historical basis for the creation of SIAC and its procedures. |
| Chandler v Director of Public Prosecutions [1985] AC 374 | Identifies important functions of appellate tribunals in reviewing executive decisions, including evidential basis and reasonableness. | Quoted to explain SIAC's functions in reviewing Secretary of State's national security decisions. |
| Kentucky Fried Chicken v Secretary of State for the Environment [1978] EGLR 139 | Confirms that a tribunal with expertise is not bound to accept uncontradicted expert evidence. | Applied to uphold SIAC's discretion in weighing expert evidence. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court began by situating the appeal within the statutory framework governing SIAC's jurisdiction, particularly section 2B of the 1997 Act and related nationality and immigration legislation. It emphasized the distinction between an appeal and judicial review, noting that SIAC's appeal under section 2B is an unqualified right of appeal, not limited to judicial review principles.
The court analyzed the Supreme Court's decision in Begum, concluding that its description of SIAC's functions on a section 2B appeal was necessary and binding. It clarified that SIAC's functions are broader than merely applying judicial review principles but must respect constitutional and institutional limits, especially the executive's role in national security assessments.
Regarding evidence and findings of fact, the court held that SIAC is empowered and often required to make findings of fact on the balance of probabilities, drawing on its specialist expertise and access to both OPEN and CLOSED evidence. However, SIAC must not substitute its own evaluative judgment on national security risk for that of the Secretary of State, except where the Secretary of State's assessment is vitiated by a public law error.
The court examined SIAC's judgment in detail, noting that SIAC made multiple findings of fact based on extensive evidence, including oral testimony and expert reports. The court found that SIAC's approach to evidence and findings was consistent with its statutory role and legal principles established in Rehman and Begum.
The court rejected the Appellant's criticisms that SIAC erred by failing to make certain findings or by inadequately addressing expert evidence. It reasoned that SIAC was entitled to weigh conflicting evidence and that the limits on SIAC's review of national security risk meant that even favorable findings to the Appellant would not necessarily displace the Secretary of State's assessment.
Finally, the court addressed the Appellant's challenge to SIAC's treatment of the second national security statement, concluding that SIAC correctly applied the relevant legal standards and did not err in law in its approach.
In sum, the court found no material legal error in SIAC's approach to its functions, evidence, or findings in this case.
Holding and Implications
The court's final decision is to DISMISS THE APPEAL.
This means that SIAC's dismissal of the Appellant's appeals against the deprivation of citizenship and refusal of entry clearance stands. The court affirmed the legal framework governing SIAC's functions on section 2B appeals, emphasizing SIAC's role in scrutinizing evidence and making findings of fact while respecting the constitutional limits on substituting the Secretary of State's judgment on national security risk. No new precedent was set beyond affirming and clarifying the application of existing authorities, particularly Begum and Rehman. The decision confirms the balance between executive discretion in national security matters and judicial oversight through SIAC's appellate process.
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