Yeates, R. v

Factual and Procedural Background

This is an appeal against the imposition of the statutory minimum sentence for a third Class A drug-trafficking conviction. The appellant, referred to as the Appellant, was observed on 6 January 2022 by plain-clothes police officers sitting in the driving seat of her car in a car park in an area known for Class A drugs. A woman nearby appeared to be dealt drugs from the Appellant's vehicle. Police stopped the vehicle after allowing it to leave the car park, detained the occupants, and conducted searches.

The Appellant was one of four people in the car, including her boyfriend and two younger individuals, one nearly 19 and the other just under 17 years old. The youngest was found in possession of multiple deals of crack cocaine and heroin, allegedly held for the other young individual, whose DNA was found on some drug wraps. Phone data linked the occupants to drug supply activities, including messages about drug sales and arrangements to drive between locations.

The Appellant admitted to agreeing to drive one of the co-accused in return for £100 but denied knowledge of drug dealing initially. She later pleaded guilty to two counts of being concerned in supplying Class A drugs, on the basis that her role was limited to driving the car after purchasing cocaine from one of the co-accused and having no prior dealings with them.

The Appellant had a significant criminal history with 15 previous convictions for 32 offences, including multiple Class A drug offences and drug driving. Two prior qualifying convictions triggered the statutory minimum sentence provision under section 313 of the Sentencing Act 2020, requiring a custodial sentence of seven years unless "particular circumstances" made it unjust. The sentencing judge imposed the statutory minimum sentence, with a reduction for the guilty plea, resulting in approximately five years and eight months' imprisonment.

The Appellant appealed on grounds that the sentencing judge failed to properly weigh her personal circumstances, the antiquity of her prior offences, and the specifics of this offence, resulting in a manifestly excessive sentence.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the sentencing judge erred in failing to find "particular circumstances" that would make the imposition of the statutory minimum sentence unjust in the Appellant’s case.
2. Whether the sentence imposed was manifestly excessive given the Appellant’s personal circumstances, the age of prior qualifying offences, and the nature of the current offending.
3. How to properly apply the sentencing guidelines in conjunction with the statutory minimum sentence provisions under section 313 of the Sentencing Act 2020.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

• The Appellant had been offence free for 17 years except for a drug-driving conviction in 2019.
• Her relapse into drug use was linked to the death of her mother in 2021, indicating an isolated incident rather than persistent offending.
• She demonstrated rehabilitation potential by being in full-time employment at the date of sentencing.
• She had caring responsibilities for her partner with mental health difficulties, which should be considered mitigating.
• There was a significant disparity between the sentence imposed under the minimum term provisions and the sentence indicated by the sentencing guidelines for a lesser role in the offending.
• Precedents exist where the court found the application of minimum term provisions unjust in cases with similar circumstances, particularly regarding the age of prior convictions and support for rehabilitation efforts.

Prosecution's Position

• The prosecution acknowledged the Appellant’s lesser role in the offending and classified the case as Category 3 with a guideline starting point of three years.

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court began by noting the highly fact-sensitive nature of minimum sentence cases and the importance of not treating prior decisions as binding authorities but as guidance. It relied heavily on the principles articulated in Woofe, which emphasized that sentencing judges must first apply the relevant sentencing guidelines before considering the statutory minimum sentence provisions.

The court identified three key principles from Woofe: (1) the sentencing guideline should be applied first; (2) the minimum sentence should only be imposed if it is not unjust, with unjustness tested by whether the minimum sentence is markedly more severe than the guideline sentence; and (3) the length of time since the last qualifying offence is a relevant factor, though not determinative.

The sentencing judge in this case failed to apply the sentencing guidelines before imposing the minimum sentence and did not compare the guideline sentence with the statutory minimum. The appellate court undertook this exercise itself and found that the guideline sentence, considering the Appellant’s lesser role and mitigation, would be around three years after reduction for the guilty plea.

The court found the imposed sentence of approximately five years and eight months markedly more severe than the guideline sentence. It also gave significant weight to the Appellant’s lengthy period of being offence free, the isolated nature of the offending, and her personal circumstances including employment and rehabilitation potential—factors not adequately considered by the sentencing judge.

Accordingly, the court concluded that this was a rare case where the particular circumstances of the offender and the offence made it unjust to impose the statutory minimum sentence.

Holding and Implications

The court QUASHED the original sentence of 2,045 days’ imprisonment on each count and SUBSTITUTED a sentence of three years’ imprisonment concurrent on each count.

The other orders made below remained unaffected. This decision directly reduces the custodial sentence for the Appellant but does not establish a new precedent beyond affirming the application of established principles regarding statutory minimum sentences and the consideration of unjust circumstances.