Moyne v Todd & Ors (Approved)

Factual and Procedural Background

The Plaintiff, a lay litigant, initiated proceedings on 20 October 2020 against multiple Defendants including a barrister, a firm of solicitors, partners of that firm, and directors of Company A. The Defendants were involved in ongoing Circuit Court Proceedings concerning possession of property owned by the Plaintiff and his spouse. The Plaintiff alleged that the Defendants, acting individually and collectively, defamed him during those proceedings by producing or uttering an altered statutory instrument with intent to damage his reputation and by making accusations of criminal conduct against him. The Plaintiff claimed damages for defamation, malicious falsehood, loss of reputation, and breach of constitutional rights.

The Defendants filed appearances and a defence denying the allegations, contending that the statements made were protected by absolute privilege under the Defamation Act 2009 and that the claim disclosed no reasonable cause of action. The Defendants sought to strike out the proceedings as frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process, and alternatively sought an order restricting the Plaintiff from initiating further proceedings on the same subject matter without court leave (an Isaac Wunder order).

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the Plaintiff's defamation claim discloses a reasonable cause of action or is frivolous, vexatious, or bound to fail.
2. Whether the defence of absolute privilege under section 17(2)(g) of the Defamation Act 2009 applies to statements made by legal representatives in court proceedings.
3. Whether an Isaac Wunder order should be granted to restrain the Plaintiff from issuing further proceedings against the Defendants without leave of the court.
4. Whether the Plaintiff's constitutional rights were breached by the Defendants' conduct in the Circuit Court Proceedings.
5. Whether the Criminal Justice (Perjury and Related Offences) Act 2021 overrides the defence of absolute privilege in defamation claims.

Arguments of the Parties

Defendants' Arguments

• The proceedings are claims for defamation, with malicious falsehood and loss of reputation claims subsumed within defamation.
• The statements complained of were made during the course of judicial proceedings by the first named Defendant acting as legal counsel, thus protected by absolute privilege under the Defamation Act 2009.
• The Plaintiff’s claim discloses no reasonable cause of action and is frivolous, vexatious, and bound to fail.
• The Defendants deny the allegations of wrongdoing and assert that all statements made were accurate and in good faith.
• The Defendants seek an Isaac Wunder order to prevent further litigation on the same issues without court leave, citing the abusive nature of the proceedings and the Plaintiff’s persistence despite explanation of absolute privilege.
• The making of criminal complaints by the Plaintiff is irrelevant to the court’s decision on the Isaac Wunder order and does not affect the Plaintiff’s ability to defend the Circuit Court proceedings.

Plaintiff's Arguments

• The first named Defendant made untrue and defamatory statements in court alleging the Plaintiff exhibited an altered copy of a statutory instrument that favored him.
• The Plaintiff denies any pages were missing from the original exhibit and complains of lack of prior notice before the Defendants raised the issue in court, alleging intent to damage his reputation.
• The Plaintiff contends that absolute privilege is overridden by the Criminal Justice (Perjury and Related Offences) Act 2021, arguing that false statements and perjury claims dissolve any claim of privilege.
• The Plaintiff disputes the entitlement of the Defendants to an Isaac Wunder order, asserting that his criminal complaints were mandatory under statutory provisions.
• The Plaintiff claims his constitutional rights under Articles 4.3.2, 38 of the Constitution and Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights were violated by the Defendants' conduct and the Circuit Court proceedings.

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court applied established principles governing strike out applications, emphasizing that such jurisdiction is to be exercised sparingly and only when a claim is clearly bound to fail. The court viewed the Plaintiff's claim at its highest, assuming all pleaded facts to be true, to determine if there was any possibility of success at trial.

The central legal principle considered was the defence of absolute privilege under section 17(2)(g) of the Defamation Act 2009, which provides complete immunity to statements made by legal representatives during judicial proceedings. The court found that the statements complained of were made in the course of the Circuit Court Proceedings by the first named Defendant acting as counsel, thereby attracting absolute privilege.

The court rejected the Plaintiff’s argument that the Criminal Justice (Perjury and Related Offences) Act 2021 overrides absolute privilege, clarifying that the perjury offence does not disapply the defence of absolute privilege for statements made in court. The court also noted that the Plaintiff’s constitutional claims do not prevent strike out, as the constitutional protection of reputation is subject to the operation of absolute privilege.

The court found no merit in the Plaintiff’s claims against the individual directors of Company A, as they were not sued in a representative capacity and cannot be conflated with the company itself.

Regarding the Isaac Wunder order, the court acknowledged the Defendants’ concerns about potential repeated vexatious litigation but declined to grant the order at this stage, noting this was the first set of proceedings against the Defendants and no evidence existed that the Plaintiff intended to issue further proceedings. The court emphasized the importance of the right of access to the courts and the need for proportionality in such orders.

Holding and Implications

The court STRUCK OUT the Plaintiff’s proceedings in full on the grounds that they are vexatious, an abuse of process, and bound to fail due to the application of absolute privilege.

The court declined to grant an Isaac Wunder order restraining the Plaintiff from issuing further proceedings against the Defendants at this time, primarily because this is the first occasion on which the Plaintiff has sued the Defendants. The court indicated that if the Plaintiff persists with further litigation on the same issues, an Isaac Wunder order would likely be appropriate and proportionate.

The direct effect of this decision is the termination of the Plaintiff’s current claims against the Defendants. The judgment reinforces the protection afforded to legal representatives by absolute privilege in court proceedings, ensuring that they cannot be sued for defamation based on statements made in the course of judicial functions. No new legal precedent was established beyond the application of existing principles.