Timpson, R. v

Factual and Procedural Background

The opinion concerns a criminal case involving the Defendant, who was convicted on 20 January 2023 at the Crown Court in Nottingham of multiple sexual offences against a minor, hereinafter referred to as "LB". The Defendant, aged 36, engaged in a sexual relationship with LB, who was under the age of 16 at the time the offences began. The relationship involved grooming, multiple incidents of sexual activity, and breaches of the Sexual Offences Act 2003. The Defendant was sentenced to concurrent terms totaling three years' imprisonment. The Solicitor General applied to refer the sentence on the grounds that it was unduly lenient.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the starting point for sentencing was appropriate given the repeated and multiple offences committed by the Defendant against LB.
2. Whether the reduction of the sentence by 25% to account for delay in trial proceedings was justified.
3. Whether the Defendant's Article 6 rights under the European Convention on Human Rights were infringed by the delay in trial.

Arguments of the Parties

Solicitor General's Arguments

• The starting point of four years' custody before reduction for delay was too lenient and should have been higher than five years due to raised culpability and repeated offending.
• The 25% sentence reduction for delay was excessive and failed to properly consider the ongoing impact of the offences on the victim.

Defendant's Arguments

• The judge was entitled to the approach taken, including the starting point and delay reduction.
• The grooming was less severe than online grooming and was not predatory in nature.
• Weight should be given to the fact that the sentencing judge also presided over the trial.

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court began by reaffirming the established principle that sentencing is an art requiring judicial discretion within a reasonable range, as articulated in Attorney General's Reference (No 4 of 1989). It acknowledged the sentencing judge’s advantage of having presided over the trial but found the sentence unduly lenient for two main reasons.

First, the court determined that the starting point of four years’ custody before reduction failed to adequately reflect the overall criminality, particularly the repeated and multiple offences over several months. The Sentencing Council Guidelines indicate a starting point of five years for Category 1A offences; however, the sentencing judge did not sufficiently uplift the sentence to reflect multiple offences as required by the Totality Guideline. The court held that the multiple offences warranted an increase, concluding that a starting point of six years was appropriate.

Second, the court found the 25% reduction for delay was unjustified. It reasoned that the delay was not solely due to external factors but was partly caused by the Defendant contesting the case, which necessitated a trial. The court emphasized that a defendant is not entitled to a delay reduction equivalent to that given for an early guilty plea when the delay results from contesting the charges. Furthermore, the court considered the pandemic-related backlog and remedial measures taken, concluding no actionable interference with the Defendant’s Article 6 rights had occurred.

Overall, the court held that the sentencing judge erred in both the starting point and the delay reduction, warranting an increase in the sentence.

Holding and Implications

The court QUASHED the concurrent sentences of three years' imprisonment imposed on Counts 3 to 6 and SUBSTITUTED concurrent sentences of six years' imprisonment on each of those counts. The other sentences remained unchanged, resulting in a total effective sentence of six years' imprisonment.

The decision directly affects the Defendant by increasing the custodial sentence to better reflect the gravity and multiplicity of the offences. No broader legal precedent was established beyond the application of existing sentencing principles and guidelines.