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Sfar v. Minister for Agriculture
Factual and Procedural Background
The Applicant kept pigs and sheep that became the subject of a Welfare Notice in July 2014. While that notice was under appeal in the District Court, officials acting under the Animal Health and Welfare Act 2013 seized the animals in August 2014. The District Court upheld the Welfare Notice and, on further appeal, the Circuit Court affirmed that decision.
The Applicant initiated two linked judicial-review proceedings in the High Court challenging (i) official inspections, (ii) the Welfare Notice, and (iii) the subsequent seizure. The High Court (Judge Twomey) dismissed the challenges. The Court of Appeal delivered a single judgment in 2020 that largely affirmed the High Court, save that it remitted one issue—the compatibility of parts of s.38 of the 2013 Act with the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)—for rehearing and vacated an Isaac Wunder order previously made against the Applicant.
The Applicant sought leave to appeal to the Supreme Court, but the application was filed outside the prescribed time-limit. The Supreme Court (Judge Clarke C.J., Judge McKechnie, and Judge O’Malley) determined the matter on 16 April 2021.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the proposed appeal raised a matter of general public importance or was otherwise necessary in the interests of justice, as required by Article 34.5.3° of the Constitution.
- Whether the Court should extend time for an out-of-time application for leave to appeal.
- Whether the Court of Appeal erred in its treatment of the Applicant’s constitutional, ECHR, and EU-law challenges to warrant-less entry, inspection, and seizure under the Animal Health and Welfare Act 2013.
Arguments of the Parties
Applicant's Arguments
- Entry onto her land without a judicial warrant, the seizure of animals during a pending appeal, and the absence of prompt notification breached her rights under the Constitution, the ECHR, and EU law.
- The Respondents’ actions were disproportionate to the stated objective of protecting animal welfare.
- Health issues and COVID-19 related internet difficulties justified an extension of time.
Respondents' Arguments
- No issue of EU law arose because officials relied solely on the domestic Act.
- The 2013 Act is compatible with the ECHR; the Applicant already enjoyed effective remedies via appeal and judicial review.
- If leave were granted, they would cross-appeal the issues remitted by the Court of Appeal.
Table of Precedents Cited
Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
---|---|---|
B.S. v. Director of Public Prosecutions [2017] IESCDET 134 | Sets out general principles governing the grant of leave to appeal under Article 34.5.3°. | Re-affirmed as the governing standard for assessing whether the Applicant met the constitutional threshold. |
Quinn Insurance Ltd. v. PricewaterhouseCoopers [2017] IESC 73; [2017] 3 I.R. 812 | Detailed exposition of the “new constitutional architecture” for Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction. | Referenced to avoid revisiting those principles in the present determination. |
Sfar v. Minister for Agriculture & Ors. [2016] IEHC 348 | High Court judgment on initial judicial-review proceedings. | Provided factual and procedural context for the current leave application. |
Sfar v. Minister for Agriculture & Ors. [2020] IECA 207 | Court of Appeal judgment under challenge. | Identified the issues the Applicant wished to bring before the Supreme Court. |
Carmody v. Minister for Justice [2010] 1 I.R. 635 | Clarifies that ECHR arguments may proceed even where parallel constitutional claims are not pursued. | Cited by the Court of Appeal; the Supreme Court noted its relevance when describing the remitted ECHR compatibility issue. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
1. Constitutional Threshold: The Court reiterated that, under Article 34.5.3°, leave will be granted only where the proposed appeal raises a matter of general public importance or where an appeal is otherwise necessary in the interests of justice. The standards outlined in B.S. and Quinn Insurance remain decisive.
2. Incomplete Documentation and Time Limit: Although the application was incomplete, the Court considered it sufficiently detailed to rule on the merits. The filing, however, was out of time. The Applicant’s explanations (health issues and COVID-19 disruptions) were acknowledged but not found compelling in light of the substantive assessment that followed.
3. Status of Remitted Issue: The key question—compatibility of s.38 of the 2013 Act with the ECHR—had already been sent back to the High Court by the Court of Appeal. The Supreme Court saw “no reason to disagree” with that course of action and regarded it as the appropriate forum for further analysis.
4. Redundancy of Supreme Court Review at this Stage: Because the central ECHR issue remains live before the High Court, a further appeal to the Supreme Court would be premature and potentially duplicative. As such, neither limb of the constitutional leave test was satisfied.
5. Extension of Time: Given the absence of qualifying issues warranting Supreme Court intervention, consideration of an extension of time became moot.
Holding and Implications
LEAVE TO APPEAL REFUSED.
The Supreme Court declined to extend time or to grant leave. The High Court will proceed to rehear the remitted question concerning the ECHR compatibility of s.38 of the Animal Health and Welfare Act 2013. No new precedent was established; the determination is final and conclusive only between the parties.
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