Morgan v The Labour Court (Approved)

Factual and Procedural Background

This opinion concerns an application for leave to issue a motion pursuant to an Isaac Wunder Order in proceedings involving the Appellant and the Board, with the Minister for Education and Skills also involved as a notice party. The Appellant's proceedings relate to her former employment with the Board, including matters concerning suspension, termination, pension, and gratuity entitlements. Previous High Court judgments, notably by Judge Ferriter, restrained the Appellant from instituting further proceedings related to her employment without prior leave of the High Court. Several related proceedings had been dismissed or struck out as frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process. The Appellant has appealed these dismissals, with pending appeals before the Court of Appeal and an application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court. The current application seeks leave to bring a motion under section 97(2)(b) of the Employment Equality Act 1998 to disclose certain information purportedly necessary to defend against alleged attacks by the Board and the Minister’s legal teams.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the High Court retains jurisdiction to make orders in respect of proceedings that have been finally determined and are under appeal (i.e., whether the High Court is functus officio).
2. Whether section 97 of the Employment Equality Act 1998 precludes the Appellant from disclosing information in the course of these proceedings, thereby necessitating an order under section 97(2)(b).
3. Whether the intended proceedings are frivolous, vexatious, or brought for an improper purpose, thereby justifying refusal of leave under the Isaac Wunder Order.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

• The Appellant seeks leave to disclose information under section 97(2)(b) to defend herself from alleged attacks by the Board and the Minister’s legal teams in multiple related proceedings.
• The Appellant claims that disclosure is necessary due to assertions that cover up ongoing discrimination and degrade her well-founded complaints.
• She refers to her ill-health as a factor supporting her application.
• The Appellant contends she needs to disclose certain documents and evidence for appeals pending before the Court of Appeal and Supreme Court.
• She has sought to introduce a letter from 2009 related to a prior discrimination complaint, describing it as sensitive and important.

Respondent's (Board and Minister's) Arguments

• Both the Board and the Minister contend the Appellant was given multiple opportunities to bring the application earlier but declined, causing the earlier judge to treat the application as withdrawn.
• They submit that the intended Notice of Motion is barred by the doctrine of functus officio, as the High Court has already made final orders.
• The Board points out the information the Appellant seeks to disclose relates to a previous complaint from 2009-2012 that was dismissed for lack of prima facie evidence and that the Appellant has not denied this identification.
• The Minister indicates consent to the production of the material sought to be relied upon but notes the Appellant has not clearly identified the information.
• The Board argues the document sought to be introduced is irrelevant to the current proceedings, which concern an appeal on a point of law against a 2020 Labour Court determination.
• They submit the application is vague, unclear, and amounts to a tactic to delay finalisation of the proceedings.

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court began by addressing the jurisdictional question, concluding that the High Court was functus officio once it had made final orders dismissing the proceedings on 28 June 2022. The Court relied on established authority emphasizing the public interest in finality and the principle that the only remedy for a disappointed litigant is appeal. Accordingly, the High Court lacked jurisdiction to entertain the Appellant’s application to issue a motion in proceedings that had concluded.

The Court then considered the legal basis for the application under section 97(2)(b) of the Employment Equality Act 1998, which governs disclosure of information obtained in investigations or hearings. The Court held that section 97(2) does not preclude disclosure of relevant information in court proceedings under Part VII of the Act (which includes appeals), and thus the Appellant did not require a court order to disclose such information if it was relevant. The purpose of section 97(2) is to prevent unlawful dissemination of confidential information to unauthorized persons, not to bar disclosure in relevant legal proceedings.

Substantively, the Court found the Appellant’s application vague and imprecise, failing to identify the specific information sought to be disclosed or explain its relevance to the appeal against the Labour Court decision. The information related to a complaint from 2009-2012 that was dismissed for lack of evidence and was unrelated to the 2020 Labour Court decision under appeal. The Court concluded that introducing evidence not before the Labour Court would be improper and irrelevant.

The Court also found the application to be a further step in a pattern of vexatious litigation by the Appellant, characterized by repeated attempts to re-litigate issues already determined by competent courts. The timing of the application, after final orders and during pending appeals, and the refusal to pursue the matter when invited by the earlier judge, indicated an improper purpose aimed at delaying finalisation rather than asserting legitimate rights.

Given the Isaac Wunder Order restraining the Appellant from issuing further proceedings without leave, and the absence of a sustainable claim, the Court refused leave to issue the intended motion.

Holding and Implications

The Court REFUSED the Appellant's application for leave to issue a motion pursuant to section 97(2)(b) of the Employment Equality Act 1998.

The refusal was grounded primarily on the High Court’s lack of jurisdiction (being functus officio) over proceedings that had been finally determined and were under appeal, the irrelevance and vagueness of the evidence sought to be introduced, and the vexatious and improper nature of the application. The Court emphasized that any application to admit further evidence must be made before the appellate courts, not the High Court. This decision directly prevents the Appellant from proceeding with this particular application in the High Court but does not set new precedent beyond reaffirming established principles regarding Isaac Wunder Orders, functus officio, and section 97 of the Employment Equality Act.