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Teasdale v Carter & Anor
Factual and Procedural Background
This appeal arises from a Family Court decision by Judge Shelton concerning the ownership of a property known as Cow House, located on a farm jointly owned by the Appellant and Second Respondent. The dispute involves the First Respondent, their elder daughter, who was found entitled to the transfer of Cow House into her sole name on discharge of the outstanding mortgage, based on proprietary estoppel. The litigation has been extensive and costly, with the property valued significantly less than the total costs incurred. The parties had previously agreed a resolution in October 2020, which was repudiated by the Appellant, leading to prolonged litigation. The appeal was heard in late 2022 following permission granted by the President of the Family Division, who noted a reasonable prospect of success based on the adequacy of the judge’s explanation of principal reasons and factual analysis.
The family background reveals that the Appellant and Second Respondent married in 1974 and have two daughters. The farm, Burne Farm, was originally owned solely by the Second Respondent and later transferred into joint names. Cow House was an unconverted barn converted into a family home for the First Respondent and her husband, financed partly by a mortgage from the Agricultural Mortgage Corporation ("AMC"). The dispute centers on whether the First Respondent acquired beneficial ownership of Cow House through promises made by the parents and her financial contributions, or whether she was merely a tenant paying rent.
The proceedings included multiple hearings, written submissions, and detailed evidence over several days, culminating in a lengthy judgment. The judge found in favor of the First Respondent on proprietary estoppel grounds, rejecting claims relating to other parts of the farm and ancillary property. Costs orders were also made against the Appellant. The Appellant appealed on multiple grounds, challenging findings of fact, the nature of the remedy, and costs orders.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the Family Court judge erred in his findings of fact regarding the First Respondent's beneficial ownership of Cow House based on proprietary estoppel.
- Whether the remedy awarded—transfer of the property on discharge of the mortgage—was appropriate or whether a lump sum payment should have been ordered to achieve a clean break.
- Whether the costs orders made in favor of the First Respondent and the Second Respondent were appropriate, including the necessity of separate representation for the Second Respondent.
- Whether fresh evidence, including a later will, should be admitted and affect the outcome.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- The judge failed to properly explain his principal reasons and analysis of the factual evidence, rendering his findings unsafe.
- The First Respondent and her witnesses gave collusive false evidence on parts of the claim.
- The judge erred in not making findings regarding an alleged listening device placed in the farmhouse.
- The Appellant was not party to the promises underlying the proprietary estoppel claim, undermining the judge’s findings.
- The payments made by the First Respondent were rent, not mortgage repayments.
- The judge failed to attach proper weight to the First Respondent’s failure to produce relevant documents.
- The judge wrongly refused a capital payment remedy to achieve a clean break and instead elevated the claim to one of constructive trust.
- The costs orders were incorrect, particularly the order for the Second Respondent’s costs and the necessity of his separate representation.
- The fresh evidence of a 2018 will should be admitted and affects the credibility and findings.
First Respondent's Arguments
- The appeal is without merit and the judge’s legal analysis and findings were faultless and legitimate.
- The First Respondent and her husband built the house, demonstrating they were not tenants.
- There was no finding of collusive false evidence; the judge simply preferred the First Respondent’s evidence.
- The Appellant was aware of and bound by the promise made by the Second Respondent regarding Cow House.
- The payments corresponded with mortgage repayments, not rent, and were made directly to the mortgage company after a freezing order.
- The fresh evidence of the 2018 will goes only to credibility and does not undermine the primary findings.
- The judge was entitled to reject the Appellant’s challenges to documentary evidence and credibility.
Second Respondent's Arguments
- The judge’s findings of fact are entitled to deference and are not unsafe given the extensive evidence and oral testimony.
- The judge’s nuanced treatment of credibility was appropriate.
- The claims relating to other parts of the farm were modest and satisfied by use of the land, not requiring further remedy.
- The Second Respondent’s representation was necessary given the impact of the litigation on the financial remedy proceedings.
- The Appellant could have sought to discharge the Second Respondent’s representation if she objected, but did not.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| TL v ML [2005] EWHC 2860 Fam | Procedure for hearing preliminary issues on beneficial ownership. | Applied to hear the claim for beneficial ownership as a preliminary issue. |
| Davies v Davies [2016] EWCA Civ 463 | Summary of proprietary estoppel principles. | Guided the court’s legal framework for assessing proprietary estoppel claims. |
| Thorner v Major [2009] UKHL 18 | Elements of proprietary estoppel: assurance, reliance, detriment, and unconscionability. | Used to define the necessary ingredients and test for proprietary estoppel. |
| Gillett v Holt [2001] Ch 210 | Interrelation of assurance, reliance, and detriment in proprietary estoppel. | Informed the court’s approach to the intertwined nature of estoppel elements. |
| Henry v Henry [2010] UKPC 3 | Proportionality and balancing detriment and benefits in proprietary estoppel. | Considered in assessing the remedy and weighing equities. |
| Jennings v Rice [2002] EWCA Civ 159 | Discretionary remedies for proprietary estoppel to avoid unconscionable outcomes. | Supported the court’s exercise of broad discretion in remedying estoppel. |
| Taylor v Dickens [1998] 1 FLR 806 | Limits on judicial discretion in proprietary estoppel remedies. | Referenced to caution against unprincipled remedies. |
| Ong v Ping [2015] EWHC 3258 | Reasonableness of separate representation costs in litigation. | Considered in assessing costs orders related to representation of parties. |
| Re: R (A Child) [2019] EWCA Civ 895 | Standard for permission to appeal: realistic prospect of success. | Guided the court’s assessment of appeal permission and prospects. |
| Piglowska v Piglowski [1999] 1 WLR 1360 | Appellate caution in overturning findings of fact and credibility. | Emphasized deference to trial judge’s assessment of evidence and witnesses. |
| Simetra Global Assets Ltd v Ikon Finance Ltd [2019] 4 WLR 112 | Requirement for reasoned judicial process and dealing with contrary evidence. | Used to consider adequacy of the judge’s explanation of findings. |
| Ladd v Marshall [1954] 1 WLR 1489 | Criteria for admitting fresh evidence on appeal. | Applied in determining whether to admit the 2018 will evidence. |
| Baker v Rowe [2009] EWCA 1162 | Costs responsibility linked to success and generation of costs. | Applied in the court’s reasoning on costs orders against the Appellant. |
| Designers Guild Ltd v Russell Williams (Textiles) [2000] 1 WLR 2416 HL | Standard for appellate interference with findings of fact. | Supported the court’s approach to the deference owed to trial findings. |
| Campbell v Griffin (Court of Appeal 2001) | Consideration of rent-free occupation and life interest in proprietary estoppel remedies. | Referenced by the Appellant in arguments on remedy proportionality. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court undertook a detailed review of the extensive evidence and the trial judge’s findings, emphasizing the deference owed to the trial judge’s assessment of witness credibility and factual determinations, particularly in family disputes where evidence is inherently imprecise. The court found that the trial judge had conducted a thorough analysis, including detailed consideration of documentary evidence and oral testimony over several days. The judge had applied established proprietary estoppel principles, as summarized in authoritative cases, correctly identifying the elements of assurance, reliance, detriment, and unconscionability.
The judge’s key finding—that the First Respondent was promised Cow House conditional on meeting conversion costs and mortgage repayment, with the Appellant’s full knowledge and authority—was supported by evidence of substantial financial contributions and involvement in the property’s construction and occupation. The court found no error in the judge’s rejection of the Appellant’s claim that payments were rent or that the promise was not made to her. The judge’s refusal to find a gift or proprietary interest in ancillary properties was also supported by the evidence and proper legal reasoning.
The court rejected the Appellant’s contention that the judge failed to adequately explain his reasoning or address contrary evidence, noting that the judgment contained clear findings and reasons. The court also found that the judge was entitled to refuse to make findings on peripheral matters such as the alleged listening device, which were unrelated to the core proprietary estoppel claim.
Regarding the remedy, the court agreed with the trial judge that transferring legal title upon mortgage discharge was the appropriate and proportionate remedy, rejecting the suggestion that a lump sum payment was necessary for a clean break. The court emphasized that the proprietary estoppel remedy must avoid unconscionable results and that a clean break payment would have been inequitable given the circumstances.
On costs, the court upheld the judge’s orders requiring the Appellant to pay half of the First and Second Respondents’ costs, finding that the Appellant’s unsuccessful litigation generated those costs. The court also accepted that separate representation for the Second Respondent was reasonably necessary given the overlap with financial remedy proceedings and potential conflicts of interest.
The application to admit fresh evidence (a 2018 will) was allowed but found not to undermine the trial judge’s primary findings or the appeal outcome, as it did not affect the established history of promises and contributions.
Holding and Implications
The court DISMISSED the appeal in its entirety.
The decision confirms that in proprietary estoppel claims involving family property disputes, appellate courts will accord substantial deference to the trial judge’s findings of fact and credibility, especially where extensive oral evidence has been heard. The judgment reinforces that proprietary estoppel remedies must be proportionate and tailored to avoid unconscionability, with transfer of property title appropriate when the claimant has met the conditions of the promise.
The court’s dismissal of the appeal affirms the trial judge’s order transferring Cow House to the First Respondent upon discharge of the mortgage and upholds the associated costs orders. No new precedent was established beyond the careful application of existing principles. The decision underscores the importance of clear agreements and the risks of protracted family litigation with disproportionate costs relative to the property value.
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