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CAB Housing Ltd v Secretary of State for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities & Anor
Factual and Procedural Background
The appeal concerns the interpretation of Class AA of Part 1 of Schedule 2 to the Town and Country Planning (General Permitted Development) (England) Order 2015 ("the GPDO"), which allows permitted development rights to enlarge dwelling houses by constructing additional storeys. The appellant, Company A, appealed against an order dismissing its application for statutory review of an inspector's decision. The inspector had dismissed Company A's appeal against the refusal by the local planning authority, Company B, of an application for prior approval for adding a single storey to an existing single-storey detached dwelling at a specified address in The City.
The inspector's decision, dated 15 June 2021, found that the proposed development would have an adverse impact on the amenity of adjoining premises and on the external appearance of the dwellinghouse, particularly due to its scale and design, and dismissed the appeal. Subsequently, Holgate J. dismissed Company A's statutory review application on 3 February 2022. Permission to appeal was granted by Lewison L.J., leading to this appeal.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the judge erred in holding that the decision-maker may control the scale of the proposal within the ambit of the prior approval controls in paragraph AA.2(3)(a) of the GPDO.
- Whether the judge was wrong to reject the submission that the phrase "adjoining premises" in paragraph AA.2(3)(a)(i) refers only to properties contiguous with the subject property.
- Whether the judge erred in rejecting the submission that consideration of "amenity" impacts is limited to overlooking, privacy, or loss of light, and whether the control on "external appearance" is limited to the principal elevation and any side elevation fronting a highway.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- The judge's interpretation reduced the value of the permitted development rights by allowing control over scale at the prior approval stage, which should be fixed by the grant of Class AA rights.
- The phrase "adjoining premises" should be narrowly construed to mean only those properties contiguous or abutting the subject property, promoting certainty and consistency with other GPDO provisions and statutory definitions.
- The term "amenity" in paragraph AA.2(3)(a)(i) is limited to overlooking, privacy, and loss of light, excluding other factors such as outlook, based on the principle of expressio unius est exclusio alterius and the use of the word "including".
- The assessment of "external appearance" under paragraph AA.2(3)(a)(ii) should be confined to the principal elevation and side elevations fronting a highway, reflecting the intention to restrict consideration to publicly visible elevations.
- The distinction between "scale" and "appearance" established in other planning contexts (e.g., reserved matters approvals) applies, and scale is fixed by the permitted development right, not subject to prior approval.
Respondent's Arguments (Secretary of State and Local Planning Authority)
- The judge correctly held that the scale of the development is subject to control within the prior approval process under paragraph AA.2(3)(a).
- The word "adjoining" should be given a wider meaning to include premises lying close to the development, not limited to those contiguous, consistent with modern usage and practical considerations in assessing amenity impacts.
- The use of "including" in the provisions is inclusive rather than restrictive, allowing consideration of amenity impacts beyond overlooking, privacy, and loss of light, such as outlook and overbearing effects.
- The control of external appearance is not limited to specified elevations but may include other elevations and impacts on neighbouring premises and the locality.
- The prior approval process is an integral part of the permitted development right, and the grant of permission is contingent upon prior approval, which involves the exercise of planning judgment including on scale.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Murrell v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government [2010] EWCA Civ 1367 | Distinction between principle of development fixed at outline stage and matters for reserved matters approval (scale and appearance distinct). | Rejected as directly applicable; the court held that the permitted development right under Class AA is subject to prior approval, including control of scale, unlike outline planning permission. |
| MMF (UK) Ltd. v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government [2010] EWHC 3686 (Admin) | Definition of "scale" and "appearance" in planning permissions; scale relates to size and relationship with surroundings, appearance to design and visual impression. | Distinguished; Class AA does not create the same dichotomy between scale and appearance as in reserved matters context, and scale is relevant in prior approval. |
| Crystal Property (London) Ltd. v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government [2016] EWCA Civ 1264 | Approval of reserved matters; distinction between scale and appearance. | Approved MMF's distinction but court found it inapplicable to Class AA prior approval process. |
| Tidal Lagoon (Swansea Bay) Plc v Secretary of State for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy [2022] EWCA Civ 1579 | Principles of statutory interpretation; ascertainment of legislative meaning with regard to purpose. | Applied to interpret Class AA provisions in light of legislative purpose. |
| R. (on the application of Mawbey) v Lewisham London Borough Council [2020] PTSR 164 | Statutory interpretation principles. | Applied to confirm approach to interpreting planning legislation. |
| Keenan v Woking Borough Council [2018] PTSR 697 | Operation of permitted development rights and prior approval process. | Supported the view that permitted development rights are contingent upon prior approval. |
| R. (on the application of Rights: Community: Action) v Secretary of State for Housing and Local Government [2021] EWCA Civ 1954 | Permitted development rights and prior approval process as integral to development consent. | Confirmed that the grant of permission accrues only upon prior approval. |
| McGaw v Welsh Ministers [2021] EWCA Civ 976 | Pragmatic statutory interpretation in permitted development context. | Endorsed a wider, pragmatic meaning of "adjacent" or "adjoining" in planning legislation. |
| Dilworth v Commissioner of Stamps [1894] A.C. 94 | Interpretation of "including" in statutory language; can be inclusive or exhaustive depending on context. | Held that "including" was used inclusively, not restrictively, in the provisions at issue. |
| Miaris v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government [2016] EWCA Civ 75 | Scope of "amenity" in planning context. | Referenced to acknowledge the potentially wide scope of "amenity". |
| New World Payphones v Westminster City Council [2019] EWCA Civ 2250 | Comparison of prior approval process with full planning permission process. | Confirmed prior approval is a simpler, less demanding process than full planning permission. |
| Corbett v Cornwall Council [2022] EWCA Civ 1069 | Interpretation of "immediately adjoining" in development plan policy. | Distinguished as concerning planning policy, not statutory provisions. |
| English Clays Lovering Pochin & Co. Ltd. v Plymouth Corporation [1974] 1 W.L.R. 742 | Different meanings of "adjoining" and "adjacent" in planning legislation. | Referenced but court rejected narrow meaning of "adjoining" in this case. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court analysed the statutory framework governing Class AA of Part 1 of Schedule 2 to the GPDO, focusing on the interplay between permitted development rights and the prior approval process. It emphasised that the permitted development right granted by Class AA is not unconditional but contingent upon obtaining prior approval from the local planning authority regarding specific matters, including amenity and external appearance.
In addressing the first issue, the court rejected the appellant's argument that the scale of development is fixed by the grant of Class AA rights and not subject to prior approval. It held that the prior approval process necessarily includes control over scale as a relevant factor in assessing impacts on amenity and external appearance. The court distinguished previous case law on scale and appearance in the reserved matters context as inapplicable to the specific statutory scheme of Class AA.
Regarding the second issue, the court interpreted "adjoining premises" in paragraph AA.2(3)(a)(i) to have a wider meaning than merely contiguous or abutting properties. It found that modern usage and practical considerations support a broader interpretation to include premises lying close to the development, consistent with the requirement to notify adjoining owners or occupiers and to consider their representations. The court rejected a narrow linguistic approach in favour of a pragmatic statutory interpretation aligned with the purpose of the provisions.
On the third issue, the court found that the term "amenity" is not confined to overlooking, privacy, and loss of light, but includes other relevant factors such as outlook and overbearing impact. Similarly, the "external appearance" of the dwellinghouse is not limited to the principal elevation and side elevations fronting a highway, but may include other elevations and impacts on neighbouring premises and the locality. The court reasoned that the use of "including" in the statutory text is inclusive rather than restrictive, and that a meaningful assessment requires consideration beyond the enumerated examples.
The court also noted that the prior approval process involves the local planning authority exercising planning judgment within the limits set by the legislation, and that this process is less demanding than a full planning permission application.
Holding and Implications
The court DISMISSED the appeal.
The decision confirms that under Class AA of Part 1 of Schedule 2 to the GPDO, the local planning authority's prior approval process includes control over the scale of the proposed development, and that "adjoining premises" is to be interpreted broadly to include premises lying close to the site, not only those contiguous. The scope of "amenity" and "external appearance" considerations is also broad, encompassing factors beyond those specifically enumerated in the legislation.
The ruling reinforces the integral role of the prior approval process in the exercise of permitted development rights under Class AA and clarifies the statutory interpretation of key terms within the GPDO. No new precedent beyond the immediate statutory interpretation was established, and the decision directly affects the parties by upholding the inspector's dismissal of the appeal and the local planning authority's refusal of prior approval.
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