S, R. v

Factual and Procedural Background

The appellant, aged 17 at the time of the proceedings, was involved in two counts of burglary of domestic dwellings committed on 26 and 27 September 2020, alongside two co-defendants, one being his father. The burglaries involved forced entry into secured homes in The City, during which valuable and sentimental items were stolen and property damaged. The offences were detected through CCTV and police investigations, including the discovery of stolen items in a vehicle driven by the appellant's father.

The appellant initially pleaded not guilty at Medway Magistrates' Court on 29 September 2020, but later entered guilty pleas at Maidstone Crown Court on 28 October 2020. The appellant was sentenced on 5 March 2021 to concurrent two-year youth rehabilitation orders with supervision for each count. Before sentencing, applications were made for the case to be remitted to the Youth Court or for the judge to sit as a District Judge (Magistrates' Court) ("DJMC") to impose a referral order, both of which were refused. The appellant appealed against the sentence on the grounds of refusal to remit and the length of the order.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the judge erred in refusing to remit the appellant's case to the Youth Court or to exercise discretion to sit as a DJMC to impose a referral order.
2. Whether the length of the youth rehabilitation order was manifestly excessive.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

• The appellant was a young person of good character who pleaded guilty to imprisonable offences and should have been subject to a referral order.
• The judge wrongly refused to exercise discretion to sit as a DJMC and impose a referral order.
• The two-year youth rehabilitation order was manifestly excessive, as the Youth Offending Team indicated rehabilitation could be completed within a 12-month referral order.

Prosecution's Arguments

• The judge properly exercised discretion in not remitting the appellant's case to the Youth Court to avoid delay, duplication, and unnecessary expense, especially given the involvement of an adult co-defendant.
• The judge was entitled to decline sitting as a DJMC to impose a referral order.
• The two-year youth rehabilitation order was necessary and proportionate given the appellant's lack of candour and the complexity of the offences.
• The sentencing approach should be individualistic and focused on rehabilitation, consistent with Sentencing Council's Overarching Principles on Sentencing Children and Young People.

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court acknowledged the statutory framework under the Sentencing Act 2020, which requires remission of youth cases to the Youth Court unless undesirable. The court explained the statutory criteria and mandatory nature of referral orders for first-time youth offenders pleading guilty to imprisonable offences.

It found that the judge had the statutory power, under section 66 of the Criminal Courts Act 2003 and section 25(2) of the Sentencing Act 2020, to remit the appellant's case to the Youth Court and to sit as a DJMC to impose a referral order. The judge’s refusal was based on a mistaken view that referral orders were unavailable to him in Crown Court proceedings, an error likely due to lack of guidance at the time.

The court emphasized that the judge’s concerns about disparity and delay could have been addressed by exercising his DJMC powers and remitting the case. Given the appellant’s good character, the supporting PSR, and the Youth Offending Team’s confidence in rehabilitation under a referral order, the failure to impose such an order was wrong in principle and resulted in a manifestly excessive sentence.

Holding and Implications

DISPOSED OF: The appeal is allowed, the youth rehabilitation order quashed, and the matter is remitted to the Medway Youth Court for sentencing.

The direct effect is that the appellant will be sentenced by the Youth Court, where a referral order is the appropriate and mandatory disposal. No new precedent is established beyond clarifying the correct exercise of powers under existing statutes and case law. The court emphasized the desirability of expeditious resolution and imposed a bail condition requiring the appellant to reside at a specified address.