Towey & Anor v The Government of Ireland & Ors (Approved)

Factual and Procedural Background

The judgment concerns multiple motions arising from a series of related proceedings initiated by the Plaintiffs against various State defendants, legal professionals, and entities including Start Mortgages DAC and Lavelle Partners LLP. The origin of the litigation stems from possession proceedings initiated by Start Mortgages DAC in 2018, resulting in a possession order made by a Circuit Court judge in June 2019. The Plaintiffs subsequently issued defamation proceedings against the judge involved and commenced various High Court proceedings challenging the validity of court summonses and orders based on alleged constitutional immunities and other claims.

The Plaintiffs assert immunity from court summonses and orders, relying on prior cases involving the Minister for Justice, the Attorney General, and the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP). They further allege constitutional breaches, treason by judges, and misconduct by legal representatives. The Plaintiffs have issued at least five sets of proceedings, many overlapping in parties and issues, but have not appealed adverse orders striking out their claims as frivolous, vexatious, or disclosing no reasonable cause of action.

The Plaintiffs failed to attend the hearing to prosecute their motions, despite being forewarned that the hearing would proceed. They communicated an intention not to attend due to an ongoing criminal investigation into alleged fraud relating to court documents. Defendants brought motions to strike out the Plaintiffs' claims on grounds including no reasonable cause of action, abuse of process, and sought Isaac Wunder orders to restrain further litigation without court leave.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the Plaintiffs' claims disclose a reasonable cause of action or are frivolous, vexatious, bound to fail, or an abuse of process warranting striking out under Order 19, rule 28 of the Rules of the Superior Courts or the Court's inherent jurisdiction.
2. Whether an Isaac Wunder order restraining the Plaintiffs from instituting further proceedings without prior court leave is appropriate in the circumstances.
3. The extent to which the Plaintiffs' claims of immunity from court summonses and orders based on constitutional provisions and prior unrelated cases have legal merit.

Arguments of the Parties

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court first addressed the Plaintiffs' claims under Order 19, rule 28 and the Court's inherent jurisdiction. It accepted the facts as pleaded by the Plaintiffs but found that these facts could not logically or legally support the inferences and conclusions the Plaintiffs sought, particularly their claim of immunity from court summonses and orders based on prior unrelated cases involving the Minister for Justice, the Attorney General, and the DPP.

The Court drew heavily on prior authoritative decisions, notably Fennell v Collins and Keary v The Property Registration Authority, which similarly rejected such immunity claims as fundamentally misconceived and without legal merit. The Court emphasized that the constitutional guarantee of equality under Article 40.1 does not confer immunity from court orders, and such immunity claims undermine the essential nature of judicial power and the rule of law.

The Court also rejected allegations of treason against judges arising from their judicial decisions, noting that judicial error does not amount to treason and that the proper remedy for alleged judicial error is appeal, which the Plaintiffs had not pursued.

Regarding the Isaac Wunder order, the Court considered the extensive history of repetitive, overlapping, and vexatious litigation by the Plaintiffs, including outrageous and unfounded allegations against judges and legal representatives. The Court found good grounds to believe the Plaintiffs would continue to initiate further proceedings on the same issues, warranting a restraining order to prevent abuse of court process.

The Court carefully balanced the constitutional right of access to courts against the need to protect defendants from harassment and unnecessary expense and to preserve court resources. It acknowledged the exceptional nature of Isaac Wunder orders and emphasized the necessity of proportionality and fairness, including providing the Plaintiffs with notice and opportunity to make submissions on the terms of the proposed order.

The Court declined to grant the overly broad restraining order sought by some defendants but proposed narrower, focused orders restraining the Plaintiffs from instituting further proceedings related to specific past orders without prior leave of the High Court.

Holding and Implications

The Court STRUCK OUT the Plaintiffs' claims under Order 19, rule 28 and the Court's inherent jurisdiction on the grounds that the claims disclose no reasonable cause of action, are frivolous and vexatious, bound to fail, and constitute an abuse of process.

Furthermore, the Court proposed to grant Isaac Wunder Orders restraining the Plaintiffs from instituting further proceedings against specified defendants concerning the subject matter of previous litigation without prior leave of the High Court. The terms of these orders were to be communicated to the Plaintiffs with an opportunity to make submissions before finalization.

The decision directly limits the Plaintiffs' ability to pursue repetitive and vexatious litigation on issues already determined by courts of competent jurisdiction. No new precedent was established beyond the application of established principles regarding striking out claims and Isaac Wunder orders. The ruling underscores the courts' duty to protect judicial resources and parties from abuse of process while respecting constitutional access to justice.