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L.B. v Minister for Justice and Equality & Ors (Approved)
Factual and Procedural Background
The Plaintiff was married to the fourth named Defendant in 1964, with whom he had five children. Following a judicial separation in 1996 and a divorce in 2004, property adjustment and pension adjustment orders were made against the Plaintiff, requiring the sale of the family home and division of proceeds, as well as a pension share for the Plaintiff's former spouse. The Plaintiff contended that he solely financed the family home and challenged these orders and the underlying statutory provisions as unconstitutional.
Previously, the Plaintiff instituted two earlier sets of proceedings: the 2004 Consolidated Proceedings and the 2011 Proceedings. These challenged the constitutionality of various Family Law Acts and the validity of property and pension adjustment orders made in the matrimonial proceedings. Both sets of proceedings were dismissed by the High Court and the Supreme Court upheld those dismissals.
The current proceedings arise from the Plaintiff's motion to amend his plenary summons and statement of claim and the Defendants' motion to dismiss the proceedings on grounds including res judicata, abuse of process, and vexatiousness. The Plaintiff seeks declarations that the Family Law Acts are unconstitutional and orders for restitution of property and monies lost due to court orders made pursuant to those Acts.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the Family Law Act, 1995 and the Family Law (Divorce) Act, 1996 were enacted ultra vires the Oireachtas, specifically violating Article 15.4.1 of the Constitution by delegating legislative power impermissibly to the courts.
- Whether the property adjustment and pension adjustment orders made pursuant to these Acts unlawfully deprived the Plaintiff of his constitutional property rights under Articles 40.3 and 43 of the Constitution.
- Whether the Plaintiff’s claims based on Article 17 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, newly introduced in these proceedings, are admissible or barred by the rule in Henderson v. Henderson.
- Whether the current proceedings are barred by the doctrine of res judicata due to identical issues having been previously adjudicated.
- Whether the proceedings constitute an abuse of process or are frivolous and/or vexatious within the inherent jurisdiction of the Court.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- The Plaintiff challenges the constitutional validity of the Family Law Act, 1995 and Family Law (Divorce) Act, 1996, asserting that the Oireachtas lacked competence to enact property provisions therein.
- The Plaintiff contends that the property adjustment orders deprived him arbitrarily and without compensation of his lawfully acquired property, infringing constitutional property rights and guarantees under Article 17 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.
- The Plaintiff argues that the doctrine of res judicata does not apply to public law proceedings, seeking to relitigate constitutional issues previously decided.
State Defendants' Arguments
- The State Defendants contend the proceedings disclose no new cause of action and are barred by the doctrine of res judicata, as the issues have been conclusively determined in two prior sets of proceedings (2004 Consolidated and 2011 Proceedings).
- They argue the introduction of the Article 17 Charter claim is an abuse of process under the rule in Henderson v. Henderson, as this argument could and should have been raised in earlier proceedings.
- The proceedings are further contended to be frivolous and/or vexatious, seeking to relitigate matters already determined and to harass the Defendants through repeated litigation.
- The State Defendants rely on established indicia of vexatious proceedings, including repeated litigation of settled issues and attempts to circumvent previous adverse rulings.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Vico Limited v. Bank of Ireland [2016] IECA 273 | Procedural principle that a defendant's motion to strike out should be determined before a motion for judgment in default of defence. | The Court referred to this precedent to justify hearing the State Defendants' motion to strike out prior to the Plaintiff's motion for judgment in default of defence. |
| Riordan v. An Taoiseach (No. 5) [2001] 4 I.R. 463 | Indicium of vexatious proceedings in Irish law. | The Court applied the indicia of vexatious proceedings as approved in this case to determine that the Plaintiff's repeated litigation was vexatious. |
| Behan v. McGinley [2011] 1 I.R. 47 | Approval of indicia of vexatious proceedings. | The Court cited this case to support the application of the indicia of vexatious litigation to the present proceedings. |
| Coleman v. Ireland [2022] IEHC 17 | Recent application of vexatious proceedings indicia. | The Court referenced this recent decision to reinforce the application of the vexatious proceedings test. |
| Re Article 26 and the Matrimonial Homes Bill 1993 [1994] 1 I.R. 305 | Constitutional limits on legislation affecting matrimonial property rights. | The Court considered this authority in rejecting the Plaintiff’s challenge to the constitutionality of the Family Law Acts. |
| T.F. v. Ireland [1995] 1 I.R. 321 | Legitimacy of legislative interference with personal rights in family law context. | The Court relied on this precedent to uphold the constitutionality of the Family Law Acts as balancing family interests and personal rights. |
| D.T. v. C.T. [2002] 3 I.R. 334 | Proper provision for spouses in divorce proceedings and constitutional context. | The Court cited this case to reject the Plaintiff’s claim that he was sole owner of the family home and to affirm the State's duty to protect the institution of marriage. |
| L.B. v. Ireland and the Attorney General and P.B. [2012] IEHC 461 | Dismissal of claims challenging property adjustment orders as unconstitutional. | The Court relied on this judgment to confirm that the Plaintiff’s claims were doomed to fail and that the statutory provisions were constitutional. |
| L.B. v. Ireland, the Attorney General and P.B. [2015] IESC 1 | Supreme Court ruling on constitutionality of Family Law Acts and separation of powers. | The Supreme Court dismissed the Plaintiff's appeal, affirming the constitutionality of the statutory provisions and rejecting the separation of powers argument. |
| Henderson v. Henderson | Rule preventing relitigation of issues that could have been raised previously; abuse of process. | The Court applied this rule to bar the Plaintiff’s new claim based on the Charter as an abuse of process. |
| Re Vantive Holdings Ltd [2009] IEHC 408 | Modern statement of the rule in Henderson v. Henderson. | The Court adopted this explanation to assess the Plaintiff’s attempt to introduce new grounds in the current proceedings. |
| Johnson v. Gore Wood & Co [2002] 2 A.C. 1 | Explanation of abuse of process related to Henderson v. Henderson. | The Court cited Lord Bingham’s judgment to emphasize the need for finality in litigation and to assess abuse of process. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court began by granting the Plaintiff's motion to amend the pleadings, allowing the State Defendants' motion to strike out to proceed on the basis of the amended claim.
The Court examined the history of the Plaintiff's litigation, noting two previous sets of proceedings (2004 Consolidated Proceedings and 2011 Proceedings) where identical constitutional challenges to the Family Law Acts and related court orders were made and decisively rejected by both the High Court and the Supreme Court.
The Court emphasized that the doctrine of res judicata applies strongly here, as the issues raised are the same and have been conclusively decided by courts of competent jurisdiction. The addition of the Minister for Justice as a Defendant in the current proceedings did not affect the identity of parties for this purpose.
The only novel ground in the current proceedings was the invocation of Article 17 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. However, the Court found that this argument could and should have been raised in the 2011 Proceedings, which were instituted after the Charter came into effect.
Applying the rule in Henderson v. Henderson, the Court held that the Plaintiff’s attempt to introduce this new ground at this late stage constituted an abuse of process. The Court considered the public and private interests in finality and efficiency in litigation, and the history of repeated unsuccessful litigation by the Plaintiff.
Furthermore, even if the doctrines of res judicata and Henderson did not strictly bar the proceedings, the Court found the current proceedings to be frivolous and vexatious. The Plaintiff was attempting to relitigate issues already decided, supplemented only by a new legal basis that lacks substantive application to the facts.
Holding and Implications
The Court STRUCK OUT the Plaintiff’s proceedings.
The direct effect of this decision is that the Plaintiff’s constitutional challenges to the Family Law Act, 1995 and the Family Law (Divorce) Act, 1996, as well as the related property and pension adjustment orders made pursuant to those Acts, are conclusively barred from further litigation in this Court. The Plaintiff is also precluded from relying on the Article 17 Charter claim as it constitutes an abuse of process.
No new precedent altering the established principles of res judicata, abuse of process, or vexatious litigation was established. The Court reserved consideration of the State Defendants' application for an Isaac Wunder order, which would prevent the Plaintiff from instituting further proceedings without leave of the Court.
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