Zalewski v Adjudication Office & ors

Factual and Procedural Background

The Appellant worked for Company A, a retail shop in The City, from 2012 until April 2016. Following disagreements about security procedures, the Appellant was summarily dismissed for alleged gross misconduct, including suggestions of dishonesty and poor performance. He invoked the Unfair Dismissals Acts 1977–2015 and lodged a complaint with Agency A (the body created by the Workplace Relations Act 2015 to hear such disputes).
Agency A listed the case for hearing twice. On the first occasion, the employer’s key witness was absent; on the second, the parties were told in a corridor that a decision had already issued. The written decision, apparently produced without any sworn evidence, dismissed the claim and contained no factual reasoning.

The Appellant commenced judicial-review proceedings. The High Court quashed Agency A’s decision by consent but, at first instance, declined to entertain a constitutional challenge to the Workplace Relations Act 2015. The Supreme Court restored standing; the present judgment is a dissenting opinion by Judge Charleton on the constitutional issues.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether adjudication of unfair-dismissal claims by Agency A amounts to the administration of justice that Article 34.1 of the Constitution reserves to courts and judges.
2. If not, whether it nevertheless falls within Article 37.1’s exception for the exercise of “limited functions and powers of a judicial nature” by non-judicial bodies.
3. Whether the enforcement mechanism in section 43 of the Workplace Relations Act 2015—which requires the District Court to grant orders without hearing the employer—breaches constitutional guarantees of fair procedures.
4. Whether judicial review, limited to legality and reasonableness, provides a constitutionally adequate safeguard in the absence of a full factual appeal to a court.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

• Agency A exercises core judicial power when it decides disputes that directly affect livelihood and reputation; such power must reside in courts or at least be subject to a de novo appeal.
• The private nature of Agency A hearings, absence of sworn evidence, and lack of reasons violate constitutional standards of fair procedures.
• Section 43’s requirement that the District Court enforce decisions without hearing the employer is a denial of justice.

Respondents' Arguments

• The 2015 Act validly assigns only “limited” judicial functions; extensive training and the possibility of judicial review sufficiently protect constitutional rights.
• Historical practice shows that employment-law tribunals have long decided such matters without offending the Constitution.
• Section 43 merely provides an enforcement shortcut and does not deprive employers of substantive rights because they may appeal to Tribunal A or seek judicial review.

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

Judge Charleton reasoned that deciding an unfair-dismissal claim is inherently judicial because it involves credibility findings that may define an individual’s honesty, competence and future employability. He drew three analytic lines:

• Technical vs. substantive disputes: Tribunals may constitutionally determine purely calculative matters (e.g. holiday pay) but not matters that “go to the core of social standing,” such as allegations of theft or incompetence.
• Nature of appeal: Article 37 tolerates non-judicial decision-making only where a meaningful factual appeal to a court exists. The 2015 Act removed the earlier de novo appeal to the Circuit Court and limited court involvement to points of law or rubber-stamp enforcement, which is insufficient.
• Fair-hearing guarantees: Section 43 obliges the District Court to convert Agency A’s decisions into enforceable orders “without hearing the employer,” even empowering it to substitute monetary awards for reinstatement. This, in the judge’s view, is a “flagrant breach” of constitutional fair-procedure principles.

He rejected the State’s contention that expanded judicial-review remedies adequately protect parties, noting that judicial review cannot correct factual errors or supply missing evidence. By removing any realistic prospect of a judicial rehearing, the Act, in his opinion, impermissibly divested the courts of core judicial power.

Holding and Implications

DISSENTING VIEW ONLY – NOT THE COURT’S FINAL ORDER.

Judge Charleton would have declared the relevant sections of the Workplace Relations Act 2015 unconstitutional, particularly those:

• vesting final unfair-dismissal adjudication in Agency A without a de novo court appeal; and
• compelling the District Court to enforce awards without hearing the employer.

The broader court majority’s holding is not revealed in the supplied text, so the legal effect of the dissent cannot be stated. Consequently, no immediate precedential change can be described based solely on this opinion.