Keal, R. v

Factual and Procedural Background

On 26/27 September 2018, the Appellant, aged 33, attacked his father, mother, and 91-year-old grandmother with various weapons causing serious injuries. He had a history of mental health issues, including ADHD and drug addiction, and had recently exhibited bizarre behaviour and attempted suicide. Following the attacks, he was detained and treated in secure hospital units. At trial in June 2021, the Appellant was convicted on three counts of attempted murder and sentenced to a hospital order with restrictions under the Mental Health Act 1983. The Appellant appealed his convictions on the basis that the trial judge misdirected the jury regarding the defence of insanity, specifically in relation to the application of the M'Naghten Rules.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the trial judge erred in law in his direction to the jury concerning the defence of insanity under the M'Naghten Rules.
2. Whether the defence of insanity is available to a psychotic defendant who knows his act is legally wrong but believes he is compelled or powerless to prevent it.
3. The proper interpretation of the term "wrong" within the M'Naghten Rules—whether it means legally wrong, morally wrong, or includes an element of choice or agency.
4. Whether the current law on insanity should be interpreted as including an element of choice or agency in criminal responsibility.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

• The trial judge misdirected the jury by not allowing the defence of insanity where a defendant is aware that his act is "wrong" but is compelled by delusions to perform it.
• The defence of insanity should be available to a psychotic defendant who believes he has no choice but to commit the act.
• The M'Naghten Rules should be read to incorporate the answer to the fourth question, treating the defendant’s delusions as if they were real, meaning the defendant was not acting of his own agency but as an instrument of the delusion.
• The current law should be reinterpreted to emphasize agency or choice as essential to culpability, aligning with contemporary understandings of mental illness and criminal responsibility.
• The trial judge should have directed the jury that if the defendant believed he had no choice but to act, the defence of insanity would be made out.

Crown's Arguments

• The sole issue for the jury was whether the Appellant knew that his actions were legally wrong.
• The term "wrong" in the M'Naghten Rules means "wrong in law" or "contrary to law," not morally wrong or including lack of agency.
• The Appellant’s multiple delusions do not support an agency-based defence as he knew the nature and quality of his acts.
• The defence of insanity does not extend to defendants who know their acts are legally wrong, even if they suffer from delusions compelling them to act.

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court first examined the meaning of "wrong" within the M'Naghten Rules, endorsing the established interpretation from Windle and Johnson that "wrong" means both legally wrong and wrong by the standards of reasonable ordinary people. The court emphasized that a defendant must lack knowledge that the act was unlawful and morally wrong to establish the defence.

Next, the court considered whether the M'Naghten Rules incorporate an element of "choice" or "agency"—the notion that a defendant compelled by delusions to act without choice should be excused. The court rejected this, noting established authority (R v Kopsch) that irresistible impulse is not part of the insanity defence under the M'Naghten Rules. The proposed jury direction by the appellant’s counsel was described as conceptually confused and legally unsupported.

The court further declined to reinterpret or reform the law to include an agency element, citing the longstanding nature of the M'Naghten Rules, the appropriateness of law reform being a matter for Parliament, and the limited suitability of a single appeal for such significant legal development.

Finally, the court found that the trial judge’s directions to the jury were appropriate and consistent with the evidence. The jury was properly directed to consider whether the Appellant knew his actions were wrong, with expert evidence presented on both sides. The jury's verdicts of guilty were therefore safe.

Holding and Implications

DISMISSED

The court dismissed the appeal, upholding the convictions for three counts of attempted murder. The decision confirms the continued application of the M'Naghten Rules as the governing test for insanity, affirming that "wrong" means legally and morally wrong without incorporating an element of choice or agency. The ruling emphasizes that significant reform of the insanity defence is a matter for Parliament rather than judicial reinterpretation. No new precedent altering the legal test for insanity was established; the direct effect is to sustain the trial judge’s directions and the jury’s verdicts in this case.