Tindall & Anor v Chief Constable of Thames Valley Police & Anor

Factual and Procedural Background

The appeal concerns whether the facts pleaded by the Plaintiff against the Defendant, referred to as the Chief Constable, disclose a reasonable cause of action in tort capable of resulting in substantial damages. The Chief Constable applied to strike out the Plaintiff's claim or alternatively sought summary judgment, both of which were refused by Master McCloud. The Defendant now appeals this refusal.

The underlying events stem from a fatal road traffic accident occurring at approximately 5:45 am on 4 March 2014 on a stretch of road between two towns. The Plaintiff claims as the widow and administratrix of her late husband, who was killed when a car driven by a third party lost control on black ice and collided head-on with her husband's vehicle. The third-party driver also died.

Earlier on the same road, about an hour before the fatal accident, another accident caused by black ice occurred involving a different driver who sustained injuries. Police officers, for whom the Chief Constable is responsible, attended the earlier accident approximately 20 minutes after it occurred and remained for around 20 minutes. They cleared debris and placed a "Police Slow" sign but removed the sign and left the scene some 20 minutes before the fatal collision. The Plaintiff alleges negligence in the police conduct during and upon leaving the scene, with vicarious liability asserted against the Chief Constable.

Master McCloud summarized the pleaded facts, noting that the first accident happened on a frozen stretch of road due to black ice from a water leak. The injured driver attempted to warn other vehicles but ceased after police arrival, who placed then removed a warning sign and left the scene without leaving any warnings or measures to alert subsequent road users. The fatal accident followed shortly thereafter.

The Plaintiff further pleads that during the injured driver’s call to emergency services, he was unable to continue warning traffic and relied on the police response. Three police officers arrived, understood the ice hazard, placed a single warning sign on the carriageway for the direction of the subsequent fatal accident, swept debris from the road, and requested a gritter, though allegedly without sufficient urgency. They left the scene taking the warning sign with them, mistakenly believing no hazard remained. The fatal accident occurred 20-25 minutes later.

It is accepted for the appeal that but for the police arrival, the injured driver would have continued warning traffic. The police did not coerce or encourage him to stop; his decision to leave was based on his assumption the police would manage the hazard. The Plaintiff alleges the police assumed control then relinquished it negligently, preventing protective measures by the injured driver and others.

The claim against the Chief Constable pleads breach of a duty not to make matters worse, alleging the police attendance caused the injured driver and others to cease warning motorists, failed to conduct sufficient risk assessment, failed to maintain warning signs, inadequately requested gritting, and failed to remain until safety measures were in place, among other alleged breaches. The case distinguishes between a duty not to worsen the situation and a duty to protect from harm.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the police officers owed a duty of care to the Plaintiff’s late husband by virtue of having made matters worse through their conduct at the initial accident scene.
2. Whether the police assumed responsibility or control over the accident scene such as to create a special relationship imposing a duty of care towards the Plaintiff’s late husband.
3. Whether the question of duty of care can be determined at this stage or requires a trial of the facts.

Arguments of the Parties

Defendant's Arguments

• The law is settled that public authorities stand in the same position as private individuals regarding negligence and do not generally owe a duty to protect individuals from harm.
• The police did not cause or increase the hazard posed by ice; their arrival merely coincided with the injured driver deciding to leave, which was not caused by any police act.
• Removal of the "Police Slow" sign restored the road to its prior condition and was not negligent or making matters worse.
• The police did not have a special relationship or control over the hazard at the time of the fatal accident, distinguishing this case from authorities where liability was found.
• All relevant facts are known from the pleadings; the issue does not require trial but can be decided on appeal.

Plaintiff's Arguments

• The duty of care is owed to a limited class of road users using the specific stretch of road affected by the hazard.
• The police made matters worse by their attendance, which led to the injured driver ceasing his attempts to warn motorists, thereby removing a protective measure.
• The police assumed responsibility and control over the hazard, creating a special relationship with the Plaintiff’s late husband and other road users.
• The case is distinguishable from prior authority where police did nothing to affect the scene; here, they removed the injured driver and the warning sign.
• The issue is fact-sensitive and the law is in flux, justifying a trial rather than summary dismissal.

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court began by reaffirming the established principle that public authorities, including the police, generally owe no duty of care to prevent harm caused by third parties absent special circumstances. The law distinguishes between positive acts that cause harm and omissions or failures to confer a benefit, with liability typically limited to the former.

The court analysed the facts as pleaded, noting the police attended the first accident, placed a single warning sign, swept debris, then removed the sign and left before the fatal accident. The police did not create or increase the hazard of black ice; their intervention was ineffectual and transient, amounting to a failure to confer a benefit rather than making matters worse.

The court rejected the Plaintiff’s argument that the police caused the injured driver to cease warning traffic, emphasizing that the driver’s departure was a private decision based on an assumption that the police would manage the hazard, with no coercion or encouragement from police officers. Therefore, the police did not "make matters worse" by their presence or conduct.

The court further held that no special relationship or assumption of responsibility arose from the police attendance. The police had no control over the hazardous ice or the subsequent accident scene at the time of the fatal collision, and the relationship with the Plaintiff’s late husband was no different than with any other road user.

The court distinguished the present case from authorities where liability was found due to police creating or exacerbating a danger or having control over a third party causing harm. It found the Plaintiff’s reliance on a "control exception" too broad and inconsistent with established case law.

The court also rejected the submission that the matter required a trial, holding that the facts were clear from the pleadings and the law settled, thus the appeal should be allowed without further fact-finding.

Holding and Implications

The appeal is allowed.

The court held that the Plaintiff’s claim against the Chief Constable discloses no reasonable cause of action in tort. The police did not owe a duty of care to the Plaintiff’s late husband because their actions did not make the situation worse but rather were ineffectual interventions amounting to omissions. There was no assumption of responsibility or special relationship giving rise to a duty of care. The decision affirms the settled legal principles limiting public authority liability for omissions and the distinction between acts causing harm and failures to confer a benefit.

This ruling results in the dismissal of the claim against the Chief Constable at this stage and does not set new precedent but reinforces existing jurisprudence on public authority duties and omissions in negligence.