Bloomberg LP v ZXC

Factual and Procedural Background

The Respondent, a United States citizen with permanent residence in the United Kingdom, was at the relevant time a senior executive of Company A, a publicly-listed multinational. Since 2013 the United Kingdom Law Enforcement Body (“the Law Enforcement Body”) has been investigating alleged fraud, bribery and corruption by Company A and certain individuals in the Foreign State. In autumn 2016 the Law Enforcement Body sent a confidential mutual legal assistance request (“Letter of Request”) to the Foreign State. The Letter of Request named the Respondent as a suspect and set out the investigators’ provisional views on his alleged wrongdoing.

A journalist employed by the Appellant obtained an unauthorised copy of the Letter of Request and, despite repeated objections from the Law Enforcement Body and the Respondent’s solicitor, published an article revealing: (i) that the Respondent had been interviewed under caution; (ii) the investigative steps sought from the Foreign State; and (iii) detailed allegations the Law Enforcement Body believed to be supported by preliminary evidence.

The Respondent sued the Appellant for misuse of private information, claiming both damages and injunctive relief. After a four-day trial Judge Nicklin found for the Respondent, awarded £25,000 and granted a prohibitory injunction ([2019] EWHC 970). The Court of Appeal dismissed the Appellant’s appeal ([2020] EWCA Civ 611). The Supreme Court (five Justices) granted permission and has now delivered the present judgment, published in open form with identifying details removed.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether, as a general rule, a person under criminal investigation has a reasonable expectation of privacy in information about that investigation prior to charge.
2. Whether, absent a pleaded claim for breach of confidence, the confidential origin of the information (the Letter of Request) rendered it private and/or diminished the Appellant’s public-interest defence.
3. Whether the lower courts erred in concluding that (a) the Respondent in fact had a reasonable expectation of privacy and (b) the article 8/10 balancing exercise favoured the Respondent.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

• The public can be trusted to respect the presumption of innocence; therefore publication of pre-charge investigative facts is not ordinarily reputationally damaging.
• Defamation authorities show that an “ordinary reasonable reader” distinguishes suspicion from guilt; the same standard should apply in privacy law.
• Privacy should protect only intrinsically private matters (e.g. health or intimate life). Business conduct within a publicly listed company is not such a sphere.
• The lower courts turned the multifactorial test into a rigid rule and over-emphasised confidentiality, wrongly conflating breach of confidence with privacy.

Respondent's Arguments

• Publication of investigative suspicions predictably harms reputation, personal dignity and family life, satisfying the threshold for article 8 engagement.
• There is a consistent line of domestic authority, professional guidance and public-policy material supporting pre-charge anonymity.
• The Appellant obtained the Letter of Request in flagrant breach of confidence; that factor legitimately weighs against publication when balancing articles 8 and 10.
• The judge applied the correct Murray factors; no basis exists for appellate intervention on factual evaluative findings.

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

1. Legitimate Starting Point. Drawing on domestic case-law, professional guidance, government policy and European jurisprudence, the Court held that publication of pre-charge investigative information ordinarily inflicts serious, sometimes irremediable damage on reputation and multiple aspects of private life. Consequently, it is a “legitimate starting point” that such information attracts a reasonable expectation of privacy.

2. No Irrebuttable Presumption. The starting point is fact-sensitive and may be displaced by counter-vailing circumstances (e.g. riot undertaken in public view). The Respondent nonetheless satisfied the test on the facts.

3. Rejection of Appellant’s Presumption-of-Innocence Argument. The Court found no empirical basis for assuming that public adherence to the presumption of innocence prevents reputational harm. Experience and judicial notice point the other way.

4. Defamation Concepts Inapplicable. The Court refused to import the “ordinary reasonable reader” construct from defamation; privacy law is a distinct cause of action concerned with autonomy and dignity, not solely falsity.

5. Confidential Origin Relevant but Not Determinative. Although no breach-of-confidence claim was pleaded, the illicit disclosure of the Letter of Request was a powerful contextual factor at both stages: it fortified the expectation of privacy and weighed against public-interest publication because it threatened the integrity of an ongoing criminal investigation.

6. Stage-One Application. Applying the Murray factors, Judge Nicklin (and the appellate courts) held that the Respondent’s attributes as a business executive did not nullify his privacy interest; the illicit source, potential reputational harm and absence of prior publicity were decisive.

7. Stage-Two Balancing. The Court accepted that corruption in the Foreign State is a matter of public interest, but emphasised that the Appellant had merely replicated confidential investigative material without independent journalistic inquiry. Upholding the confidentiality of the Letter of Request, protecting the fairness of the investigation and shielding the Respondent from disproportionate harm outweighed the Appellant’s article 10 rights.

8. Appellate Deference. Consistent with PJS and AAA, the Supreme Court saw no error of principle justifying interference with the evaluative balance struck by the trial judge and affirmed by the Court of Appeal.

Holding and Implications

APPEAL DISMISSED.

Immediate effect: the injunction and damages awarded to the Respondent remain in force; the Appellant may not republish the investigative details within England and Wales.

Broader implications: the judgment authoritatively confirms that individuals under criminal investigation, but not charged, generally enjoy a reasonable expectation of privacy regarding that fact and related details. Media organisations must therefore exercise heightened caution when publishing leaked or confidential pre-charge material, and should expect courts to scrutinise public-interest justifications with particular rigour where publication threatens ongoing investigations or derives from obvious breaches of confidence. No new cause of action was created, but the decision consolidates and elevates the existing line of authority on pre-charge anonymity.