Association of Independent Meat Suppliers & Anor, R. (on the application of) v Food Standards Agency

Factual and Procedural Background

On 11 September 2014, Company A purchased a live bull at Auction Market A for £1,361.20. An Official Veterinarian (OV) initially deemed the animal fit for slaughter, after which it was assigned kill number 77 and slaughtered. A Meat Hygiene Inspector subsequently found three abscesses in the offal. Later the same day, following discussion with the inspector, the OV declared the carcass unfit for human consumption because pyaemia was suspected. Without an affixed health mark, selling the carcass would have constituted a criminal offence under regulation 19 of the Food Safety and Hygiene (England) Regulations 2013.

Company A consulted an independent veterinary surgeon and disputed the OV’s assessment. It contended that, absent voluntary surrender, the OV must seize the carcass under section 9 of the Food Safety Act 1990 and seek condemnation before a Justice of the Peace. Agency A (the statutory regulator) rejected that view, maintaining that disposal as an animal by-product under the Animal By-Products (Enforcement) (England) Regulations 2013 was sufficient. On 23 September 2014 the OV, acting for Agency A, served a disposal notice to that effect, advising judicial review as the available route of challenge.

Judicial review proceedings were commenced by Company A and Association A (a trade body representing approximately 150 slaughterhouses). They asserted that section 9 was the mandatory procedure, or alternatively that the United Kingdom had failed to provide an adequate appeal mechanism against OV decisions. The claim failed in the lower courts. The United Kingdom Supreme Court referred two questions to the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU); after receiving the CJEU’s answers, the Supreme Court issued the present (second) judgment without further oral hearing.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the use of section 9 of the Food Safety Act 1990 is compatible with the EU food-safety regime established by Regulations (EC) Nos 854/2004 and 882/2004.
2. Whether article 54(3) of Regulation 882/2004 requires a merits-based appeal against an OV’s decision, or whether conventional judicial review on public-law grounds suffices to secure effective judicial protection.

Arguments of the Parties

Company A and Association A

• Asserted that section 9 is the correct and obligatory mechanism for resolving disputes over OV decisions regarding carcasses.
• Contended that, if section 9 were unavailable, EU law obliges the United Kingdom to furnish an alternative procedure allowing substantive review of the OV’s decision.

Agency A

• Acknowledged that section 9 could be used but denied any legal duty to do so, noting the availability of other lawful options.
• Argued that treating section 9 as an appeal process would improperly allow a Justice of the Peace to substitute his or her assessment for that of the OV, contrary to EU requirements.
• Maintained that judicial review supplies all necessary safeguards demanded by EU law for challenging OV decisions.

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Supreme Court relied decisively on the CJEU’s interpretative guidance:

• Incompatibility of Section 9: The CJEU held that section 9 would replace the OV—designated by EU legislation as the primary decision-maker—with a court ruling on substantive merits, thereby contradicting Regulations 854/2004 and 882/2004. Moreover, section 9 does not permit an operator to initiate proceedings or empower the Justice of the Peace to annul the OV’s decision, rendering it inadequate for the remedy demanded by article 54(3).
• Sufficiency of Judicial Review: Applying factors such as the technical expertise required, the OV’s duty to give written reasons, and the public-health objective of the regime, the CJEU concluded that conventional judicial review—allowing challenges for illegality, irrationality, or procedural unfairness—affords effective judicial protection. EU law does not necessitate full re-examination of all factual findings.
• Property Rights: Any economic loss to Company A is justified by the paramount goal of consumer protection; hence, the limited review standard is proportionate.

Adopting those conclusions, the Supreme Court found no unlawfulness in Agency A’s refusal to invoke section 9 and no failure by the United Kingdom to provide an adequate appeal mechanism.

Holding and Implications

APPEAL DISMISSED.

The Court affirmed that section 9 of the Food Safety Act 1990 cannot lawfully be used as an appeal route against an OV’s decision under the EU food-safety framework. Judicial review remains the exclusive and sufficient avenue for challenging such decisions. The ruling confirms regulatory practice for slaughterhouse operators but does not establish a new common-law principle beyond aligning domestic procedure with EU requirements.