Contains public sector information licensed under the Open Justice Licence v1.0.
Barclay, R. v
Factual and Procedural Background
The Applicant, now aged 62, was originally convicted in 1979 for wounding with intent to cause grievous bodily harm and sentenced to two years' custody. Between 1981 and 2003, the Applicant committed numerous offences, including multiple violent offences. On 11th August 2003, the Applicant violently assaulted two men in a public park using a hammer and a bottle, causing serious injuries. After police attempts to locate him, the Applicant attended a police station with legal counsel but declined to comment on key aspects of the incident. He was subsequently identified by victims and witnesses.
In August 2004, following a Crown Court trial before Judge Crowther QC and a jury, the Applicant was convicted of two counts of wounding with intent and acquitted of a third. Due to the Applicant’s prior conviction for a similar offence, the law mandated an automatic life sentence under section 109 of the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000 ("PCC(S)A 2000"). At sentencing in October 2004, the judge considered whether exceptional circumstances existed to avoid the life sentence. The judge concluded there were no such circumstances, fixing a minimum term of 16 months before parole consideration. The Applicant has been imprisoned for over 17 years since sentencing.
The Applicant subsequently sought an extension of time of over 16 years and leave to appeal against the sentence. This application was referred to the full court by a single judge. The court obtained updated reports from the Parole Board and the Probation Service, revealing ongoing concerns about the Applicant’s risk to the public and his conduct in prison, including threats and aggression. However, a recent Parole Board review recommended transfer to open conditions, indicating some progress.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the sentencing judge applied the correct legal test under section 109 of the PCC(S)A 2000 when imposing the mandatory life sentence.
- Whether the Applicant demonstrated exceptional circumstances to avoid the automatic life sentence, specifically whether he posed a significant risk to the public at the time of sentencing.
- Whether the court should grant an extension of time to permit the late appeal against sentence.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- The sentencing judge failed to apply the correct test for exceptional circumstances under the PCC(S)A 2000, particularly by not explicitly considering whether the Applicant posed a significant risk to the public.
- The judge misstated the test by accepting a psychiatrist's remark that the Applicant did not pose any danger to the public, which was argued to be a misapplication of the correct legal standard.
- If the judge applied the wrong test, the court should undertake the assessment itself and conclude that on the 2004 material the Applicant did not pose a risk to the public.
- The Applicant sought to challenge the admissibility of up-to-date information from the Parole Board and Probation Service, arguing it should not be considered in the appeal.
- The Applicant suggested the court should recuse itself from considering the application after receiving the new reports.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| R v Offen and Others [2000] EWCA Crim 96 | Clarification of exceptional circumstances test under predecessor to section 109; court must consider whether the defendant poses a significant risk to the public. | The court accepted Offen as establishing the need to evaluate risk to the public and used it to confirm the judge’s approach to exceptional circumstances. |
| R v Fletcher; R v Smith [2002] 1 Cr App R(S) 82 | Obligation to impose automatic life sentence unless offender does not pose significant or unacceptable risk of serious and continuing danger to the public. | The court relied on these principles to affirm the mandatory nature of the life sentence absent exceptional circumstances. |
| R v Kelly (No 2) [2002] 1 Cr App R(S) 85 | Burden of displacing the presumption of risk lies with the appellant; exceptional circumstances mean no need to protect the public. | The court adopted the test from Kelly (No 2) as clear and straightforward, rejecting arguments that the judge applied the wrong test. |
| R v Lang [2005] EWCA Crim 2864 | Identification of factors to assess risk of further offences under automatic life sentence provisions. | The court acknowledged that this case post-dated the sentencing and could not be used to reverse engineer the judge’s decision but recognized its relevance to risk assessment generally. |
| R v Beesley and Others [2011] EWCA Crim 1021 | Admissibility of further evidence in dangerous offender cases after prior findings of dangerousness. | The court distinguished the present case from Beesley, rejecting the argument that up-to-date information was inadmissible here. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court began by addressing the delay of over 16 years in applying for leave to appeal, finding no good reason for the delay and rejecting the Applicant's argument that lack of legal access justified it. Despite this, the court proceeded to consider the merits.
Regarding the legal test applied by the sentencing judge, the court found that the judge correctly applied the test for exceptional circumstances as formulated in Kelly (No 2), which requires evaluation of whether the offender poses a significant risk to the public. The court rejected the argument that the judge misstated the test or failed to apply the mechanism from Offen. The court emphasized substance over form, noting the judge’s clear understanding that the issue was whether protection of the public against significant risk was necessary.
The court examined the judge’s analysis of exceptional circumstances, noting two key strands: the long interval between offences and the Applicant’s intervening offending history. While acknowledging the long gap, the court agreed with the judge that the Applicant’s numerous violent offences during the interim negated any exceptional circumstances. The court also accepted the judge’s evaluation of the psychiatric report, which, despite a contradictory remark, supported the view that the Applicant posed a significant risk due to his propensity to overreact violently to perceived threats.
The court found the judge’s evaluation to be a reasonable judicial assessment that took into account relevant evidence and was not plainly wrong. The court further considered the updated Parole Board and Probation reports, which confirmed the Applicant’s ongoing risk to the public, reinforcing the judge’s original conclusion.
Finally, the court briefly addressed the Applicant’s detailed submissions on the 2004 material, concluding that these did not suffice to displace the statutory presumption or undermine the judge’s evaluation. The court rejected all grounds of appeal and refused the applications.
Holding and Implications
The court REFUSED the applications for an extension of time and leave to appeal against sentence.
The direct effect is that the Applicant’s sentence stands as imposed, with no exceptional circumstances found to avoid the mandatory life sentence. The decision confirms the application of the statutory framework governing automatic life sentences for second serious offences and affirms the judicial approach to assessing risk and exceptional circumstances. No new precedent was established, and the ruling reinforces existing principles regarding the evaluation of risk and the importance of up-to-date information in long-delayed appeals.
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